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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF ANT COMMUN SM
IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1930-1960
1

1

MAY 1996

JUDITH LARRABEE HOLMES
A.B., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

J.D., COLUMBUS SCHOOL OF LAW, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Milton Cantor
This dissertation tells the story of how anticommunism

operated on the state and local level
the depression through the 1950s.

in

Massachusetts from

Using analytic tools from

both political history and social history, it asks: what

initiatives were driven by anticommunism, who were the
people behind these initiatives, why did they want to

suppress political dissent, and where did their ideas

originate
The findings show that anticommunism on the state and
local level was far more complex than has been appreciated.
In Massachusetts,

political ideas travel through

a

prism of

class and ethnicity before taking shape as political
actions.

Neither the pluralist analysis of McCarthyism as

a

mass based movement from below, nor the revisionist analysis
of McCarthyism as an elite rivalry over political power

adeguately explain what happened in Massachusetts.

vii

A more accurate picture reveals pockets of

anticommunist activity throughout the state.

These pockets

were peopled with conservative Yankees, professional

anticommunists, Catholic legislators and opportunist labor
leaders.

different.

However, the ideas driving each group were quite

What this study shows is the usefulness of

ant i communism in helping Americans find common political

ground across class and ethnic differences.

For most people

it was a lot easier to agree on what was un-American than it

was to agree on what was American.

Massachusetts anticommunists maintained an unbroken
thread of activity throughout the period of this study, 1930
to 1960.

Evidence of anticommunism and antiradicalism

during the Second World War

— expressed

as opposition to

conscientious objectors and support for the Christian
Front

— links

the "little Red Scare" of the depression to

postwar McCarthyism.
The same groups of people supported anticommunist

initiatives during the cold war as had during the depression
and war years.

The Catholic Church continued to be the

single most influential source of anticommunism.

Union

leaders used anticommunist Catholic labor doctrine to oust

rivals from power within the electrical workers union.

A

legislative commission dominated by socially conservative
Irish Democrats investigated subversion among liberal
Yankees.

Cold war anticommunism on the state level was

driven by ethnic conflict not party rivalry.
viii
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

This tells the story of how anticommunism
operated on
the state and local level in Massachusetts
from the

depression through the early cold war.

Using analytic tools

from political history and social history,
it asks: who were
the people behind anticommunist initiatives,
what was their

rationale for suppressing political dissent, and
where did
their ideas originate? The findings are both expected

and

unexpected.

In some instances,

anticommunism in

Massachusetts was similar to what other writers found
elsewhere; in many others, it was not.

Political ideas In

Massachusetts travel through a prism of class and ethnicity
before taking shape as political action."^

Since no two

states have quite the same configuration of local

characteristics, the refraction of anticommunist ideology at
the state and local level produced a far more complex

history than has been appreciated.
To date, scholarship on anticommunism focuses primarily
on the national level and on events during the early cold
war, the period usually referred to as "McCarthyism

.

"

Two

explanations for the emergence and virulence of McCarthyism
have emerged from this work.

Neither adequately explains

what happened in Massachusetts.

Historians writing in the 1950s argued that McCarthyism
is best understood as a mass based movement from below.

To

Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, and others, McCarthyism

represented American totalitarianism.

They characterized

Senator McCarthy as a demagogue tapping into the same grass
roots sentiments that had produced earlier Populist revolts

against modernization.

This interpretation is based

primarily on psychoanalytic inference, an emerging field of
study in the 1950s.

Major analytic categories are loosely

studied ethnicity and "status anxiety."^
In the late 1960s,

political scientist Michael Paul

Rogin shattered this analysis by examining voting records in
the mid-West.

He found McCarthy's electoral support came

from industrial counties that elected traditional Democratic
or Republican candidates, not from rural counties with

Populist traditions

.

Revisionist historians who followed

Rogin argue that McCarthyism was

a

product of conservative

and liberal elites contending for political power.

To them,

Senator McCarthy was another player in the partisan power
struggle between elites in Congress.^

Most work done on

McCarthyism since then accepts this revisionist framework as
a

starting point for focusing on a particular manifestation

of anticommunism on the national level.

Pluralists and revisionists both characterize

McCarthyism as an outbreak of political repression in the
early cold war years.

Revisionists recognize previous

episodes of anticommunism

— the

Red Scare after World War

I

and the "little" Red Scare during the late 1930s— but do not
try to find links between them.

Revisionists explain

.

McCarthyism as a product of contemporary events,
specifically the cold war and conservative reaction
to the
New Deal. A recent work by Michael J. Heale, a
British

historian of U.S. political history, takes a longer view.^
He argues that antiradicalism is an ideological
imperative
of American nationalism with deep roots in the political

culture, and that McCarthyism is its most recent

manifestation.

A host of factors account for the virulence

of McCarthyism,

according to Heale, including "the incessant

and complex interplay between popular opinion, private

interest groups, and public officials."

Thus, Heale

sidesteps the top down vs bottom up debate of pluralists and

revisionists
Heale

's

analysis is helpful for this study.

Anticommunism did not simply break out in Massachusetts with
the rise of Joe McCarthy; rather, it was a constant undertow
in the political culture of the state throughout the

depression, the war years, and the early cold war.

One

question this study asks is how anticommunism changed during
these three periods.

In taking the "long view," the subject

matter is expanded from "McCarthyism,

"

the term generally

used to denote the Red Scare in the early postwar period, to

"anticommunism," a term that encompasses opposition to the

activities and ideology of the Communist party as well as
more general opposition to lef t-of-center liberal and
radical ideas.

In Massachusetts,

anticommunist initiatives

were about more than eradication of the Communist party;
3

they were also about anti-intellectualism
and cultural
hegemony.
Ellen Schrecker's introductory essay to The
Age of
McCarthyism sketches a new direction in the scholarship
on

McCarthyism.^

Schrecker argues that the countersubversive

tradition, standing alone, is not enough to explain the

pervasiveness of McCarthyism.

For her, McCarthyism was also

"the mid-twentieth-century manifestation of a continuing

backlash against the modern, secular world.

""^

This echoes

the concerns of pluralist historians who identified great

anxiety in the lower middle class as a key force driving
anticommunism.

Such cultural factors account for the

leading role of conservative institutions, like the Catholic
Church, in shaping and promoting anticommunist initiatives
on the state level.

Other than the work done on voting records, neither

pluralists nor revisionists tested their interpretations
with local studies.

Until recently, the little work done on

the state level concentrated on legislative investigations
and enactment of repressive legislation

Q
.

Without benefit

of studies that examine sources of state and local

initiatives

,

historian Robert Griffith and others argue that

anticommunism on the state level was "derivative" of
national initiatives and that state legislatures "responded
almost slavishly to the force of federal law and precedent
and to the anxieties aroused by national leaders."

One

local study, designed specifically to test this theory.

concludes that "the Communist issue did not originate on
the
national level and then spread to the states and localities.

Another, however, suggests that local

anticommunism resulted from an "elite-led, federal
campaign.

"^-^

The evidence from Massachusetts refutes the copycat

thesis.

On the state level, anticommunist initiatives were

driven by local factors, such as ethnicity and class, as
much as by national and international events.

These local

factors gave anticommunism in Massachusetts a particular
character,

just as local factors in other states gave

anticommunism a particular character there.

To explain

anticommunism on the state and local level as being merely
derivative of federal initiatives fails to capture the
complexity and variation of anticommunist political culture.
Two examples from Massachusetts illustrate the falsity
of Griffith *s sweeping generalization.

The conventional

wisdom of revisionist historians is that anticommunism was,
in part, a conservative backlash against New Deal policies.
It was a way for Republicans to attack Democrats without

having to attack New Deal programs that proved popular with
voters.

In Massachusetts,

however, it was traditional

Democrats, like James Michael Curley, who championed

anticommunist initiatives.

At the same time, these urban

Democrats embraced New Deal programs and the growing power
of the federal state.

Chapters three and six explain why.

5

In 1950, Massachusetts workers in locals of a

Communist-led union, United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America (UE), had to decide whether to stay with
their union when it was expelled from the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) for failing to purge

communists from its leadership, or to secede and join the
staunchly anticommunist rival union, the International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (lUE).

clear choice.
time high.

In 1949,

It was a

federal anticommunism was at an all-

President Truman's Loyalty Security Program had

been in effect for three years, the denunciations of the

House Committee on Un-American Activities garnered front
page headlines, the leadership of the Communist party was on
trial in Manhattan federal court, and Chinese Communists

defeated the United States' ally, Chiang Kai-shek, amidst
accusations of communist treachery in the State Department.
Given the level of national rhetoric, one would expect

anticommunism to carry the day in local union elections with

workers bolting from the UE.

This is not what happened.

Twenty-eight Massachusetts locals remained in the ousted

Communist-led UE, while only twelve locals voted to secede
from the UE and join the anticommunist lUE.

Chapter six

explains what happened.
If conventional explanations do not describe what

actually happened in Massachusetts, then what does?

A more

accurate picture depicts pockets of anticommunist activity.
Some pockets were peopled with conservative Republicans,
6

.

reacting to and copying national anticommunist initiatives
as Robert Griffith predicts.

Some pockets were part of the

"wide-ranging anti-Communist network" of the political right

wing that Ellen Schrecker identifies

.

Indeed,

leaders of

national, conservative organizations, like Sentinels of the

'

Republic and the John Birch Society, lived in Massachusetts
and were part of the Yankee elite.

However, most pockets of

anticommunist activity in Massachusetts, were peopled with
socially conservative Irish Catholic Democrats and new

v

/

/

immigrants
Revisionist historians identified the political roots
of anticommunism while ignoring its social roots.

Their

protagonists believed communism was subversive because it
aimed to overthrow the government.

These politically

conservative anticommunists saw the growing power of the
state as a dangerous prelude to communist takeover.

By

emphasizing politically conservative sources of
anticommunism, revisionists overlook socially conservative

sources of anticommunism.

Other Americans, who were not

politicians, opposed communism because they believed it was
immoral.

Led primarily by the Catholic hierarchy, they

feared communism would replace Christian values with godless

materialism.

These socially conservative anticommunists saw

the growing power of the state as

a

threat to the authority

of the church.

Both politically conservative and socially conservative

anticommunists used politics to fight communism.
7

However,

social concerns are brought to politics more easily at the
local level than at the national level.

Since the

revisionists studied anticommunism on the national level, it
is not surprising that they missed localist,

conservative sources of anticommunism.

socially

In Massachusetts,

the political culture of anticommunism was socially

constructed as much as it was politically constructed.
Because the meaning of anticommunism was malleable enough to
embrace both sources, it became enormously powerful in

helping Americans find common ground across class and ethnic
differences.

With working class, middle class and ruling

class allied to fight communism, reminders of class

antagonism were branded un-American.

When the national

internal enemy was vanquished, along with it went class

analysis leaving poor and working class people with no tools
to confront underlying inequities.

The methodology of this study is straightforward.

First

I

tried to identify as many anticommunist initiatives

as possible; then,

I

worked backwards from these events to

identify the people behind them.

As much as possible,

I

have used the words and ideas of the actors themselves to

explain their motivation.

The next chapter paints a social

portrait of Massachusetts during the period under
investigation.

The third chapter looks at anticommunist

fourth
initiatives in the context of the depression, and the

international
chapter does the same thing in the context of

conflict and the Second World War.
8

The fifth chapter

explores red-baiting in the labor movement and workers
response to anticommunist rhetoric.

The sixth chapter

analyzes anticommunist initiatives in the state legislature
and in local communities at the height of McCarthyism.

seventh chapter concludes the study by comparing the

experience of Massachusetts to that of other states.

9

The

Notes
In other states,

race and/or gender may also play
significant roles in the operation of anticommunism at the
local level.
In the South, for instance, anticommunism was
a powerful tool for segregationists to derail the Communistled interracial movement for social justice in the 1940s and
the black-led civil rights movement in the 1950s.
Race is not a determining characteristic of
anticommunism in Massachusetts because there were so few
African-Americans in the state from 1930-1960, and they were
relatively powerless politically. When African-Americans do
appear, they tend to be more tolerant of political dissent
than their counterparts in white ethnic groups. From the
research I have done, there were no major anticommunist
players or spokesmen in the African-American community.
Scholars are just beginning to investigate the impact
of gender on anticommunism.
See, e.g., Kate Weigand, "The
Red Menace, the Feminine Mystique, and the Ohio Un-American
Activities Commission: Gender and Anti-Communism in Ohio,
1951-1954," Journal of Women's History 3 (1992), No. 2, pp.
70-94.
In Massachusetts, women were visible and active on
however, uncovered any
I have not,
both sides of the issue.
gender-driven explanations of anticommunist initiatives in
the state.
^The classic work of this school is The New American
Right, a collection of essays edited by Daniel Bell and
published in 1955 by Criterion Books. This book was
republished with additional essays in 1962 as The Radical
Contributors to the original edition included Bell,
Right.
Richard Hofstadter, Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset,
See also, Richard Hofstadter, The
and Peter Viereck.
Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New
York: Knopf, 1965); Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1962); and Peter Viereck, Shame and the
Glory of the Intellectuals: Babbitt Jr. vs the Rediscovery
of Values (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953).

^Early works of the revisionists include Michael Paul
Rogin, The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967); Robert Griffith, The Politics
of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Amherst, Mass.:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 1987); and Athan
Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the
Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971).
of
The antidote to Bell's Radical Right is a collection
essays edited by Griffith and Theoharis, The Specter:
Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of
McCarthyism (New York: Franklin Watts, 1974).

10

.

The sprawling bibliography of McCarthyisin includes
books on the entertainment industry's response to
McCarthyism, the career of Senator McCarthy, the role of
Congressional cominittees the labor movement and the
Communist Party, prosecutions of communists, the FBI's
shadowy role in fueling McCarthyism, liberal reaction to
communism, and McCarthyism in higher education.
For
comprehensive bibliographical essays, see Ellen W.
Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) and the
introduction to the second edition of Robert Griffith's, The
Politics of Fear (1987). David Caute s book. The Great
Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978) contains an exhaustive
but unannotated bibliography.
,

'

Heale, American Anticommunism, Combating the
Enemy Within, 1830-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
For a similar analysis from a different perspective,
1990).
see Michael Paul Rogin, Ronald Reagan: The Movie and Other
Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987).
^M.

J.

^Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism, A Brief
History With Documents (Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
Schrecker is presently at work on a full synthesis. This
book is a college level textbook containing a collection of
documents and an introductory essay.
In the essay,
Schrecker sets forth only the skeleton of a much fuller
argument
^Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism, p.

10.

^The earliest work on the state level is Walter
Gellhorn, ed.
The States and Subversion (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Other state and local
Cornell University Press, 1950).
studies include: James Truett Selcraig, The Red Scare in the
Midwest, 1945-1955 , A State and Local Study (Ann Arbor,
Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1982); M.J. Heale, "Red Scare
,

Politics: California's Campaign Against Un-American
Activities, 1940-1970," Journal of American Studies 20
(1986), 5-32; Don E. Carleton, Red Scare! Right-wing
Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and Their Legacy in Texas
(Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1985); Ronald W. Johnson, "The
Korean War Red Scare in Missouri," Red River Valley
Historical Review 4 (Spring 1979), 72-86; Dale Rich
Sorenson, "The Anticommunist Consensus in Indiana, 19451958," (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1980; Thomas
Michael Holmes, "The Specter of Communism in Hawaii, 194753," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1975);
Ingrid Winter Scobie, "Jack B. Tenney: Molder of AntiCommunist Legislation in California, 1940-49," (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970); Edward Robert
11

2

Long, "Loyalty Oaths in California, 1947-1952:
The
of Anti-Communism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University Politics
of
California, San Diego, 1981).

^Robert Griffith, "American Politics and the Origins of
•McCarthyism, " in Griffith and Theoharis, eds., The
Specter, pp. 14-15.
See also, Robert Justin Goldstein,
Political Repression in Modern America (Cambridge, Mass
Schenkman Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 348-349, and Ellen"
Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism, pp. 41 and 71.
Schrecker
argues that anticommunism may have been even more extreme on
the state and local level because close collaboration among
people connected with the "anti-Communist network" provided
expertise and information for anticommunists working on the
state and local level.
'

•

^°Selcraig, Red Scare in the Midwest, p.

150.

^^Gary Paul Henrickson, "Minnesota in the 'McCarthy'
Period: 1946-1954" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Minnesota, 1982
)

1

.

Schrecker, Age of McCarthyism, pp. 9-15, passim.
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CHAPTER

2

A COMMONWEALTH OF IMMIGRANTS

Massachusetts is home to many symbols that define core
values of America's political culture.

The Mayflower

Compact, Boston Tea party, Battle of Bunker Hill, minutemen

and town meetings are part of every schoolchild
of American history.

'

s

catechism

These symbols of freedom and

representative government were familiar anchors for the

commonwealth as it grew and changed dramatically in the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Massachusetts

residents continue to celebrate Patriot's Day with a

reenactment of the day the shot heard round the world was
fired on the Lexington town common.

Bostonians take a

holiday in March to commemorate the day hated British troops

withdrew from the city in 1776.

By the twentieth century,

however, there were far more immigrants than Yankees

celebrating these patriotic high holy days.

In 1930, when

this study begins, two out of three Massachusetts residents

were either immigrants or children of immigrants.
Massachusetts, the proud symbol of America's Yankee
heritage, had become a commonwealth of immigrants.

Of

course the original patriots were immigrants too, but this
fact seemed lost on their Yankee descendants who felt

besieged by the newcomers and clung tenaciously to their
ancestry and past.
13

.

From 1930 to 1960, the period under investigation here,
the tide of new immigration slowed considerably.

At the

same time, immigrants who decided to stay struggled to be

incorporated into the social, political and economic life of
the commonwealth.

In the course of these struggles,

immigrants both altered and were altered by the rich
political culture in Massachusetts.

They recast traditional

political values and ideas to incorporate their experiences
into those of eighteenth century Yankee patriots.

There was

a great deal at stake in this period of economic and

political upheaval as both immigrants and Yankees struggled
to define what it meant to be American.

For most people, it

was a lot easier to agree on what was un-American than it

was to agree on what was American.

Since they equated

communism with un-Americanism, anticommunism became the
common ground between Yankee and immigrant political

\y

culture
As stated in chapter one,

I

have defined anticommunism

as encompassing both specific opposition to the Communist

party as well as more generalized opposition to ideas that

threatened the established order.

Before presenting the

analysis of how anticommunism operated in Massachusetts,
however, we need to know more about the respective social

position of immigrants and Yankees, the players in this
drama, and their political loyalties.
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We also need to know

more about the institutions that shaped their political
values.

These topics are the focus of this chapter.
Immigrant Majority

Four million people lived in Massachusetts in 1930; by
1960,

there were five million."^

The great period of

population growth in the commonwealth

caused by massive

,

immigration in the late nineteenth century

,

was over

.

From

1840 to 1910, the population grew by at least twenty percent

each decade

in the 1930s,

;

growth dropped to only two

percent; and in the 1940s and 1950s it climbed back to nine

Population growth was not spread evenly throughout

percent.
the state

.

Older textile centers

Lowell, Lawrence, and Holyoke

from 1930 to 1960.
19 60

,

its suburbs

dramatically

.

,

— Fal

1

River, New Bedford,

— experienced

a net

decline

While Boston grew slightly from 1930 to
such as Med ford and Newton

,

grew

As the overall population stabilized, the

ratio of recent immigrants to native born decreased

substantially.

Table 2.1 summarizes these data.

Although immigrants came to Massachusetts from the four
corners of the world, a few countries predominated.

Before

1880, most immigrants came from the British Commonwealth,

particularly Ireland and Canada, with the remainder coming
from Germany and Sweden.

In 1882,

a

new stream of

immigrants began arriving from southern and eastern Europe,

particularly Italy, Poland and Russia.^
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By 1930,

the

Table 2.1 Percent of Massachusetts population born in U.S. and born abroad, 1900-1960
1900

1930

1960

Native born, native born parents

38

33

61

Native born, at
least one foreign
born parent

32

41

27

Foreign born

30

26

11

Source:

1900,

1930,

1960 Census

country of origin of foreign stock in Massachusetts (meaning
foreign born plus native born with at least one foreign born
parent) in descending order of magnitude was: Ireland (20%),

English-speaking Canada (14%), French-speaking Canada (12%),
Italy (12%), England/Scotland/Wales (10%), Poland (7%),

Russia (5%), Scandinavia (4%), Germany (3%) and Portugal
(2%)

It is no surprise to find that the Irish were the

largest of all immigrant groups in Massachusetts in 1930.
In fact,

the percentage of Irish was even larger than the

figure above indicates because census takers did not

identify third and fourth generation immigrants.

If they

had been included in the foreign stock, the proportion of
Irish in Massachusetts in 1930 would have been 20 to 25

percent of the total population.
the percentage was even higher.

bear this out.

Of course,

in urban areas

The figures in Appendix A

Not only were the Irish the largest
16

immigrant group, they had also been in Massachusetts the
longest and were the most settled.

Table 2.2 shows the

percent of foreign stock that was second generation
(children of immigrants) for different countries of origin
and again, the Irish lead the list.

Table 2.2 Percent of Massachusetts
foreign stock that is second generation (children of immigrants by
country of origin, 1930
)

Ireland
Germany
French-speaking Canada
Poland
ALL
Italy
Engl and/ Scot land/Wales
Portugal
English-speaking Canada
Russia
Source:

72
71
66

62
62
61
60
58
55

44

1930 Census

Immigrants who arrived in Massachusetts settled in
urban areas all across the state.

In 1930,

90 percent of

the foreign stock lived in one of five metropolitan areas

defined by the federal Census Bureau: Boston, Worcester,
Springfield, Lawrence-Lowell, and Fall River-New Bedford.

These metropolitan areas included center cities as well as

smaller cities and towns surrounding them.

Boston was by

far the largest of these metropolitan areas and was home to

over half the foreign stock in the state, as shown in Table
2.3.

Immigrants did not spread evenly throughout these

metropolitan areas.

Different nationalities followed
17

Table 2.3 Percent of all Massachusetts foreign stock
living in Metropolitan Districts

Boston Metropolitan District
Boston city
Outside Boston

55
20
6b

Worcester Metropolitan District
Worcester
Outside Worcester

9
5

A

ft

Springf ield-Holyoke Metropolitan District
In central cities
Outside central cities

10
5
c

Lawrence-Lowell Metropolitan District
In central cities
Outside central cities

8

5
3

New Bedford-Fall River Metropolitan District*
In central cities
Outside central cities

8
6
2

*The Census Bureau includes Providence in this District
as well.
They are not included here.
Source 19 30 Census
:

relatives and jobs to different places in the state

.

For

instance, while French-speaking Canadians went to textile
cities, English-speaking Canadians went to commercial

centers; Portuguese went to New Bedford and Fall River;

Swedes to Worcester; Italians to Boston and Lawrence but not
Lowell; Russians to Boston.

One exception were the Irish

who, by 1930, were a presence in every urban area in the

state.

These differing patterns of settlement meant that

the ethnic makeup of urban areas varied considerably.

Appendix A presents this data for cities of 50,000 or more.
Religion is another way to look at the ethnic diversity
that defined Massachusetts from 1930 to 1960, although hard
18

.

data is very hard to find.

In 1926,

the U.S. Census Bureau

conducted its third, and last, census of religious bodies.
Unlike the population count made at the beginning of each
decade, it was a census of religious organizations rather

than a census of individuals.

Data were collected

by-

sending the pastor of every church and congregation a
schedule to complete.

Given this method of data collection,

the accuracy of the census of religious bodies is even more

dubious than the count of individuals.

Nevertheless, it is

of some value and is all that is available.

The 1926 census of religious bodies reported that there

were 2.5 million church members in Massachusetts; that
figure represents about 60 percent of the total population
at that time.*

Of the reported church members,

65 percent

belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, 26 percent to various
Protestant denominations, and
congregations.

9

percent to Jewish

Table 2.4 presents this breakdown in more

detail
Even though immigrants had numerical superiority in

Massachusetts in 1930, Yankees clung doggedly to social and
The key to maintaining this control was to

economic power.

keep the doors of key institutions firmly shut.

Through the

depression and well into the postwar era, the Yankee elite

operated within

a

very insular world.

Bound together by

lifelong ties formed at prep schools. Ivy League colleges,
and exclusive social clubs, these men controlled access to
19
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Table 2.4 Number and percent of Massachusetts church
members in denominations with 10,000 or more members,
1926

Number of
church members

Roman Catholic

i

Jewish

Protestant

,

,629,424

65 2

213,085

8 .5

657,695

26 3

total

Congregational
Episcopal
Northern Baptist
Methodist
Unitarian
Lutheran
Universalist
Greek Orthodox
National Spiritualist
Presbyterian
Negro churches
Other
Source

:

their ranks

.

Percent of all
church members
.

.

159 252
141, 952

5

residence and schooling

.

7

89,635

3 .4

84, 929

3

.

4

28,203

1

.

1

20, 887
14, 997
13 452

.8
.5
.5
.4
.4
.4

,

11,805
11, 270
10, 563
70, 750

2

Census of Religious Bodies, 1926, Table

Cultural identifiers

A

u

— ancestry,

— necessarily

.

8
2

religion,

excluded immigrants no

matter how well educated or wealthy they were.

Also

excluded were native born white Americans without the right
social credentials
One way to look at the class structure in the

commonwealth is through the 8,000 biographies collected in
Who's Who in Massachusetts
Larkin, Roosevelt

&

,

Larkin.

a book published in 1940 by

The publishers,

lacking none of

their own hubris, subtitled the book: "A Volume Containing

a

Biographical History of Every Important Living Person in The
20

Commonwealth."

It appears from the acknowledgements that

information was gathered through the alumni offices at
Harvard, MIT, Williams, Amherst, Simmons, Boston University
and Babson.

Other sources must have been polled as well

since many entries do not include

these colleges.

a

reference to one of

It seems likely that professional

organizations such as bar associations, medical
associations, and academic associations were also consulted.

Noticeably absent among the acknowledgements are any
officials from Catholic colleges and fraternal organizations
in the state.
A random sample of the biographies reveals that 75

percent of these "Important Living Persons" belonged to one
of the high status Protestant religions (Episcopalian,

Unitarian, or Congregational) while only nine percent of the

sample are Catholic and five percent are Jewish.
is politically homogeneous as well

— 80

The sample

percent are

Republicans, 10 percent are Democrats and 10 percent are

Independent
to college.

— and

well educated, for nearly 80 percent went

Of the college graduates,

40 percent went to

Harvard College or one of Harvard's graduate schools.

Occupationally

,

the sample represents wealthy men in high

status jobs: eight percent owned mills or other factories,
15 percent were

managers or technical advisors, nearly

15

percent were bankers and investment advisors, nearly 20

percent were college professors or school administrators,
21

—
nearly one-third were doctors or lawyers.

The remaining

eight percent were artists, ministers, and small

businessmen.

The Catholic and Jewish men in the sample were

in solidly middle class professional positions:

school administrators, engineers, and

a

lawyers,

dentist.^

What is remarkable about this sample is that Jews and
Catholics, who constitute 75 percent of the church members
in Massachusetts in 1926, make up only 15 percent of "Every

Important Living Person" in 1940.

On the other hand.

Episcopalians, Congregationalists and Unitarians represent
13

percent of all church members, yet they are 75 percent of

the "Important Living Persons."

While these sources may

lack statistical reliability, they point in the general

direction of

a

society that permitted some movement to its

middle ranks, but was very closed at the top.
A study that examines occupational mobility and

ethnicity in Boston confirms this description.^

Stephen

Thernstrom set out to investigate social mobility in Boston
from 1880 to 1970.

He was interested particularly in which

men changed their class
of work.

— either

up or down

— over

a

lifetime

Thernstrom defined class on the basis of

occupational category.

Overall, he found that 25-30 percent

of all semiskilled male workers and 20-25 percent of all

unskilled male workers ended their working careers in white
collar jobs.

One exception was the depression generation

men just beginning their work life when the panic hit.
22

The

unskilled and semiskilled workers among them were never able
to catch up, and did not experience the same mobility as

their fathers or sons.

While there was some prospect for upward mobility in

occupational level, inherited social advantages counted
most.

If you started at the top,

you were almost guaranteed

to stay there throughout your working life.

Approximately

95 percent of the men who started in high status white

collar jobs ended their working career at the same level.
If you started at the bottom,

you might gain respectability,

but certainly not wealth or power.

It was very hard for a

poor man's son to break into the top occupational ranks.
Only nine percent of the sons whose fathers were skilled

laborers and five percent of the sons whose fathers were

unskilled laborers made it into high status white collar
jobs.

These data confirm the findings from the Who's Who

sample: that men in high status jobs were most likely to be

well-educated, Protestant, Yankees.

Thernstrom found variations in occupational mobility
among different immigrant groups.

Irish and Italian men

were overrepresented at the level of semiskilled and

unskilled workers as late as 1960.

First generation Irish

and Italians lagged behind other immigrant groups in

occupational mobility, although the Irish did slightly
better than Italians at finding low status white collar
jobs,

probably because of their language advantage.
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Middle-

.

,

class Irish men tended to work for other people
in clerical
jobs and as salesmen.

They did not become private

entrepreneurs, a position that would have given them
more

economic and social power.

Sons of Jewish immigrants did

extraordinarily well with 75 percent ending up in solidly
middle class jobs at the end of their working career.

Thernstrom also compared job classification by
religion.

He found that while Catholic and Protestant

working class men moved up the occupational ladder at the
same rate, Catholic white collar workers skidded down to

blue collar jobs much more often than Protestant men did.
He also found that sons of middle class Protestant men were

much more likely to end their careers in high status white
collar jobs than sons of middle class Catholic men.

These

numbers corroborate the conclusions drawn from the Who's Who
sample

Thernstrom concludes Irish and Italian men were locked
out of white collar jobs by the cultural values of peasant
life they brought with them to the New World.

Thernstrom, immigrants

'

According to

"attitudes towards education

,

work

thrift and consumption" determined occupational patterns of
their sons.

This explanation ignores the impenetrability of

Yankee society.

Where you got a job depended on who you

knew; who you knew depended on where you went to school and

where you lived; where you went to school and where you
lived depended on where your father went to school and where
24

.

you grew up.

,

Massachusetts was not a meritocracy in the

thirty years from 1930 to 1960.

As more and more immigrants

flooded into the commonwealth in the late nineteenth
and

early twentieth centuries, Yankee elites kept access to
high
status jobs closed to newcomers.
The case of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti

illustrates best the deep gulf separating Yankees and
immigrants. 7

Sacco and Vanzetti were Italian immigrants

charged in 1920 with robbing the payroll of

a

South

Braintree shoe factory and killing the paymaster and guard.
Both men were anarchists; both men were armed when they were

arrested on

a

street car late at night.

From the moment of

their arrest, police treated them as dangerous radicals.
Sacco was a shoe worker and Vanzetti

a

fish peddler.

While

both defendants had solid alibis, all their corroborating

witnesses were Italian immigrants like themselves
Judge Webster Thayer, a 70 year old Yankee patrician

who presided over the six week trial held in Dedham in 1921

was widely reported to have made comments such as "I'll get
the bastards."

Compounding Thayer's bias, the prosecutors

were much better lawyers than the defense attorneys
Sacco and Vanzetti testified on their own behalf.

.

Both

Neither

man used an interpreter making them easy prey for the

prosecutor who belittled their alibis and hammered home
inconsistent statements they made to police interrogators.
They were painted as un-American foreigners who carried
25
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weapons and fled to Mexico to avoid fighting in
World War
Although Sacco tried to explain his anarchist beliefs

I,

to the

jury,

the language barrier and ineptness of his lawyers
made

him look more like a criminal than a political prisoner.
The jury convicted Sacco and Vanzetti of first degree

murder and Thayer sentenced them to death.

There was some

local publicity of the case during the trial, mostly

negative.

After Thayer pronounced the death sentence,

radicals and liberals all over the world rallied to Sacco
and Vanzetti

's

defense.

New defense lawyers began

a

lengthy

appeal process as criticism of the trial mounted nationally
and internationally.

All appeals were eventually denied.

People all over the world petitioned Republican Governor

Alvan Fuller to grant Sacco and Vanzetti executive clemency.
In 1927,

Fuller responded by appointing

committee

— consisting

a

three man advisory

of Harvard president A.

Lawrence

Lowell, MIT president Samuel Stratton, and former probate

judge Robert A. Grant

— to

review the evidence for him, and

by postponing the execution date while the Lowell committee

held hearings.

Over the course of ten days, the committee

heard from representatives of the prosecution and defense,
Judge Thayer,

jurors, and alibi witnesses.

Lowell assumed

the role of prosecutor, impeaching the recollection of a

critical alibi witness.

The Lowell Committee concluded that

Sacco and Vanzetti received a fair trial, paving the way for
the execution
26

In August 1927,

as the Lowell Conunittee held hearings

and courts heard final appeals, multitudes of Sacco and

Vanzetti supporters kept vigil.
full riot gear, guarded the city.

Boston police, dressed in

Thousands rallied daily

on Boston Common; hundreds of picketers were arrested in

front of the state house.

Celebrities like Katherine Anne

Porter and Edna St. Vincent Milay joined radicals, liberals,
workers, mothers, Beacon Hill matrons, college students,

artists and writers to demand clemency.
failed, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed.

When all appeals
Thousands of

mourners filed through a small Italian funeral home to pay
their last respects; ten thousand more followed the coffins
to Forest Hills cemetery.

The case of Sacco and Vanzetti became an epic struggle

between Yankee authority and immigrant aspirations.

To

Judge Thayer and his generation of Yankee patriarchs, Sacco
and Vanzetti were ungrateful, disloyal foreigners bent on

destroying everything they and their forefathers had
sacrificed to build.

To newer immigrants, Sacco and

Vanzetti were victims of imperious, prejudiced Yankees
incapable of understanding the plight of working men and
women.

The case stood as an allegory of the great divide

between Yankees and immigrants in Massachusetts.
Party Politics
The one public arena where the numerical superiority of

immigrants worked to their advantage was party politics.

When voters went to the ballot box, it did not matter

whether they had been
or ten weeks.

in

Massachusetts for ten generations

Of the foreign born,

the Irish were best

situated to capitalize on this fact because they had been in

Massachusetts the longest and were the largest immigrant
group.

Also, they brought with them exposure to Anglo-

American political traditions.
century,

By the late nineteenth

Irish immigrants were firmly situated in the

Democratic party in opposition to the Yankee controlled

Republican party.

Municipal ward politics became the one

stepping stone to local power and prestige for Irish
immigrants.

Hugh O'Brien, the first Irish Mayor of Boston,

was elected in 1885.

With political power came access to

patronage jobs and respectability for Irish politicians.®
The first successful Irish candidate in

a

statewide

race was David Walsh, who was elected lieutenant governor in
1912.

Walsh was the son of a skilled hornsmith who

emigrated to Massachusetts in the early 1850s.

His family

valued education highly, graduating all ton children from
high school.

Supported by two unmarried sisters, who worked

at the Bigelow Carpet factory, Walsh graduated from Holy

Cross College and Boston University Law School.

practicing law

in

After

Fitchburg for several years as a

plaintiff's attorney for injured workmen, Walsh turned to
politics as his primary vocation.

Not only was he the first

Irish Catholic to be elected lieutenant governor, he was
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also the first Democrat to hold that office since the

founding of the Republican party.

Walsh was elected

governor the next year, 1913, when the Republicans split
over the candidate from Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive
party.

In 1918,

Walsh joined Henry Cabot Lodge in

Washington, D.C. as a Bay State Senator.

His early

successes at winning statewide elections were due, in part,
to the fact that he was not a typical urban Irish

politician.

Hailing from Clinton,

a

small industrial town

about 40 miles west of Boston, Walsh worked his way up

through the local Democratic party, earning the respect and

allegiance of Yankee Democrats like Joseph Ely from
Westf ield.^

Another ambitious Irish politician at this time was
James Michael Curley of Boston.

For Bay State Yankees,

Curley was "that man" long before Franklin

elected to the Presidency.

D.

Roosevelt was

The son of a widowed scrubwoman,

Curley learned the ropes of Boston's ward politics early on,

parlaying that knowledge into

Massachusetts politician.

a

lifelong career as

a

Lacking the formal education of

Walsh, Curley was a self taught, spellbinding orator with an

Irish voice of honey.

He first won elective office as a

representative to the Massachusetts legislature in 1902.

During his fifty year political career, he served as
alderman, congressman, mayor of Boston for four terms and

governor for one term.

Curley

's
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career was also marked with

scandal, twice serving time in prison for municipal fraud.
He was known as much for his loyal followers as his powerful

enemies.

Within state politics, Curley was always at odds

with David Walsh who had much more power within the state

Democratic party.

Neither Curley nor any other Irish politician in Massachusetts could build a political machine on the scale of

Tammany Hall in New York.

Ward politics in Boston was so

"feudal" that no politician could gain hegemony over his
rivals.

Within Boston, Curley competed with other powerful

Irish politicians, such as Martin Lomasney and John "Honey
Fitz" Fitzgerald, for control of city politics.

Each

political boss controlled neighborhoods, but none was able
to dominate all rivals.

This meant that while politics

was a stepping stone for individual, ambitious Irishmen, it
held an insecure future at best.

It also meant that no

politician would be able to wield more than temporary, local
power against the entrenched Yankee elite.
The political antics at the 1932 Democratic National

Convention illustrate well the diffusion of power among
Irish politicians in Massachusetts.

The state delegation,

adopted
led by Walsh, was committed to Al Smith, the

favorite son of Bay State Democrats.

Curley,

sensing

a

shift in political fortune, was the most prominent

Massachusetts Democrat to break with Smith and endorse
Curley arrived
Franklin Roosevelt during the 1932 primary.
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at the Democratic National Convention in August without

delegate credentials.

While the official Massachusetts

delegation defiantly cast its votes for Al Smith, even after
the tide turned decisively toward Roosevelt on the fourth

ballot, Curley's unmistakable Irish brogue boomed from the

convention hall as "Don Jaime Miguel Curleo," chairman of
the Puerto Rican delegation, triumphantly voting for

Roosevelt

12

Politics was a tool of power

power

— primarily

— albeit

for Irish immigrants.

it fairly limited

Once in power, the

Irish succeeded in keeping Italians and Jews out of urban

Democratic party machines, although all ethnic groups
succeeded in electing their own to some local offices, often
on the Republican ticket.

13

From 1900 to 1930, party loyalty remained strong in

Massachusetts.

Both parties devised strategies to attract

new voters to their ranks.

The Republican party remained

solidly Yankee after the Civil War, and recruited Jewish

voters with policies that benefited businessmen and African

American voters with its legacy of abolitionism.

Republican

as
protectionist policies attracted immigrant voters, such

factories.
French Canadians, looking for work in mills and
Irish, with
The Democratic party was just as solidly urban

some rural Yankees.

The Irish controlled Boston's local

for
politics, leaving the Yankees to run candidates
Italians supported Democratic candidates
statewide offices.
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but their participation in electoral politics was very low.
The two parties competed vigorously for votes of newer immi-

grants by running candidates with immigrant names for lesser

positions on party slates and by rewarding key supporters

with patronage

jobs.''^*

The presidential election of 1928 turned Massachusetts

back into a two party state after eight decades of

Republican domination.

Al Smith's candidacy began a

transformation of the Democratic party into the dominant
political party in the state.

Although political scientists

point to this election as a critical realignment in

Massachusetts politics, it was foreshadowed by David Walsh's
1926 statewide victory and not consolidated for another

decade.

Walsh ran better than any Democratic candidate

before him, in part because the Republicans had so little to

offer immigrant voters during the 1920s.

The party's

association with Prohibition, one hundred percent
Americanism, and the Ku Klux Klan drove immigrants into

David Walsh's coalition.

Walsh carried wards of newer

immigrants that had never voted Democratic before such as

French Canadian districts in shoe and textile cities, Jewish

neighborhoods in greater Boston, and African American
quarters in Boston.

But Walsh's victory was not the turning

point in the realignment process.

Even though he squeaked

by to beat William Butler, Republicans still maintained

control of the governor's office and both houses of the

state legislature.

Walsh's 1926 victory demonstrated what

was possible, not what was.

He won because immigrant voters

and Yankee Democrats respected him and supported the issues
he represented.

Two years later, these same voters embraced Al Smith,
the son of Irish and Italian immigrants who rose through

Democratic party ranks to the governor's mansion in New
York.

The 1928 election, more than any other, reflected the

depth of class and ethnic cleavages in the commonwealth.
The two candidates

— Herbert

Hoover and Al Smith

— gave

voters

a crystal clear choice between old stock Protestant

Americanism, with its policies of economic conservatism,

Prohibition and immigration restriction

,

and new immigrant

Americanism, with its policies of religious pluralism,
Both parties knew the election

reform, and ethnic pride.

would be won or lost on immigrant votes.

An amazing 94

percent of all registered voters in Massachusetts went to
Smith narrowly carried the day

the polls in November 1928.

with 50.5 percent of the

vote."*"^

Smith's victory was just

a

step in the electoral

realignment process in Massachusetts.

It took another

decade for immigrant voters, who switched parties to vote
for Smith, to register as Democrats and vote regularly for

Democratic candidates.

Gerald Gamm's study of presidential

election voting behavior in Boston examines this twenty year
process,

from 1920 to 1940,

for different ethnic groups.
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Jews made the most dramatic shift from the ranks of the

Republican party to the Democratic party.

In the process of

becoming heavily Democratic, class distinctions among Jewish
voters disappeared.

No longer did Jewish businessmen vote

differently from Jewish workers.

Italians were not so much

realigned during this period as recharged.

Italians who

voted in the Progressive era and the 1920s supported

Democratic party candidates; however, not until the New Deal
coalition brought them concrete benefits did Italians begin
to vote in large numbers.
men,

In addition to mobilizing more

Italian women finally registered to vote in the 1930s.

Among African Americans in Boston, women abandoned the
Republican party much earlier than men, and registered to
vote in larger numbers than men.

Boston-born Black men

tended to remain loyal to the Republ ican party while newer
arrival s from the South tended to register as Democrats

Among the Yankees and Irish, there was no realignment.

Yankees remained solidly Republican although they became

politically demobilized with fewer and fewer turning out to
vote.

The Irish remained solidly Democratic.

were found among Irish women in the 1920s.

New recruits

Like Jews, Gamm

found no class cleavage in Irish voting patterns.

Middle

class Irish voters and working class Irish voters both

supported Democratic party candidates in impressively large
numbers
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Gamin's conclusion that ethnicity,

not class, defined

the New Deal coalition in Boston rests on a narrowly

conceived definition of class.

Gamm used what was available

to him, traditional material measures of income such as "the

value of owned homes, the monthly rent of rental units, the

number of families owning mechanical refrigerators, the
number of homes centrally heated, and the level of education

attained by adults," to identify lower class, middle class
and upper class voters among Jews, Italians, Blacks, Yankees
and Irish.

^®

However, class in Boston was determined by

more than mere income.

Immutable characteristics, such as

family name, and cultural identifiers, such as speech
patterns, appearance, and hobbies, were what got you into

Groton or Harvard, not the ability to pay the bills.

Graduates of Harvard, not Boston College, filled corporate

board rooms.

The "shabby gentility"

wealthy families
Irishmen.

— had

— poor

Yankees from once

more access to power than most wealthy

Yankee elites discriminated against upper income

Irish and Jewish immigrants as much as they did against

their working class relatives.

In 1930,

ethnicity and class

were the same thing in Massachusetts.
From 1930 to 1960, immigrants coalesced in the

Democratic party and went head-to-head with Yankees in the
one public arena available to them

— politics.

Throughout

the process of realignment, however, crossover voting was

common.

Votes for Franklin Roosevelt were not necessarily
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votes for local Democratic party candidates.

Ethnic rivalry

and anti-Irish sentiment among newer immigrant groups

continued to animate the Republican party throughout this
period.

Because of their greater numbers, Irish politicians

dominated Democratic party machinery in urban areas
throughout the state where immigrants lived and voted.

They

dispensed patronage jobs and municipal contracts to their
kinsmen, not other immigrant groups.

Italians, Jews and

French Canadians lacked enough votes to contest Irish
domination.

Republicans courted their votes, making sure

names of newer immigrants appeared on their ticket.

While

newer immigrant voters supported national Democratic
candidates, like Al Smith and Franklin Roosevelt, locally

they supported the party that met their needs.

Electoral power gradually shifted from center cities,

where immigrant voting was most cohesive, to emerging

middle-class suburbs, where second and third generation
immigrants were less likely to identify as ethnic Americans
or with ethnic issues.

Table 2.5 shows which party

controlled political offices in Massachusetts from 1930 to
It graphically demonstrates the high degree of

1960.

crossover voting and continuing efficacy of the Republican
party.

Several factors account for the fact that the
until
Massachusetts legislature remained solidly Republican
After 1932, factionalism crippled
the end of the 1950s.
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Table 2.5 Party control of political office in
Massachusetts, 1930-1960
Lieut
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Gov.

Gen*

Gov.

1931-32
1933-34
1935-36
1937-38
1939-40
1941-42
1943-44
1945-46
Q47_4Q
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1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60

Democ
Democ
Democ
Democ
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Democ
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Democ
Democ
Repub.
Repub.
Democ
Democ
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Repub.
Repub.
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Democ
Repub.
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Repub.
Repub.
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Repub.
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C D/Ujh

Pp riM h
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Democ
Democ
Repub.
Repub.
Democ
Democ

,

State
House

Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.

Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
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Democ
Democ
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Democ

Source: Latham, Massachusetts Politics

State
Senate

pUL)

.

Even
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Repub.
Democ

.

Democ
Democ
Repub.
Repub.
Democ
Democ
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the Democratic party on both the state and local level

When Curley endorsed Roosevelt

he split with the Walsh-Ely

wing of the party which still controlled the party's
organization.

In 1934, Curley challenged Walsh and Ely's

control by running in the primary against their candidate.

Although Curley won the primary, and the election, he was
never able to consolidate power and rebuild an efficient
state organization.

After 1934, Ely withdrew from party

politics, joining ultra conservatives to attack the New
Deal; Walsh became a national voice for isolationism, openly

challenging Roosevelt's foreign policy.

Left "rudderless,"

mired in
the party ran questionable candidates and became
scandal.

Factionalism also crippled local Democratic

party organizations.

Economic distress brought on by the

depression exacerbated interethnic hostility as different
groups competed for access to New Deal jobs and programs. ^°
Catholic Church

Along with their growing power at the ballot box,
immigrants had access to one institution beyond the reach of
When Massachusetts

Yankee control, the Catholic Church.

celebrated the church's one hundredth anniversary in 1908,
Boston Archbishop William Henry O'Connell (later to become
Cardinal) delivered a sermon extolling the amazing growth of
the church at the centennial service attended by Bay State

Yankee leaders as well as Catholic dignitaries.

O'Connell

recalled the often fractious history of descendants of

Pilgrims and Catholic immigrants and then noted all the
changes that had taken place.

He concluded:

"^^
has passed; the Catholic remains.

"The Puritan

That is exactly what

Yankee elites feared the most.
By 1930, Cardinal O'Connell was a well known figure in

Massachusetts life.

Internationally, he had close ties to

Vatican leaders; nationally, he was dean of the American
bishops; locally, he presided over
diocese."^^

a

"million member arch-

William O'Connell was born in Lowell to

Irish immigrant family.

a large

His father maintained steady work

found semi-skilled and
in the mills while his older brothers
the youngest of six
skilled work in the industrial town. As

attend high school and
sons, William had the opportunity to
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college.

After graduating from Boston College, he attended

seminary in Rome at the American College and later returned
to serve as its rector for five years.

O'Connell's close

association with the Vatican shaped his cosmopolitan tastes,
his authoritarian temperament, and his Old World view of the

Church's role in society.
was very conservative.

O'Connell's message to his flock

He opposed baseball games on Sunday,

lipstick on women, plays by George Bernard Shaw and popular

crooners on the radio.

As a militant Catholic, he believed

that the Church was the only institution capable of leading
the masses away from the immorality of modern life which he

blamed on Bolshevism, socialism, and popular culture.
After becoming archbishop of Boston in 1907, O'Connell

quickly moved to consolidate his power among priests in the
archdiocese.

He personally purchased the failing weekly

newspaper of the archdiocese, The Pilot, and became its
publisher, controlling content and editorial policy.

O'Connell used the pages of The Pilot to preach his fervent

anticommunist views directly to his flock.

In 1929,

O'Connell inaugurated the Catholic Truth Hour, a Sunday

afternoon radio series featuring lectures
advance by the Cardinal

— from

— cleared

in

prominent Catholic educators.

O'Connell promoted talks on the evils of communism through
this medium as well.

O'Connell rarely intervened directly in political
matters, preferring to cultivate an image of neutrality in
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temporal matters.

He maintained a safe distance from

controversial Irish Catholic politicians like James Michael
Curley and John

F.

Fitzgerald.

By temperament, he was more

comfortable with Yankee patrician politicians and voted
Republican.

O'Connell did not bother his good friend Gover-

nor Alvan Fuller with a clemency appeal for Italian

anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, until

directed to do so by the papal secretary of state two weeks
before the execution.

The one exception to O'Connell's

noninvolvement in politics was when he thought the state was
legislating morality; an area, he believed, that was the
sole province of the church.

In 1924,

for instance,

O'Connell campaigned aggressively against a proposed

constitutional amendment to prohibit child labor.

For him,

the amendment was immoral because it usurped family and

spiritual authority by substituting the will of "a

centralized bureaucracy more in keeping with communism than
the base-rock principles of American government."

In 1935,

when the amendment resurfaced, O'Connell's spokesman
admonished Catholics that "nothing Redder ever came out of
Red Russia.

Following O'Connell's leadership, the Catholic Church
in Massachusetts fervently opposed anything that smacked of

even liberalism.

O'Connell kept the church's own liberal

organization, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, from

gaining

a

foothold in Massachusetts.
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When O'Connell died in

he was succeeded by Richard Gushing,

1944,

a man born and

raised in a middle class Irish family in South Boston, who
was as likeable and out-going as O'Connell was solemn and
aloof.

Gushing was photographed kissing babies, throwing

footballs, and riding with nuns on the roller coaster at

Revere Beach.

He was well suited to the church's more

secular image and role in mid-twentieth century America.

Although cut from different cloth, Gardinal Gushing was just
as anticommunist as Gardinal O'Gonnell.

anticommunism was rooted

m

While O'Gonnell's

papal encyclicals, Gushing »s

V

anticommunism was rooted in the politics of the cold war.
O'Connell and Gushing

's

leadership ensured that the

immigrant majority in Massachusetts would hear plenty about
the evils of communism from their church.

What Catholics

heard from the pulpit was that there could be no compromise

with communism.

From the Pope down to the parish priest,

the church taught that communism was a rival religion that

must be destroyed before it destroyed the church

.

What this

study will show is that the Catholic Church was the most

ubiquitous source of anticommunism on the state and local
level in Massachusetts.

Conclusion
In 1930,

as this study opens,

Catholic immigrants and

their children were a clear majority of residents in Yankee

Massachusetts.

Lacking access to social or economic power,

immigrants used their voting power to transform Bay State
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politics from a one party state to a two party state.

No

longer would the Yankee controlled Republican party be

assured of dominating public policy in Massachusetts.

As

party politics became more competitive, it became clearer
that the cleavage between Republicans and Democrats was

based on ethnicity and class.

In the 1930s,

Irish Catholic

Democrats thought communism was a much greater problem than
erosion of civil liberties, while moderate Yankee Protestant

Republicans thought just the opposite.

The next chapter

focuses on the depression era conflict between immigrant

sensibilities and Brahmin prerogatives over the question of
communism.
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CHAPTER

3

REDS, PINKS AND CRACKPOT PROFESSORS
IN THE DEPRESSION

The economic downturn began in Massachusetts
right

after World War

I.

Throughout the 1920s, shoe factories and

textile mills moved South at an alarming rate, leaving
one-

industry cities like New Bedford and Lowell badly
distressed.

Manufacturing declined twice as fast in the

state as in Boston.

At first Boston fared better than the

rest of the commonwealth because it was predominantly a

commercial and financial center; however, the economic

downturn in the periphery soon affected the Hub as well.

When the stock market crashed in 1929, Massachusetts was
already struggling.
An early indication of overriding economic worries

among voters came in May 1930 when the Second Congressional
District, encompassing Springfield and surrounding

industrial and manufacturing cities in western
Massachusetts, elected a Democrat to Congress for the first
time in forty years.

The Democrat ran on a platform that

called for the federal government to step in and help with

economic hard times the region experienced.''"

By October

1930, only 60 percent of the state's work force had full-

time jobs.

Throughout 1931 and 1932, Massachusetts communities

struggled to meet basic needs of the unemployed, while the
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Hoover Administration promised recovery was just
around the
corner.
in December 1932, the American Federation of
Labor
reported that 30 percent of Boston's work force was out
of

work.

The average, however, masked the unevenness of

unemployment in Boston.

Unskilled African Americans,

Italians and Irish were much more likely to be unemployed
than Back Bay Yankees.

Although public relief skyrocketed,

75 percent of the jobless had no relief at all.^

Boston's

mayor, James Michael Curley, advocated public works to meet
the crisis, but was stymied by a hostile Republican

legislature unwilling to allocate necessary funds.

In 1933,

Curley headed a nationwide mayors' committee to petition

Hoover and Congress for

a $5

billion federal public works

program.

Federal spending programs of the New Deal did not bring
relief to Massachusetts until late in the 1930s.

In 1933,

Washington gave Boston only $1.9 million in relief funds,
the equivalent of one week's worth of public welfare

expenditures, and the Public Works Administration did not

begin any projects in Boston until 1935.

By the late 1930s,

the state finally began PWA building projects such as public

housing, the Huntington Avenue subway line, roads and

bridges.

Massachusetts received little direct relief from

the federal government because Governor Ely, a Democrat from

western Massachusetts and

a rival of

Mayor Curley, did not

lobby the Republican controlled legislature to authorize

matching funds necessary to qualify for federal relief.
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When funds came in, however, Curley ignored
federal
guidelines angering New Deal bureaucrats in Washington.*
In Boston and other urban areas,

unemployed workers

competed with each other for jobs created by New Deal
programs.

The AFL used its influence to make sure federal

projects created skilled jobs for unemployed union members
in the building trades,

its biggest constituency.

Irish project directors discriminated against Italian

workers; Italians discriminated against African-Americans.
In this context of dire economic need for many,

competition among unskilled workers for
of jobs,

a

and fierce

dwindling supply

initiatives to rid the state of reds, pinks and

crackpot professors were an easy diversion from other

seemingly insolvable problems.
Four important local factors shaped anticommunist

initiatives in Massachusetts during the depression: the
powerful conservatizing influence of the Catholic Church,

century old rivalry between Yankee elites and Irish
immigrants, militant struggles between capitalists and

workers over diminished profits, and anti-Semitism.
Patriotic societies such as the American Legion, Daughters
of the American Revolution,

and,

on the far right, the

Sentinels of the Republic stepped up local agitation as
well.

Anticommunist activity turned up in three venues:

among police and other law enforcement agencies, in local
and municipal government, and in the state legislature.

most prominent statewide initiatives were enactment of a
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The

teachers' oath law in 1935 and the convening of

a

special

commission in 1937 to investigate the activities of
subversive organizations within the commonwealth.
The Police

The first overt anticommunist initiatives during the

depression came from police and municipal authorities in
response to militant strikes and demonstrations protesting
unemployment.

While the Communist party had

a

hand in these

radical activities, its members were certainly not the sole
actors.

Nevertheless, the presence of even

a

few communists

gave police and municipal authorities a freer hand to

suppress all radical organizing in the name of combatting

subversive influences.
Industry in the state had been fleeing to the low-wage
South since the end of World War

I.

Conditions of the early

depression led thousands of working people in Massachusetts
to protest their deteriorating economic situation.

When

they did,

local authorities moved in quickly to break

strikes.

By raising the Red flag, police drove a wedge

between striking workers and their leadership, winning

community support for their actions.

In 1928,

27,000

textile workers in New Bedford went on strike under the

leadership of the left-led National Textile Workers Union.
At the time, only one-third of the striking workers were

union members.

Police arrested hundreds of workers.

Strike

leaders were forced to hold meetings outdoors because police
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closed down every suitable hall for building code
violations.
River,

When the strike spread to neighboring Fall

its chief of police arrested 200 picketers when they

tried to hold a parade and outdoor demonstration.^
In February 1931,

10,000 textile workers in Lawrence

struck to protest management

'

s

while speeding up machinery.

ten percent cut in wages
The National Textile Worker's

Union, and its fiery communist organizer Edith Berkman, led

this strike.

Local and state law enforcement agencies

quickly joined forces to stop the strike.

The Lawrence

police arrested the strike committee for conspiring to

destroy property and intimidate employees.
trial,

After their

federal prosecutors from Boston rearrested strike

leaders and detained them on immigration charges.

While

strike leaders were in jail, Lawrence police officers raided
the union's headquarters seizing all their records,

typewriters, mimeograph machines and papers.

The owner of

the building gave the union notice that their lease was

terminated, while the owner of a local hall hired for the

union's mass meetings cancelled the contract.^

These

to
actions demonstrate how police pressured private citizens

subversive
help them destroy what they considered to be a
leaders backed
It also suggests that local business
union.
the police crackdown as well.

Lawrence was
By 1937, repression of communists in

official policy.

The Lawrence City Marshal told

Massachusetts
investigators for the Civil Liberties Union of
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that city officials denied use of municipal facilities
to

speakers who were "too radical."

According to the marshal,

police prohibited leafleting for radical causes and

picketing for political purposes, and denied parade permits
to groups that advocated unpopular doctrines.

Police also

prevented labor organizers from entering the city freely.
School authorities banned "liberal" student clubs.''
In 1933,

Lowell shoe workers struck over wages, union

protection and the closed shop.

As the strike wore on,

shop

owners decided to reopen their businesses with
strikebreakers.

Local police escorted strikebreakers into

shops past angry picketers.

When physical confrontations

broke out between strikers and strikebreakers

,

local

newspapers blamed the violence solely on "Red" influence in
the union.

8

The charge was preposterous since these shoe

workers belonged to
with the AFL.

a

conservative craft union affiliated

Communism was

a red

herring that diverted

attention away from deeper economic causes of the strike
brought on by the depression
The police in Boston repeatedly tangled with

Communist-led protests on the Boston Common.

They had no

trouble enlisting support from James Michael Curley,

Boston's Irish Catholic mayor.

Curley hated communists and

wanted to keep them out of Boston.

He never hesitated to

use the powers of his office to suppress advocates of

doctrines that offended the sensibilities of his Catholic
constituency.

During his stints as mayor of Boston, Curley
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tangled with the Ku Klux Klan, Margaret Sanger and the
Cominunist party.

^

He was adamant in refusing to issue

permits for Communist-sponsored rallies on the Boston
Common.

In May 1929,

police arrested speakers representing

the Cominunist party and Socialist party at a rally on Boston

Common when they began to discuss Sacco and Vanzetti.'^^
1931,

Curley refused to issue

In

permit for a rally featuring

a

Edith Berkman, the cominunist organizer of striking textile

workers in Lawrence.

Police turned off the lights in the

middle of evening rallies if they disapproved of the content
of speeches.

Plain-clothed police officers patrolled

Boston's parks looking for communists violating park

regulations that prohibited the distribution of handbills

'^"^
.

Mayor Curley and Police Commissioner Michael Crowley
saw only communist agitators behind unemployment rallies and

other mass demonstrations during the early depression.

Their policy was to respond to these events with
show of force.

a great

In March 1930, when 4,000 people gathered in

Boston to protest unemployment, Curley ordered mounted

policemen to ring the Common.

When protestors headed up

Beacon Hill to picket the heavily guarded state house,
police charged the marchers, beating them back with
nightsticks.

Similar clashes took place at a May Day

demonstration in 1930, and in August 1930 at

a

demonstration

commemorating the third anniversary of the execution of
Sacco and Vanzetti.^^

In October 1930,

a

specially

organized "Flying Squadron" of crack shooters equipped with
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tear gas bombs joined 200 police officers to stop
unemployed

workers from marching on the national convention of the

American Federation of Labor held in Boston.
1931,

300 police officers armed with tear gas,

guns and "old hickory nightsticks"

police strike

— surrounded

— not

On May Day,

submachine

used since the 1919

5,000 people gathered to hear

speakers on the Boston Common.

Mayor Curley read Boston

well; he heard almost no opposition to his policy of massive

state repression in response to communist organizing.
In 1933,

Curley's Police Commissioner ordered officers

to bring all arrested communists to headquarters for

photographing and fingerprinting to build

a "red file."^^

This marked the beginning of Boston's Red Squad.

Commissioner Crowley had been working on this project since
1930 when he testified in Washington, D.C. before

Representative Hamilton Fish's legislative committee

investigating subversive propaganda.

Crowley was part of a

group from Massachusetts, including law enforcement

officials and a professional red hunter, who testified at
the Fish committee hearings.

The lead-off witness from

Massachusetts was Edward Hunter,

a

shadowy figure who headed

the Industrial Defense Association established in 1926 to

keep communists out of industry.

Hunter was financed by

wealthy industrialists, and once he prepared a Massachusetts
blacklist for the local D.A.R.

In the interchange between

Fish and Hunter, it is very clear that both men were

motivated by anti-Semitism in their hunt for communists.

Chairman Fish repeatedly interrupted Hunter to ask him
if

communists he was naming were

Jewish."^''

Other witnesses

from Massachusetts who testified at the Fish committee

hearings included Michael Crowley, Superintendent of Police
in Boston, along with his Chief of Detectives.

They were

both quite embarrassed when Fish asked if the Boston police
had established a Red Squad and they had to answer no.

By

1933, that machinery was in place.

Repression of strikers, union leaders and radicals was
certainly not new in Massachusetts during the depression.
The only new aspect of this form of antiradicalism was

targeting the Communist party.

In 1912 it was the IWW;

twenty years later it was the Communist party and left-led
unions.

Throughout the depression, officials in industrial

areas like Lawrence, New Bedford and Boston quietly went
about doing what they had always done

agitators out of town.

— kicking

labor

The source of these initiatives were

local manufacturers and business elite backed by local

newspaper editors and middle-class immigrant leaders.

David

Goldberg, in his work on Lawrence, describes conservative

Italians who launched an Americanism campaign in 1919 to

discredit the left-led textile union, and to distance
"loyal" Italian workers from labor leaders who "do not
18
belong to our people."

The events are catalogued here to show the continuity
of anticommunism from the 1920s through the 1930s and to

illustrate how the Communist party was blamed for sowing
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discontent among working people.

In 1930, Mayor Curley

called for "the application of the same character of courage
that made possible the firing of the shot heard around the

world at Lexington to solve the problem of Communism we face
today." 19
communism.

The problem, however, was capitalism, not
The stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing

depression called into guestion capitalism's promise of
future prosperity for anyone willing to compete.

Some

ordinary Americans, though few in number, began to consider

communism as an alternative to capitalism.

This is what

frightened so many political and community leaders in

Massachusetts
National Anticommunism
The principal anticommunist initiative in the early
1930s at the national level was Representative Hamilton

Fish's investigation of communist propaganda.

Although the

Fish committee hearings and report did not produce any

federal legislation to combat communism, the publicity

thrust Fish into the limelight as he toured the country

denouncing subversion.

This caught the attention of

political leaders in Massachusetts.

In 1931,

Mayor Curley

invited Fish, who he described as a "prominent

anticommunist," to be the principal speaker at Boston's
"patriotic exercises" on May Day.^^

Fish told the crowd

being brought
that communism was "alien" to America and was
in from the Soviet Union.

He estimated that two-thirds of
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all communists in the U.S. could not speak
English, and

warned the 5,000 spectators to be on guard against
"invidious attacks against our economic system and even
our
form of government by Communists, Socialists, pink

intellectuals, college professors and a smattering of
ministers. "^^
Not since the end of World War

I

had there been such

alarm over suspected communist subversion in education.

In

1921, Vice-President Calvin Coolidge wrote a three-part

article for a national women's magazine subtitled "Are the
'Reds'

Stalking Our College Women?"

Coolidge focused his

outcry on the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, organized
in 1905, and the radicalism it created among the women

students.

The furor died down rather quickly, perhaps

because it was "only women" who were at risk of becoming
Bolsheviks.

Higher education for women was still seen as a

novelty in the early 1920s and was not taken very seriously
by men with power.

A decade later, Hamilton Fish charged

that communists were boring from within institutions that

trained the next generation of elite men, such as Harvard
and the University of Chicago.

This charge was taken very

seriously by anticommunists in Massachusetts.
Fish's report did more than just grab headlines.

broadened the scope of the Red Menace in America.

In the

past, radicals were seen as violence prone, dangerous,

foreign labor agitators.
deportation.

The solution was arrest and

What Fish did was to Americanize the Red
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It

.

Menace.

An alert citizenry had to watch out for American

born teachers as well as immigrant labor leaders.

added

a

Fish also

strong dose of anti-Semitism to national

anticommunist rhetoric.

By targeting the New York City

public school system, he painted an alarming picture of

Bolshevik Jews tainting gullible American youth
Other national forces also focused attention on the
threat of communist subversion in schools.

In

1934,

the

Hearst newspaper chain launched a crusade against "Red"
col lege professors based on the Fish committee report

Massachusetts
articles.

,

.

In

the Boston American printed these sensational

At the same time,

national patriotic groups such

as the American Legion and Daughters of the American

Revolution increased their lobbying for anti-subversive
legislation.

These groups were more active and more united

in their national anticommunist propaganda programs in 193435 than they had been for many years.

American Legion launched

a

23

In 1934,

the

national campaign to win passage

of state legislation requiring loyalty oaths for teachers.

John Walsh, chairman of the Legion's national legislative
committee, was also vice commander of the Massachusetts

department and chairman of its legislative committee.

organized the fight for passage of
state legislature,

a

a teachers'

He

oath in the

topic discussed in more detail below

24

Associates
Professional red hunters, such as James True
up their
headquartered in Washington, D.C., also stepped
and colleges."
campaign against "Red corruption of schools
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Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee sent Harvard
President James Conant an excerpt from True

'

s

weekly

Industrial Control Reports with a note saying "it throws
helpful light upon some of the forces behind the various

states requiring teachers' oaths."

Anti-Semitism was the

dominant theme of this arch conservative publication that
railed against the "Roosevelt-Frankfurter new deal,"

Washington Post publisher Eugene Mayer, international Jewish
bankers, and Eleanor Roosevelt.

True reported that "results

now establish the fact that a campaign, started about 18

years ago, has been waged to indoctrinate with socialism and

communism the teaching of all American schools and
colleges... As a result, Harvard, once a leading university,
has graduated more communists than any college in the

world. "^^

With national organizations focused on the threat of
communist subversion in education, it is no coincidence that
nearly half the nation's state legislatures

Massachusetts

— considered

— including

teachers' oath bills in their 1934

and 1935 legislative sessions amidst these national

anticommunist campaigns.

Once the issue was brought to

the state level, however, it was debated in purely local

terms
Catholic Anticommunism
legislature,
Among Irish Democrats in the Massachusetts
oath, these
the most vocal supporters of a teachers*
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national anticonununist initiatives echoed the warnings
of

their church.

There were two threads to the anticonununist

argument articulated by the Church hierarchy and by Catholic

intellectuals in Massachusetts during the depression.

According to one thread,
existence of the Church.
domain was morality.

threatened the very

cominunisin

Within civil society, the Church's

However, since scientific materialism

had no moral component, there was no need for a God or a

church within a communist state.

Cardinal O'Connell, the

conservative Prelate of the Boston Archdiocese, defined
communism as

"new Paganism" that "insofar as it denies the

a

existence of God and proposes the abolition of all religion,
is a heresy with which no Catholic can compromise while

remaining

a

member of the Church.

communism was

a rival

"^^

From this perspective,

religion that must be destroyed before

it destroyed Christianity

.

John St

.

John

,

a

Jesuit

professor at Weston College, told listeners of the Catholic
Truth Hour that "most religions have cherished the

conviction of
exception.

.

a

world invasion; and Communism is no

.We Catholics are the main object of the attack;

it is our Faith and our Church which it is desired at all
28
costs to destroy."

Such prophecies did not seem exaggerated in the context
of Catholic persecution in Mexico by the Cardinas regime,

events that were well known to Catholics in Massachusetts.
The newspaper and voice of the Boston Archdiocese, The
Pilot, carried weekly horror stories of Mexican priests
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being arrested or murdered and Catholic schools and
churches
being closed down. Later, in 1936 and 1937, the stories
of

Catholic persecution in Spain filled the pages of The Pilot.
The other thread of the anticommunist argument

articulated by the Church hierarchy and Catholic
intellectuals was that communism threatened to destroy

democracy from within.

Father Corrigan, a Jesuit professor

at Boston College, warned the freshman class that "the

nuclei of Communism have been planted in the ranks of labor,
in the schools and colleges. "^^

In early 1935,

a

listener

of the Catholic Truth Hour asked why so many of their

programs focused on communism when there seemed to be so
little danger of it in New England.

Rev. Ahern,

a Jesuit

professor speaking for the Diocese, responded that few
people were aware of the enormous communist propaganda

machinery that "attacks the very foundation of American
Democracy."

"How," he asked,

"can any red-blooded American

remain silent, especially if he has the opportunity to
arouse his fellow citizens to a sense of an impending

danger? "^°

According to this argument, communism threatened

the existence of the Church since it was democratic

institutions and values that sustained the Church in the

United States.

Cardinal O'Connell explained to his flock

that "Communism is an enemy of the Democracy in which the

Catholic Church has lived, prospered and developed

.

"^^

When the two threads of the anticommunist argument were
intertwined. Catholics became the new American patriots,
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protecting the Republic from evil outside forces.

In

Massachusetts, descendants of Irish immigrants championed
the values of Yankee forefathers while descendants of

Revolutionary patriots peddled foreign, disloyal doctrines.
This was repeated at all levels of the Church as well as by

Catholic laymen.

Cardinal O'Connell urged Catholics to "let

your sense of fundamental justice and your sound Americanism
be an impregnable bulwark" against the spread of communist

ideas.
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P.J. Moynihan, the State Secretary of the Knights

of Columbus, warned a western Massachusetts audience that

"too many native born Americans take their privileges for

granted."

"The United States," he explained,

on Catholic principles.

"was founded

Thomas Jefferson received his

inspiration for the Declaration of Independence from
Catholic writings
Society:
love...

"'^
.

Governor Hurley told the Holy Name

"It may yet be our destiny to save the America we
[from] modern liberalism that embraces red Russia,

red Spain and red Mexico."^*

The Massachusetts delegation

to the Knights of Columbus annual convention in 1936 praised

the work of the organization in spreading "Catholicism and

Americanism" throughout the nation."'^

Another source of Catholic anticommunism during the

depression was Father Coughlin, the populist radio priest
from Detroit.

Boston was one of the strongest Coughlinite

Cardinal
cities in the United States much to the dismay of
forbade his
O'Connell considered Coughlin a demagogue and
Coughlin
priests from listening to Coughlin -s radio show.

-s

.

first sermons were broadcast from Detroit in 1926.

By the

time the stock market crashed, he already enjoyed a
national

audience.

Coughlin focused on the peril of domestic

communism as the major theme of his 1929-30 broadcast
season.

From his radio pulpit, he preached that Catholics

must choose between Christ and the "Red Fog."
1930s,

By the mid-

Coughlin was railing against bank reform and currency

reform.

His analysis of these issues was quite muddled and

quickly degenerated into overt anti-Semitism.

Coughlin's

villains were bankers and wealthy industrialists who he

portrayed as haughty, cold-blooded schemers.

This

characterization fit Irish Boston's view of their own
tormentors

— puritanical

Protestants

Coughlin visited Massachusetts several times.

During a

vacation to the Berkshires in the summer of 1935, he drove
to Boston to visit his "old friend," Governor Curley.

Word

flew threw both chambers of the legislature that Cough 1 in
He entered the floor of the House to

was in the building-

"thunderous applause

.

"

Leveret t Sal tonstal

1

,

an inf luential

Yankee politician and Speaker of the House, introduced
Coughlin.

Allowing as how he did not agree with all of

Coughlin's views, he nevertheless greeted Coughlin warmly
saying that "the House is greatly honored in having you

address them."

Coughlin talked very briefly about "dangers

threatening the world today, Nazism, Communism and that
other form of dictatorship which is now insinuating itself
into State and Federal government "--the last being New Deal
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"pinks" in government.

He urged the legislature "to do your

utmost to keep intact the democratic form of government and
to see that nothing subversive undermines it."

With that he

left the chamber to a standing ovation and went to the

Senate which gave him a similar reception.

During this trip

to Massachusetts, Coughlin reported that Boston had the

second highest per capita membership in his organization,
the National Union for Social Justice.
In 1936,

"^"^

Father Coughlin joined forces with Dr.

Townsend of California and formed the Union Party which ran
a

slate of candidates in national and state elections.

The

vice-presidential nominee on the Union Party ticket was
Thomas
Boston.

C.

O'Brien, a middle class Irish Catholic lawyer from
Some Massachusetts politicians running for re-

election to the House of Representatives in 1936 abandoned
Roosevelt and the Democratic party at the top of the ticket
in order to win Father Coughlin 's endorsement.
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Although

Roosevelt swept the state in 1936, the Union Party

presidential candidate did better than any other third party
candidate since the Civil War.

Curley blamed his defeat to

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in the senatorial race on the

presence of

a

Union Party candidate on the ballot.
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Whatever else it may have been, Catholic anticommunism
was never monolithic.

The hierarchy of the Church and

supporters of Father Coughlin had very different agendas

when attacking communism.

Coughlin based his appeal based

receptive
primarily on class, and workers were particularly
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to his message.

Among Church officials, by contrast, there

was great disagreement over what was communistic.

Cardinal

O'Connell never supported programs initiated by the moderate

wing of the church, led by Monsignor Ryan in Washington,
D.C.

For O'Connell, even these programs were too radical.

When we listen to Catholic laymen articulate their reasons
for combatting communism, what comes across is fear for the

survival of their church, the most important institution in

their daily lives.
Teachers' Oath

For several reasons, then. Catholic legislators took
up the banner of anticommunism by advocating passage of a

teachers' oath law in 1935.

The bill required all teachers

in public and private schools and universities to take the

following oath:
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and that I will faithfully
discharge the duties of the position of
according to the best of my
I

abilities
Technically, this is not a "loyalty" oath because the

affiant does not swear loyalty to the government.

proponents of the bill clearly saw it as

a

as a means to root out subversive teachers.

debated the bill as if it were

a

However,

loyalty oath and
The legislature

loyalty oath.

What made

private
the bill so extreme was that it covered teachers in
schools, colleges and universities as well as public
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institutions.

Other states had not gone this far, prompting

the American Civil Liberties Union to denounce the

Massachusetts law as "more sweeping than any law yet passed
in 18 states with such legislation
In early June,

1935, when the teachers'

oath bill

reached the floor of the House, Tommy Dorgan, an Irish

Democrat from Dorchester, called on every "loyal American"
to support the bill.

now," he urged,

"The time to stop Soviet propaganda is

"not when the horse gets out of the stable.

Keep America for Americans."

Representative Casey,

a

As he was speaking.

fellow Irish Democrat from Boston,

scuffled with guards at the door as he tried to enter the
chamber carrying a large American flag to present to Dorgan.
Liberal Yankee Republicans opposed the teachers' oath.

During debate, Christian Herter, the representative for
Yankee wards in Boston's Back Bay, spoke against the bill,

calling it "class legislation."

Republican Walton Tuttle

from suburban Framingham told his colleagues that "Public

Enemy Number One is ignorance parading in the guise of

legislation such as this."*^

Opponents of the teachers' oath were caught by surprise

when the bill was introduced in the legislature at the
request of the American Legion.

Senator Henry Parkman, Jr.,

the blue-blooded Republican chairman of the Education

Committee, warned Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee in
February,

1935 that "in the present temper of the

Legislature it is likely to be passed."*^

The American

Legion came to the hearing on the bill well prepared, and

presented a strong case.

This prompted fifteen college

presidents to petition the Education Committee for an

opportunity to respond.

President Daniel Marsh of Boston

University acted as spokesman for the college presidents at
the rehearing.

Opponents of the bill were guick to display

their anticommunist credentials.

They argued that while

they opposed communism, the bill was unacceptable because it

singled out teachers and cast dispersion on their loyalty.

When Robert

J.

Watt,

legislative agent for the Massachusetts

Federation of Labor, testified, he told the committee that
"while those who wave the flag do the talking, the American

Federation of Labor has done more to keep down Communism in
this country than any other force.

"^"^

The American Legion and its allies set the terms of

debate which oath opponents were never able to overcome.

Legionnaires succeeded in establishing the principle that

opposition to the oath was an act of disloyalty.

Different

strategies to get around this labelling were unsuccessful.

When the bill reached the Senate floor for its third and
final reading. Republican Senator Henry Parkman, Jr.

demanded a roll call, urging his colleagues to "recover your
sanity.

We are going back to the Dark Ages in this sort of

legislation trying by this method to inspire loyalty."

Democratic Senator Charles Miles, chairman of the Education
Committee, told Parkman his remarks were an insult to the
Senate.

The bill passed 27 to 3.^^
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Parkman

'

s

roll call

strategy backfired; when forced to take a public position,
few senators opposed the oath.
In the House,

oath opponents took a different tack and

tried to defeat the bill without requiring legislators to
take a public stand.
vote,

The bill was defeated on a standing

68 to 61 with many legislators not voting.

Representative Dorgan, however, demanded

a roll call.

Oath

opponents then tried to kill the bill by proposing an
amendment postponing implementation of the law for forty
years.

When Dorgan "protested violently," the roll was

called and the amendment was defeated.*^
The bill passed the House,

130 to 94,

and it was signed

into law by a jubilant Democratic Governor, James Michael
Curley.

While the teachers' oath bill was being debated in

the legislature, Curley had used all the powers of his

office to win passage of the bill.

The American Legion

praised his contribution claiming his "whole-hearted,
enthusiastic" support of the bill was "so energetic as to
46
even discourage many sources of opposition."

Curley

's

r.

One of

powerful opponents was his Commissioner of

Education, Dr. Payson Smith.

Smith had been Commissioner

since 1917 and was widely respected throughout the state by

public school teachers and principals as well as by the

notables at Harvard's School of Education.

Smith did not

support the teachers' oath bill or Curley 's efforts to beef
up the Education Department's Division of Americanization.

The Division's main work was to give advice and clerical
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assistance to immigrants filling out forms for
naturalization.

Governor Curley wanted to use the Division

to "combat the spread of communism" by questioning

applicants about their political beliefs.*^

When Smith's term expired in December, 1935, six months
after the teachers' oath was enacted, Curley retaliated

against Smith and his liberal Yankee supporters by

appointing James Reardon as Commissioner.

At the time,

Reardon was a little known school superintendent from Adams,
a small town in

western Massachusetts.

His main

qualifications seemed to be that he was Irish and that he
supported the teachers' oath.

The night before he was sworn

in as Commissioner, Reardon told the press "I am 100 percent

in favor of the Oath bill.

do not believe that Communism

I

and Socialism should be spread among our school children,
and the teachers who spread this type of propaganda should
48
be driven from our schools."

The following year,

1936,

those opposed to the

teachers' oath law formed the Massachusetts Society for

Freedom in Teaching to organize
repeal of the law.

a

stronger effort to win

Samuel Eliot Morison, a prominent Yankee

historian at Harvard, served as chairman of the committee.
The Society recruited a formidable army of educators, labor
leaders, and Protestant ministers to square off against the

American Legion.

Twelve hundred spectators crowded into

Gardner Auditorium to root for their side when the
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legislature's education committee held hearings on repeal of
the law.
The entire Yankee educational establishment in

Massachusetts that had for so many years excluded Irish
students turned out to support the repeal bill.

For these

educators, the issue was academic freedom, not communist

subversion.

President Conant of Harvard led a delegation

that included the presidents of Radcliffe, Williams,
Amherst, Smith, Mount Holyoke, Tufts, MIT, Wheaton, and

Simmons as well as the headmasters of Milton Academy,

Phillips Academy, Winsor Academy, Williston Academy, Browne
and Nichols School, and the Fenn School.

Public school teachers were represented by Hugh Nixon,

president of the Massachusetts Teachers Federation, an

organization affiliated with the National Educational
Nixon's organization represented 21,000

Association.

elementary and secondary school teachers, approximately 80
percent of all teachers in the state.

He told the committee

that "teachers resent this nation-wide drive to make them
jump through a hoop at the behest of an organized minority

who are using the whip of suspicion and

misrepresentation."*^

Other organizations of educators

opposed to the oath included the Massachusetts Elementary
Principals Association, Massachusetts Junior High School
Principals Association, Massachusetts High School Principals

Association and Massachusetts School Superintendents
Association
...

•
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The only Massachusetts educators absent from the

hearings were those affiliated with Catholic schools.
1935,

In

Boston college president Gallagher joined his

colleagues to testify against the teachers' oath.

A year

later, however, the presidents of Boston College and Holy

Cross declined to join the delegation of college presidents.
The president of Holy Cross explained that it was not "an

appropriate time to raise the issue again.

"^^

One detects

the hand of Cardinal O'Connell in this abrupt reversal of

position.

Labor presented a united front in opposition to the
teachers' oath.

The AFL, the Central Labor Union of Boston

and every other industrial center in the state, all American

Federation of Teachers locals in the state, as well as
locals of many other unions sent representatives or messages
to the hearings.

Michael Flaherty, president of the

Massachusetts Federation of Labor, an AFL affiliate, told
the committee that "such a bill is not good Americanism."^^

John Walsh, state commander of the American Legion and

Waltham school committee member, led the fight to keep the
oath.

Witnesses on this side of the issue included American

Legion officials and representatives from other patriotic
organizations.

Legionnaire Royal Hayes, formerly

a special

investigator of communism in New York's public schools,

testified as an "expert" on subversion.

Oath supporters

also called Howard A. Chase, a recent convert from the "Red

Army of Massachusetts," to testify about communist

indoctrination in Massachusetts classrooms.
of his testimony,

In the course

Chase red-baited James Sheldon, floor

manager for opponents of the oath, accusing him being
communist.

a

However, Chase discredited himself when he

admitted that he had testified the year before in favor of
the oath under an assumed name.^*

The only educator called to testify for the oath was
Dr.

Frederick Gillis, Assistant Superintendent of Schools in

Boston.

He told the committee that teachers "are not

flattered in the least by being associated with the ideas of

absolute academic freedom and intellectualism given off by
these infallible professors and college executives

.

"^^

Gillis was one of several witnesses to articulate such anti-

intellectual feelings.

Representative Dorgan told the

committee it was their job to "protect the children for
their parents against the dangerous minority of professors."
"What is an American?" he asked.

professor.

"Certainly it's not a

The man in the street is a better American than

some of the prof essors

.

"^^

Irish Democrats on the Education Committee deeply

resented being lectured to by "crackpot professors."

bristled before the luminaries from higher education.

They

Tommy

Dillon, an Irish Democrat from Cambridge, told his

colleagues in the House that the professors "treated the

members of the committee as if they were so much dirt; and
deep down in their hearts they really think we are that much
dirt."

Representative Dorgan, who liked to be called the

father of the teachers' oath, reported that educators
wanted
to change "we,

the people, to we, the professors."

Senator

Miles, a Democrat from Brockton, thought that Professor

James McLaughlin of Harvard Law School was "insulting and

ridiculing" the committee when he accused them of "danc[ing]
to the tunes of their masters, Mr. Hearst and the American

Legion.

"^"^

The House defeated the repeal bill 88 to 133, a similar

vote to the one the year before when the law was enacted.

Later that year, in November 1936, Republicans were swept
into local office throughout the state, even though Franklin

Roosevelt easily carried the state in the presidential
contest.

The following year,

1937,

a

more strongly

Republican legislature mustered enough votes to pass

a bill

repealing the teachers' oath by

a vote of

Democratic governor, Charles

Hurley, promptly vetoed the

F.

129-112.

Irish

bill finding it a barrier "against the subversive influences
of our day."

He labelled opponents of the oath as "vicious

minorities" bent on destroying "the principles upon which
this Republic was founded."

In 1938,

to pass the Senate and in 1939,

House 102-105.

a repeal bill

failed

it was voted down in the

The teachers' oath remained law in

Massachusetts until 1986.
The battle over the teachers' oath in Massachusetts

demonstrates well the difficulty of trying to deconstruct
the political culture of anticommunism because anticommunist

currents of thought were carried over the airwaves, in
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newspapers, in taverns, from pulpits, and among

acquaintances.

both sides.

One approach is to look at the players on

Among Bay State legislators. Catholics were the

most vocal proponents of the teachers' oath.

Anticommunism

hit a nerve among them, but not among Yankees, for specific

reasons.

One reason was that they felt deeply threatened by

communism.

They believed that a communist state would

destroy their church and the democratic institutions that
allowed their church to thrive just as Catholics currently
were being persecuted in Mexico and Spain.
Most Yankee Protestants had no reason to feel the same
threat.

There were exceptions, of course.

Alexander

Lincoln, a prominent Yankee lawyer who was treasurer of the

Constitutional Liberty League of Massachusetts and president
of the Sentinels of the Republic, two arch-conservative

organizations, was one such example.

58

Anticommunist

Protestant elite, such as Lincoln and Hamilton Fish were

isolationists and saw the communist movement as the primary
force behind internationalism.

Most of the Yankee elite,

however, understood that economic, social and state power

was firmly within their control and that their institutions
could "tolerate" a few extremists, especially when they were

their own kind, such as Dr. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana,
a well-known communist sympathizer at Harvard.

The only

institution Irish Catholics controlled was their church,

whose existence was threatened by communist ideology.
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Another Irish nerve that anticommunism touched was the
century long ethnic rivalry between Irish inunigrants and
Yankees.

This rivalry was fueled by class conflict as much

as by different religious practices and customs.

Although

Irish influence in Massachusetts politics was clearly

established by the 1930s, the Irish had made little headway
in business or social affairs of the state.

This was very

clear in the parallel educational systems in Massachusetts-

-private schools for the Protestant elite, parochial schools
for the Catholic middle class, and public schools for

everyone else.

The loyalty oath legislation penetrated one

exclusive Yankee domain--pr ivate educat ion--even though
individual Catholics were unable to do so.

Nowhere was this

clearer than in Cambridge, home to Harvard University, the
symbol of Yankee domination and exclusion.

Six Irish

Democrats and one Republican represented Cambridge in the
state legislature.

All of them voted in favor of the

teachers' oath while Harvard's educational elite led the

opposition
The teachers' oath debate was also colored by the

cultural gulf between Catholic authoritarianism and

Protestant individualism.
loyalty to

a

The act of declaring one's

superior was very familiar to Catholics.

As

Monsignor Peter Guilday, secretary of the American Catholic
History Association, explained to Samuel Eliot Morison: "It
Oath.
is so difficult to know what to say about the new Test

We are so used to them."

Guilday pointed to his own
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colleagues at Catholic University who took an annual
"oath
against modernity."

Catholic clerics, Guilday explained,

must take an oath of loyalty at every rung up the

ecclesiastic ladder.

Catholic laymen in Massachusetts

took every opportunity to reaffirm their loyalty to Cardinal
O'Connell.

At the Massachusetts Knights of Columbus annual

meeting in 1930, the membership adopted a resolution
extending their "deep sense of fealty and gratitude and
constant loyalty to His Eminence, Cardinal 0 Connell

.

"^°

'

When John Swift, a state Supreme Court judge and president
of the Massachusetts State Council of the Knights of

Columbus wrote to Cardinal O'Connell, he signed his letters
"With renewed assurance. Your Eminence, of our constant
loyalty. "^^

Cardinal O'Connell's message to the annual

Knights of Columbus Patriots' Day Banguet is 1931 concluded
that "obedience to the State is loyalty to God, and

patriotism is blessed by religion.

"^^

Such professions of

loyalty were unheard of among elite Protestant religions and

were totally incompatible with Yankee individualism.

Thus,

what was natural to Catholics, was anathema to Episcopalians
and Unitarians.
It is wrong to conclude,

however, that Irish Catholic

Democrats were the only politicians who supported the oath.
There were blue-blooded Republicans, like Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr.,

and Yankee Democrats, like former Governor Joseph Ely,

who supported the oath as well.

Jewish legislators, both

Democrats and Republicans, supported the oath.^"^

In

general, Democrats supported the oath and Republicans

opposed it although there were many defections on each side.
The Democrats were consistent, at least, with approximately
80 percent favoring the oath and 20 percent opposing the

oath each time it came to a roll call vote.

Among Catholic

Democrats (Irish, Italian, French Canadian and Portuguese),
91 percent supported the teachers'

oath.^*

Republicans were the ones who hesitated on the
teachers' oath.

In 1935, when the oath was first

introduced, 37 percent of the Republican legislators were in

favor and 63 percent opposed; in 1937, only 23 percent of
the Republicans favored the oath while 77 percent opposed
it;

in 1939,

were opposed.

30 percent favored the oath, while 70 percent

Republicans who favored the oath came from

the two extreme wings of the party

— arch

conservative

Yankees and "liberal" Catholic Republicans sympathetic to

working class issues.

One way to illustrate this voting

pattern is to compare the CIO and AFL ratings of legislators
supporting and opposing the oath.

These ratings were based

on the number of times legislators voted for a position

endorsed by the AFL or the CIO.

A rating of 100 means the

legislator voted in favor of every bill endorsed by the AFL
or the CIO; a rating of zero means that the legislator

opposed every bill endorsed by the AFL or the CIO.

In 1940,

the
Republicans as a whole received a 34 percent rating from

Democrats as
CIO and a 33 percent rating from the AFL, while
a

and 73
whole received a 70 percent rating from the CIO
77

percent rating from the AFL.

The arch conservative Yankees

who voted for the teachers' oath were rated well below the

Republican average:
from the AFL.

percent from the CIO and

18

1.^

percent

The "liberal" Republicans who voted for the

oath looked more like Democrats than Republicans in their

ratings from organized labor:

61

percent from the CIO and

64 percent from the AFL.^^

What these numbers illustrate is that

a

coalition of

Catholic Democrats, Republicans with working class
sympathies, and conservative Yankee Republicans supported
the teachers' oath in Massachusetts.

To these legislators

and their constituents, communism threatened their way of
life.

Catholics feared for their church; Yankees feared for

their fortunes.

Of all

the anticommunist initiatives in the

depression, the teachers' oath was the most contested.

The

battle over "crackpot professors" created strange
bedfellows, like Mayor Curley and Hamilton Fish.

because anticommunism
multidimensional.

,

This is

like its counterpart Americanism, was

Different people ascribed quite different
what all agreed on was that

meanings to the same words.

communists and the Communist party were easy targets
troubling times.

in

very

Despite all the rhetoric, however, as a

tool to combat communism in the commonwealth,

oath accomplished very little.
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the teachers'

Special Commiss ion to Investigate Communistic.
Fascist, Nazi and Other Subversive Groups. 1937
The other anticommunist initiative in the Massachusetts

legislature during the depression was the empaneling of a
special commission to investigate "Communistic, Fascist,
Nazi and Other Subversive Groups" in the commonwealth.

Representative Philip Sherman of Somerville filed the bill
creating the commission in December 1936.

Sherman was a 38

year old Jewish Republican lawyer who had represented his

suburban Boston district since 1931.

According to a

reporter covering the hearings for the New Republic, Sherman

promoted the commission to "prove that there are no Jews in
the

CP." 67

If this really was true,

how Sherman intended

to accomplish this goal is a mystery since there were a

number of Jews in the leadership of the Communist party in
New England.

The General Secretary for District One, which

included Massachusetts, was Philip Frankfeld,

a man

whose

family were Jewish immigrants and who had moved to Boston
from New York City.

Perhaps the reporter meant that Sherman

wanted to prove not all Jews were communists.

With anti-

Semitism on the rise throughout the 1920s and 1930s, middle
class Jews were very concerned about adding the stigma of

communism to the ammunition of their antagonists.

In 1924,

the Ku Klux Klan held a rally in Worcester that was attended
by 15,000 people.

The principal Klan spokesman was King

Kleagle Eugene Farnsworth of Maine whose rhetoric was anti-
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Although the record

is somewhat murky on the charge of Lincoln's anti-Semitism,

the perception that Yankee elites v;ere anti-Semitic was
not.^^
a
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It war; in this climate of anti-Semitism that

Philip Sherman proposed to investigate Reds in

Massachusetts

—
The bill establishing the special commission sailed

through the House and Senate and was signed by Governor

Hurley in May 1937.

This was the same legislative session

when the House and Senate were embroiled in combative
hearings and debate over repeal of the teachers' oath.

A

month before the special commission bill was enacted, the
repeal bill had passed the House and Senate by a very narrow
margin, only to be vetoed by Governor Hurley.

When the

special commission bill came up for a vote a month later,

only half of the representatives were present to vote as had

been present on the repeal bill vote.

Clearly, the forces

seeking repeal of the teachers' oath law
legislature and in the community

— did

— both

in the

not put the special

commission in the same category as the oath.

While the

teachers' oath was considered to be a threat to civil
liberties, the special commission was not.

The major

difference between the two bills was their target.

The

teachers' oath applied to all teachers in the state,

including influential Yankee educators.

The special

commission targeted Reds and "other subversives."

Only a

minority of people opposing the teachers' oath believed the
First Amendment applied to communists.

Everyone else

conservatives, moderates and liberals alike

— dismissed

this

argument as communist propaganda.
The chairman of the commission was Senator Sybil
Holmes, a conservative Republican lawyer from Brookline who

had been an assistant district attorney for Middlesex County
81

in the 1920s. "^^

As a newly elected Senator and the first

woman to sit in that body, she appears to be an unlikely
candidate for the position.

However, she was a relative of

Senate President Samuel Holmes Wragg, the person who

appointed the three Senators to the commission, and perhaps
he thought he could control Miss Holmes better than a more

experienced male colleague.

The appointment of a junior

Senator does indicate that it was not a highly prized
position.

Another senator was Thomas Burke, an Irish

Catholic Democrat from Boston who had been an active

proponent of the teachers' oath.

Commissioners appointed by the Republican speaker of
the house represented the spectrum of immigrant groups in
the commonwealth.

He appointed three Republicans, Philip

Sherman, the original sponsor of the Resolve establishing
the commission, Edward Sirois, a French-Canadian from

Lawrence and Anthony Julian, an Italian from Watertown, and
two Democrats, Michael O'Brien, an Irishman from Easthampton
and Jackson Holtz, a Jew from Boston."'^

Governor Hurley

made three appointments including James Rose, former

commander of the Massachusetts Department of the American
Legion, and Leo Halloran, an Irishman from Quincy and also a

former commander of the Massachusetts Department of the

American Legion.

The secretary to the commission was Roland

Parker, nephew of Herbert Parker, the patriarchal, arch

conservative Yankee lawyer who at the age of 87 was still
active in the Sentinels of the Republic.
82

All in all, this

.

was a very conservative commission whose members had several
axes to grind.
In the beginning,

the left in Massachusetts cooperated

with the commission, on the theory that it would investigate
the right as well as the left.

Exposure of fascist

tendencies in the commonwealth fit right into popular front
strategy.

When hearings began in September 1937, two

leadoff witnesses were Philip Frankfeld, head of the

Communist party in Massachusetts, and Earl Browder, head of
the Communist party of the United States.

Both men appeared

They testified that the Communist party was

voluntarily.

not a subversive organization and outlined a fairly tame

version of party history.

Following popular front strategy,

Browder told the commission the party's program was
"educational, to win the majority to our concepts of
socialism.

We do not believe in the use of force against

the will of the majority."*^*

The commissioners had a quite

different agenda for these hearings.

Chairman Sybil Holmes

demanded lists of all Party members and contributors.
Senator Burke wanted to know if Frankfeld believed in God.
the
James Rose asked Frankfeld if he would bear arms for

United States against the Soviet Union.

After these initial

liberal
combative sessions, the Communist party and its

investigation and
allies began criticizing the scope of the
of fascism in
called for a more extensive investigation

Massachusetts
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The commission held hearings throughout the fall 1937.
It met 59 times in public hearings and 40 times in closed,

executive session, hearing 70 witnesses and collecting over
1,000 exhibits.

report

In May 1938,

it issued a 580 page final

Only 29 pages dealt with fascism and Nazism; the

other 551 dealt with the Communist party.

The report

reveals that the commission had access to undercover

information about the internal workings of the party.

It

details meetings, resolutions, and internal instructions
from the Central Committee of the CPUSA to District One; it
names hundreds of people as Communist party functionaries or

"fellow travellers" in Massachusetts; it lists aliases of
the leadership; and it exposes recruiting strategies and
76
organizing techniques.

There were at least two sources of this information.
One was the Bureau of Intelligence of the Massachusetts

National Guard.

In June 1937,

a week after their first

executive meeting, the commissioners met for several hours

with General Cole and Colonel Dalton of the National Guard.
to
As a result of this meeting, the National Guard agreed

secret
give the commission the results of their ten-year

investigation of communists in Massachusetts.^^

The

National Guard had long been involved in anti-radical
activities.

In 1912,

it was summoned to Lawrence to patrol

during the great
the streets and protect strikebreakers

textile workers' strike.

In 1919,

the Guard was called out

patrolmen were locked out
to police Boston when the city's
84

over the issue of union recognition.
1930s,

In the 1920s and

the Guard's public role was limited to more

traditional emergencies like the 1936 flood disaster and the
1938 hurricane.
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it appears from the commission's report,

however, that during this time the Guard was very active

clandestinely.
The other source of undercover information was local

police.

The commission asked all chiefs of police in the

state to share their files on communist activity within

their jurisdiction.

Although there is no extant record of

compliance by local authorities, the findings of the report
suggest that cooperation was extensive.

For instance, the

final report contains brief sketches of 77 individuals from

the Springfield area who are "known" communists and

"supporters" of the Communist party.

One man, John Daja,

was reported to be "a paid agitator of the Communist party

during labor troubles in western Massachusetts."

Another

was Oliver Larkin, a Smith College professor included

because he belonged to the Massachusetts Committee to Aid
Spanish Democracy and the American League Against War and
Fascism.

Mrs. Frank Mauri made the list because she was

"alleged to be the distributor of Communist propaganda in
Greenfield. "®°

It is very likely that this information came

from a clandestine Red Sguad within the Springfield police.
The commission's report was criticized widely for being

one-sided even as 2,000 copies were quickly snatched up.
well as issuing a report, the commission also recommended
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As

1

passage of twelve bills to deal with the cominunist threat in
the state.

These bills ranged from election reforms to make

it impossible for the Communist party to run candidates to

establishment of

a

Division of Citizenship that would

collect ongoing information about radical activities in the
state.

This Division would have continued the investigation

made by the special commission, in essence

institutionalizing the Red hunt in Massachusetts.
these bills passed.

None of

Most died in committee or were referred

to the next session of the legislature.

Apparently the

extreme position of the special commission was not a

majority view in the Massachusetts legislature.
An indication of the commission

'

s

extremism was its

inability to get adequate funding from the executive and
legislative branches of government.

In the fall of 1937,

when several witnesses refused to turn over membership
lists, the commission sued them in civil court to force

compliance.

The lawsuit prolonged the commission's work and

When Chairman Holmes sought

legal fees drained its funds.

additional funds from Governor Hurley, he refused to
8
transfer money from any other appropriation.

Since the

legislature was not in session to authorize additional
appropriations, the commission was forced to make do with
the funds it had.

In spring 1938, when the legislature was

back in session, the House refused Chairman Holmes' request
to authorize additional funds so that the commission could

complete its investigation.
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.

Another indication of the commission's unpopularity was
the fact that none of its members was able to capitalize

politically on their role in exposing
activities.

In 1938,

"

subversive"

Chairman Holmes was defeated in her

bid for reelection to the Senate making her a one-term
senator.

Although Leo Halloran, former American Legion

official and fellow member of the special commission,

charged that she was defeated because of her "work against
83
subversives," this was not true.

defeated Edward Mullowney,
educated attorney.

a young,

In 1936, Holmes narrowly

popular, Harvard

Two years later, the slim margin of

victory went in favor of Mullowney, not Holmes.

She lost

the election in the Republican stronghold of Brookline where

A prominent political

Mullowney picked up his votes.

commentator for the local Brookline newspaper blamed her
defeat on lack of support from "important politicians" and
"influential Republicans" who backed Miss Holmes in 1936 but
failed to support her reelection in 1938.

What this

suggests is that some of her Republican constituency

switched sides and her political mentors sat out her
reelection.

It does not make sense that liberal Republicans

would abandon an anticommunist Republican for an
anticommunist Democrat solely on the issue of communism.
were more
What makes more sense is that her constituents
Harvard Law School
drawn to a bright, young male graduate of
self-taught female
than they were to a doughty, conservative

lawyer
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Of all the anticommunist initiatives during the

depression, the special commission had the potential to do
the most damage to communist organizing in the commonwealth.
Yet,

surprisingly, this initiative had the least popular

support.

The resolve establishing the commission slipped

through the legislature virtually unnoticed while attention
focused on the battle to repeal the teachers' oath law.

In

contrast to the teachers' oath, the commission had few

boosters and few opponents.

Its hearings were noisy and

well publicized but its report, detailing virtually all

communist activity in the commonwealth, went unheeded.

The

legislature as a whole seemed uninterested in the findings.
Both the Governor and the legislature refused to allocate
any additional funds to the committee.

None of the

legislation recommended by the commission ever made it out
of committee,

suggesting that the Republican leadership did

not back the commission's report.
The special commission was not a grassroots initiative
led by local citizens groups, but rather a project launched
The principal source of

by disgruntled conservatives.

information for the special commission was the Bureau of
Intelligence of the National Guard and local red squads.
Law enforcement's agenda was to publicize information about
the Communist party in Massachusetts, naming as many names
as possible.

Their targets were communists and communist

sympathizers who had broken no laws and were outside the
reach of traditional police repression.
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The legislature as

a whole,

however, did not share this agenda during the

depression nor were they being pressured by their
constituents to investigate communism in the commonwealth.
Catholic Lay Groups

Although the commission failed to get any of its
proposed legislation passed, it did generate a lot of
publicity about the potential threat of communism in the
state, and it did publish hundred of names of people it

labeled as communists and communist sympathizers.

This

exposure made it extremely difficult for popular front

activities in Massachusetts to continue in 1937 and 1938.
Catholic lay groups led the battle against communism at
the local level.

The source of these anticommunist

initiatives lay at the highest levels of the Catholic
hierarchy.

In 1934,

the Pope's Secretary of State

designated the Knights of Columbus as "the standard bearers
of Catholic action."®^

Seeking to fulfill this mandate, the

national office of the Order launched a campaign to pressure

President Roosevelt to intercede in Mexico on behalf of

persecuted Catholics.

Although the campaign was

unsuccessful, it served to heighten the issue of

anticommunism among Catholic men in the United States.

In

Atheistic
May 1937, the Pope issued an Encyclical "On
targets.
Communism" spurring the Knights on to find new

Massachusetts
That fall, the Knights of Columbus in

announced

a

campaign to combat communism uncovered during
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.

the special commission's hearings.

The thrust of the

campaign was to alert people to the fact that communists
were "boring from within."

Cardinal O'Connell gave his

blessing to the campaign and agreed to "cooperate in the
work which the Knights of Columbus are doing to combat

Atheistic Communism in this country."

Q "7

The campaign opened

with a mass meeting in Boston in November 1937 attended by
The principal speaker was Dr. George Derry,

500 knights.

Director of the Knights' Department of Social Education.
Derry warned his fellow knights not to be complacent because
"It can happen here."

The strategy of the Communist party,

he told the crowd, was to capture labor unions,

"seduce" the

CIO into a farmer-labor coalition, and play on the hard

times wrought by the depression to bring about a social
revolution.

Another speaker was Reverend Michael Ahern, a

Jesuit teacher at Weston College and director of the

Archdiocese's Sunday radio program, the Catholic Truth Hour.
Ahern reminded the Knights of the Catholic tradition of
using Church endowments from wealthy parishioners to take
care of the poor.
said,

Communist revolution comes about, he

"in direct proportion to the denial of Catholic

practices and principles

.

"^^

The message that comes across

one had to be
loud and clear is that to be a good Catholic,

anticommunist
combat
Massachusetts knights brought the campaign to

municipal
communism to the local level by pressuring
Loyalist
authorities to censor films favorable to the
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government in Spain.

The issue of the Spanish Civil War

deeply divided Catholics and Protestants in Massachusetts.^^
Cardinal O'Connell was particularly outspoken in his

denunciation of what he believed was a communist government
in Spain.

The Boston Archdiocese newspaper, The Pilot, ran

lurid stories of Catholic atrocities in Spain long after

these practices declined in the summer of 1936.^°

Supporters of the Loyalist government saw the Spanish Civil
War as an epic struggle between Democracy and Fascism.
most visible support organization in Massachusetts was

The
a

medical committee, headquartered at Harvard, that raised
funds to send an ambulance to the Loyalist government.

Once

again, the antagonists were Irish Catholics and Yankee

intellectuals.

When support committees organized film

showings sympathetic to the Loyalist cause, local Knights
finally had a concrete issue.
In February 1938,

local Catholics called on Fall River

Mayor Alexander Murray to ban

a

meeting sponsored by the

Friends of the Lincoln Brigade at which the Spanish War film
"Heart of Spain" was to be screened.

Mayor Murray banned

the meeting because the film was "communistic and not in the

best interests of the community."

told reporters:

"I

Fall River's police chief

will have my men arrest any speaker

whose remarks are subversive to the government."

Two days

after the banned film showing, Fall River authorities

allowed a pro-Franco meeting to take place that was attended
by Governor Hurley.

In April 1938,

the Mayor of Brockton

banned a showing of "Heart of Spain" in a municipal
auditorium.

When organizers found a private auditorium, the

building inspector condemned the hall because the seats were
not nailed down.^^

In May 1938,

the Norwood School

Committee revoked a permit for the Friends of Spanish

Democracy to hold a lecture in the school auditorium when
Knights and other Catholic groups protested.

Two weeks

earlier, the school committee had granted a permit for a

pro-Franco meeting.

In July 1938,

Provincetown selectmen

banned a showing of "Spain in Flames" when the local

American Legion post protested.
In the summer of 1938,

the Friends of Spanish Democracy

found obstacles at every turn when they announced a

screening of "Blockade" in Boston.

The State Deputy of the

Knights of Columbus asked the League of Catholic Women to
organize the protest in Boston.

The League, organized in

1910 by Cardinal O'Connell in response to the Protestant

clubwomen's movement that excluded Catholic women, initially
focused on educational programs for wealthy Catholic
matrons.

In the 1930s,

Cardinal O'Connell asked the League

to "speak for Catholic interests at legislative hearings on

subjects concerning the home and family life."^^

The League

became very active in legislative battles over the Child
Labor Amendment and birth control.

In 1934,

its

president, Lillian Slattery, began speaking out against
communism.

Although some fellow League members thought

Slattery 's foray into "political matters" inappropriate.

their complaint to Cardinal O'Connell fell on deaf ears.^^

Slattery lectured on communism at local women's
organizations, like the Scituate Women's Betterment Club.

From 1935 until her death in 1938, Slattery vigorously

organized countless formal and informal lectures on the
menace of communism.^''

By 1938, the League was primed to

take on the task of closing down "Blockade" in Boston.
The Catholic women first appealed to the Boston City

Council, claiming that the movie was "communistic" and that
it appealed for help for the Spanish Loyalist cause.

The

City Council agreed and voted unanimously to ask Mayor

Maurice Tobin to ban the film.

Tobin did not fall in line,

however, and insisted on seeing the film.

When Tobin

announced that he would allow it to be screened, the
Catholic women took their protest to Governor Hurley.
Senator Burke, a former member of the special commission,

endorsed the demand that the Governor revoke the license of
any theatre showing the film.^®

The Catholic women lost

their battle, however, and the film was shown.
A similar battle took place in Worcester.

Loyalist support organization announced

a

When a

screening of

"Blockade," students from Holy Cross College protested.
Initially, the mayor agreed to ban the film on the grounds

that it would incite riot.

But, when the Civil Liberties

Union interceded, the Mayor agreed to submit the film to the

Worcester Board of Motion Pictures.

The Board consisted of

62 residents from all walks of life, who watched the film

and voted 39 to 23 to permit it to be shown.

No riots

ensued.

Like the teachers' oath fight, the campaign of lay

Catholics to stop leftists from organizing support for the
Loyalist government in Spain was very noisy with impassioned

spokesmen on both sides.

The campaign drew great publicity

particularly when public officials balked at censorship.
Like the special commission, the grass roots campaign among
lay Catholics achieved limited success.

The source of this

anticommunist initiative was the Catholic Church; the

Vatican identified the issue while local groups identified
the target.

Conclusion

Returning to historiographical questions raised in
chapter one, what happened in Massachusetts during the

depression does not fit any of the competing paradigms.
However, it may be unfair to expect models developed to

explain postwar anticommunism

McCarthyism

— to

— what

most writers refer to as

explain prewar anticommunism as well.

However, if these models do not work, what does?

The

evidence of anticommunism in Massachusetts during the

depression suggests that no one source was at work.

Police

harassment, the teachers' oath, the special commission, and
lay Catholic opposition to the Loyalist cause in Spain are
all distinct anticommunist initiatives springing from

different needs and circumstances.
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The least surprising of depression era anticommunist

initiatives is harassment of radicals and communist-led
unions by local authorities.
commonwealth.

This was nothing new in the

On the other hand, the teachers' oath law was

a depression era anticommunist initiative new in the

commonwealth, if not in the country.

The Fish committee

report, the American Legion, and Hearst press created a

national stir about Red teachers in the United States that,
in Massachusetts, played right into long standing Yankee-

Irish antagonism.

Of all the anticommunist initiatives in

the depression, the teachers' oath was the most contested.

Supporters of the oath were Catholic Democrats, liberal

Republicans with working class sympathies and archconservative Republicans.

The special commission was a home

grown anticommunist initiative championed largely by the
right wing.

It was not derivative of federal initiatives to

establish the House Un-American Activities Committee because
its final report was issued before Chairman Martin Dies even

began holding hearings.

Although it named many names, it

did not create a statewide clamor to stop communist

organizing in the state.

When lay Catholics organized to

stop pro-Loyalist support groups, they were following the
lead of their church.
The old paradigms, top down or bottom up explanations,
do not help us understand depression era anticommunism in

Massachusetts because issues of ethnicity and class muddy
the waters considerably.

There was no one source driving
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ant i communist initiatives in the 1930s.

Instead, there

W(

several sources, each with different prejudices and

different goals.

Catholics feared for their church, Red

Squads wanted a docile labor force, and conservative

isolationist Yankees hated Jews and Bolsheviks.

These

forces never consciously united to fight communism in the

commonwealth but rather bumped into each other doing the
same thing at critical moments.
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CLUM), Box 1, Folder "CLUM Correspondence, 1931"; Boston
Herald, April 30, 1931.
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46.

^^American Legion, Department of Massachusetts,
Proceedings of Annual Meeting, 1935, p. 41.

^^Zechariah Chafee to James B. Conant, December 9,
Harvard
1935, Zechariah Chafee Papers, Special Collections,
Law School Library, Cambridge (hereinafter referred to as
"Chafee papers"), Box 32, Folder 19; James True Associates,
Industrial Control Reports, No. 125 (November 23, 1935), No.
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126 (November 30, 1935), Chafee papers. Box 32,
^^The chronology of consideration of teachers' oath
laws in state legislatures is as follows:

1917
1919

1921
1923

The District of Columbia passed an oath law.
Two states passed oath laws: Ohio and Rhode
Island.
Four states passed oath laws: Colorado, Nevada,
Oregon and South Dakota.
West
Two states passed oath laws: Oklahoma and
Virginia
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1925
1929
1931

1934

1935
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,

,

—

Florida passed an oath law.
Indiana passed an oath law.
Four states passed oath laws California Montana
North Dakota and Washington.
Maine considered a bil 1 but it was killed in
committee
New York passed an oath law.
Maryland passed an oath law that was vetoed by the
governor
Six states Arizona Georgia Massachusetts
Michigan, New Jersey and Vermont passed oath
laws
The District of Columbia strengthened its existing
:

,

,

,

,

law

Ten states considered but did not pass an oath bill:
the Connecticut bill never left committee; the
Delaware bill was vetoed by the governor; the
Illinois Kansas Nebraska, Pennsylvania South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin bills were
voted down in the legislature
Four states were approached by representatives of the
American Legion but no bill was introduced
Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota.
,
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—

Idaho,
By the end of 1935, only 12 state legislatures
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had never considered a teachers loyalty oath.
Linville, Oaths of Loyalty for Teachers (American
Association of University Professors, 1936)).
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He
over the Archdiocese of Boston for almost thirty years.
knew the Irish Catholic communicants in the diocese very
The son of an immigrant Lynn shoemaker, he had become
well.
sophisticated, cultured and very conservative. The
quotation is from his 1936 pastoral letter, "Thy Kingdom
Come," read at every mass in the Archdiocese and reprinted
in The Pilot, January 4, 1936.
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Americanism at
the Division did hold a public meeting on
Speakers included Governor
Gardner Auditorium in Boston.
who spoke on
Curley, John Kearney representing the AFL
Clark
"Labor's Interest in Americanism," Preston Massachusetts who
representing the Associated Industries of
and Eva
sDoke on "Industry's Interest in Americanism," and Industrial
Wh?tLg? president of the Women's Educational
Department of
League! Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
^''Boston Globe,
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14.
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In
Massachusetts, all appointments have to be approved by the
Governor's Council, an eight person body elected by the
voters.
At noon on December 18, 1935 Curley announced that
he was going to submit Smith's name for reappointment.
He
then met with Lieutenant Governor Hurley and the five
Democrats on the Council behind closed doors for more than
At the Council meeting immediately following their
an hour.
meeting, Curley first submitted Smith's name. The three
Republican members and Lieutenant Governor Hurley voted to
confirm but were outvoted 5-4. Curley then submitted
Reardon's name and the five Democrats, plus Lieutenant
Governor Hurley, voted to confirm.
Previous to the vote, Curley had engineered an
endorsement of Reardon from the Board of Directors of the
Massachusetts Teachers Federation, an affiliate of the
National Education Association representing approximately 80
percent of the public school teachers in the commonwealth.
One month before Reardon's appointment, that body had
adopted a unanimous resolution commending and supporting Dr.
After a month's worth of arm-twisting by Curley, the
Smith.
Board of Directors convened a special meeting the day before
Reardon's appointment and voted, 12-8, to recommend Reardon.
John Davoren of Milford introduced the substitute resolution
by telling the Board of Directors that Governor Curley
Davoren, who led the pro"expected" their endorsement.
Reardon forces, was president of the Massachusetts Teachers
The pro-Smith forces were led by Mrs. Grace
Civil League.
Woodward, a teacher at the Roosevelt School in Melrose and
president of the Massachusetts Teachers Federation. Boston
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December 1938.

^^Boston Globe, April

3,

1935; Boston Post, March 6,

3,

1936.
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^^Program of Patriot's Day Banquet, April 19, 1931,
Knights of Columbus Papers, AABo, Box 3-15.

have identified Jewish legislators by name, not a
One was identified in the press as
very precise measure.
In 1935, the Jewish Democrats who voted in
being Jewish.
favor of the teachers oath were Albert Rubin of Fall River
and Bernard Finkelstein of Boston and the Jewish Republicans
were Samuel Cohen and Abraham Zion of Boston and Frederick
Reinstein of Revere. One Jewish legislator. Republican
Philip Sherman of Somerville, voted against the bill.
^•^I

^*The 1935 roll call vote on the teachers' oath bill
was taken on June 12, 1935 and is recorded in the House
the
Journal at pages 1290-1296; the 1937 roll call vote on
March 18,
bill to repeal the teachers' oath was taken on
pages 596-598;
1937 and is recorded in the House Journal at
was taken on
the 1939 roll call vote on the repeal bill
Journal at
February 16, 1939 and is recorded in the House
Ethnicity was determined based on membership in
oaae 442
prepared by the
clubs and organizations listed in a document
gives
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts that
1940-41
biographical sketches of each legislator in the Profiles."
Legislators,
session. CLUM, Box 4, Folder "Mass.
^^Ibid.
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^^The political work of the Sentinels was national in
scope and focussed on reining in the gains women made
through Progressive era legislation. The Sentinels were the
leading force of a conservative backlash against women in
In a 1929 letter explaining the work and
the 1920s.
purposes of the Sentinels, the organization claimed as their
principal accomplishments defeat of the Child Labor
Amendment, repeal of the Maternity Act, and opposition to
the establishment of a federal Department of Education.
They identified themselves by the organizations they
The list represents an organizational Who's Who of
opposed.
General Federation
the first wave of feminism in the U.S.:
of Women's Clubs, National Trade Union League, National
Council of Jewish Women, Young Women's Christian
Association, National League of Women Voters, National
Consumer's League, National Women's Party, National Congress
of Parents and Teachers, National Council of Women, American

Child Health Association, National Women's Christian
Temperance Union, American Association of University Women,
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's
the
Clubs, and the Children's Bureau and Women's Bureau of
(Unsigned letter to Samuel Fisher, New
Department of Labor.
York City, February 6, 1929, Alexander Lincoln Papers,
Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Box 1,
Folder "Papers, 1929-1940.")
Leaders of the Sentinels, such as Alexander Lincoln,
the reason
may well have been anti-Semitic; but it was not
For conservative middle
why the organization was founded.
anti-Semitic in
class and elite Americans to have not been
Class was the
this time period would have been exceptional.
Alexander Lincoln told
issue that motivated the Sentinels.
holding hearings on
the Massachusetts legislative committee
"there is a large
the Child Labor Amendment in 1924 that
kept in school
class of persons who are not helped by being "are benefited
under 16
up to the age of 16." Many persons
(Lincoln
labor."
by being able to do certain kinds of
papers. Box 5, File 27.)
.
4.4
antifor
Lincoln
on
attack
1936
After Curley's
(Lincoln's
life
Semitism, Lincoln retired from public
of Franklin
retirement may also have been the result League forces in
Rooseve!t's sound defeat of the Liberty return to public
a
in 1939, Lincoln contemplated
1936!
.
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office and called on Gabriel Stern, a Boston advertising
agency executive, to rally support for him.
In March 1939,
dozens
Stern collected
of letters from leading Jewish
businessmen, lawyers and rabbis in Massachusetts supporting
Lincoln's reentry into public life.
(Lincoln papers. Box 7,
File 45)
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Brookline Chronicle, November 5, 1936. Sybil Holmes'
obituary states she was Assistant Attorney General from
1930-1934.
The contemporary sources are more likely to be
Boston Globe, July 20, 1979.
accurate.

mother of Senate President Samuel Holmes Wragg
was Mary Holmes a relative of Sybil Holmes' father, Henry
Holmes, who represented Chelsea in the legislature for many
Ibid.; Who's Who in Massachusetts, Vol. One, 1940years.
''^The

41.

ethnicity of Sherman, Holtz, and Julian, see
Sirois was an
Who's Who in Massachusetts Vol. Two, 1946.
ambitious politician, known to be the "personal
representative" of Leverett Saltonstall in Essex County.
(Letter from Kenneth Johnson to Samuel Eliot Morison, April
University,
8, 1936, Morison Papers, Archives of Harvard
Pusey Library, Cambridge.)
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Special Commission Report, p. 148-153.

^^Boston Globe, October 28,

1937.
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^^Boston Globe, November
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^^Donald F. Crosby, "Boston's Catholics and the Spanish
Civil War: 1936-1939," New England Quarterly 44 (1971): 82100

^°The Pilot, September 19,
September 5, 1939.

1936,

February 20, 1937,

^^Fall River Herald News, February 13, 1938; Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Newsletter on Civil
Liberties, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1938.

^^Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Civil
Liberties Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 4, April 1938.
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Circular from J.F. Minehan, Secretary to Cardinal
O'Connell, September 22, 1934, League of Catholic Women
papers, Archives of the Archdiocese of Boston, Box 2-12.
^^Lillian G. Slattery, President, League of Catholic
Women to Rt Rev. R.J. Haberlin, January 30, 1931, League
Catholic Women Papers, AABo, Box 2-10; Lillian G. Slattery
to Rt. Rev. Richard A. Burke, February 5, 1931, Box 2-10;
Acting Secretary to Mrs. Edward C. Donnelly, January 17,
1935, Box 2-12; Lillian G. Slattery to "Dear Friend," June
5, 1929, Box 2-10.
.
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1934,

Mrs. C.G. Flynn, President to Rev. Father Phelan,
League of Catholic Women papers, AABo, Box 2-12.
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Lucille A Harrington President to "Member of the
Board of Trustees, " undated. League of Catholic Women
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CHAPTER

4

WARTIME ANTICOMMUNISM

Ant i communist sentiment continued throughout the war

years in Massachusetts.

During the period of the Soviet-

Nazi pact, from August 1939 to June 1941, police and

municipal harassment of Communist party antiwar activities
At the same time, the legislature debated a bill

increased.

aimed at communists to keep "subversive" parties off the
ballot.

With the Soviet Union allied to Hitler,

anticommunist liberals in Massachusetts resigned from

organizations too closely connected to popular front
politics.

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the

Communist party joined the war effort at home and the

government temporarily halted anticommunist initiatives.
However, radicals who continued to oppose the war, such as

conscientious objectors, faced stiff opprobrium in their

communities

During the war, isolationist ideology emphasized

anticommunism and anti-Semitism.

Father Coughlin's

followers found support among some Irish Catholics in
Massachusetts.

In 1939,

Coughlin-backed Christian Front

activities surfaced in Boston.

As the nation plunged into

flourished
war alongside the Red Army, the Christian Front

among men left behind on Boston's home front.

^

Coughlinites

anticommunist
were not the only isolationists to continue
the America
activities during the war. National leaders of
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First movement joined local isolationists on public platforms in Boston to argue that subversives at home posed an

even greater threat to national security than the Axis

powers
By following the thread of anticommunism on the local
level, we see that the wartime alliance between the Soviet

Union and the United States did not halt anticommunist
activity.

Scholars studying anticommunism on the national

level, where the Roosevelt Administration accepted Communist

party assistance after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet
Union, missed the important link between the prewar "little

Red Scare" and postwar "McCarthyism" expressed at the local
level.

^

This chapter sheds light on that link in

Massachusetts
Nazi-Soviet Pact

When the Soviet Union announced its alliance with the
Third Reich in August 1939, the Communist party in the

United States abruptly reversed its call for war against
fascism.

In Massachusetts,

the party's "Yanks Are Not

Coming" committee organized antiwar activities as vigorously
in
as it previously organized for United States involvement

fighting fascism in Europe.

The sudden shift in position,

prompted only by foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union,
fueled the fires of anticommunism.

Detractors used the

United
shift to bolster their claim that communists in the
who
States were puppets of the Soviet Union; liberals,
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joined the party or front organizations to fight fascism,

resigned in disgust; pro-British Yankees denounced antiwar

communists as a fifth column.

Overnight, the Soviet-Nazi

pact eliminated whatever legitimacy the Communist party

gained through its popular front activities.

This opened

the door to a new wave of harassment against communist

activities in Massachusetts.
In 1939,

the Boston Red Squad surreptitiously searched

CP headquarters without a warrant.

against the police.''

No action followed

Across the river in Cambridge, police

confiscated 5,000 antiwar flyers from Young Communist League
leaf letters in Harvard Square.^

In November 1939,

the

Harvard Corporation banned Earl Browder, chairman of the
Communist party in the United States, from lecturing to the
John Reed Society of Harvard, a "non-political organization

composed of students interested in the study of scientific
socialism," because it would be "in bad taste.

The next

month, the Cambridge City Council passed a law prohibiting

quotations from Stalin, or photographs of Stalin, in any
magazine, book or paper distributed by the City.^

Presumably, this law covered public school textbooks,

although there is no evidence of its enforcement in
Cambridge
In spring 1940, Boston plainclothes officers broke up

an antiwar meeting of "The Yanks Are Not Coming" committee
to prevent the head of the Massachusetts branch of the

Veterans of Foreign Wars from speaking at the meeting.^
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May 1940, B nai Brith invited
'

J.

Edgar Hoover, director of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to address their annual

banquet.

Hoover told 2,000 B'nai Brith members and

supporters that the greatest problem facing the nation was
"fellow travellers who do the bidding of Communists."®
In spring 1941, the Worcester chief of police denied a

permit to the Communist party for an outdoor antiwar meeting
because it would be "unpatriotic."

In Boston, the

Charlestown naval ship yard dismissed two men who were
suspected of belonging to the party because they were "ill

disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States. "^°

At the same time, the FBI trained three

battalions of Boston police in espionage and sabotage.
Police commissioner Joseph Timility told a Harvard Business
School audience there was "close collaboration on matters of

national defense and fifth column activity" in the
commonwealth.

'^

Given

J.

Edgar Hoover's views on the

Communist party, that surely meant communist activity as

much as it meant fascist activity.

Evidence of this

federal-local law enforcement collaboration surfaced at the
Boston
1941 May Day rally on Boston Common when plainclothed
police, FBI agents, and Army intelligence officers openly

party
monitored 500 people gathered to hear local Communist
associate
leaders Otis Hood and Ann Burlak, and Ben Davis,

editor of the Communist party newspaper.

12

debated a bill,
In 1941, the Massachusetts legislature

candidates from
sponsored by the American Legion, to keep
110

"un-American" parties off the ballot.

While proponents of

the bill paid lip service to opposing fascists as well as

communists, the real target of the bill was the Communist
party.

Legislators knew that Communist party candidates had

never come anywhere near an electoral victory.

The purpose

of the bill was to prevent communists from having a platform

during campaigns and raising difficult questions.

Mrs.

LaRue Brown, spokeswoman for the Massachusetts League of

Women Voters, told the House Elections Committee that the
"real desire of the proponents was to ... stop the

Communists from talking.
of the House,

"party

...

"^"^

When the bill reached the floor

legislators changed the proscribed group from

engag[ing] in or promot[ing] subversive activity"

to "any party which is identified or affiliated with a

foreign government or foreign political party and which
exists mainly to act for, with, or on behalf of such foreign

government or foreign political party.

"^^

This language

made it crystal clear that the target of the bill was the

Communist party.

However, the bill's proponents did not

have enough votes for passage, and the House referred it to
the next session of the General Court by a vote of 80 to 57.
By the following year, the nation was at war with Germany,

allied with the Soviet Union.

No one reintroduced the bill

When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941,
ending the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Communist party suddenly
reversed policy, as it had in 1939, and now promoted U.S.

involvement in the European war.

The alliance of the Soviet

.

Union with England and France in the summer of 1941, and
with the United States after Pearl Harbor in December 1941,

temporarily halted government harassment of the Communist
party on the state and local level in Massachusetts.

The

popular front, hov/ever, had already lost its liberal allies
and when government-sponsored anticommunism resurfaced after
the war, there were fewer voices to protest the new

initiatives
The Communist party's second abrupt reversal on the

need to fight fascism in Europe fostered anticommunist

sentiment within liberal organizations.

In 1940,

the

American Civil Liberties Union's national governing body
passed a provision prohibiting supporters of "totalitarian

dictatorships" from serving on its board of directors or
staff.

Based on this new policy, the ACLU's national board

of directors purged Communist party member Elizabeth Gurley

Flynn from its ranks.

The Civil Liberties Union of

Massachusetts (CLUM), an affiliate of the ACLU but not

a

subsidiary chapter, disagreed with the ACLU and never
adopted an anticommunist policy.

Mary Elizabeth Sanger,

executive secretary of CLUH, told Roger Baldwin, national

director of ACLU, in no uncertain terms that:

"We do not

our
require oaths of allegiance nor -opinions tests' of

members or officers and we have loyalty and allegiance.
Committee
allow our officers and members of our Executive
such meetings as
full civil rights and freedom to sponsor

they choose.

"^^

We

.

In the short run,

CLUM's refusal to purge suspected

Communist party members from its ranks meant that
influential,

liberal supporters resigned.

Henry Hamm, for

instance, resigned as associate counsel and member of CLUM
in 1942 because executive committee members worked on the

"Free Browder convention."

organization with

a

He would not belong to an

"strong minority block" on its executive

committee that influenced policy and made CLUM

"subsidiary

a

of which the Communist party is the holding company. "^^

the long run, however, CLUM

'

s

In

refusal to toe the line meant

one clear voice would continue to be heard opposing

anticommunist initiatives afrer the war.
Conscientious Objectors
Radicals outside the Communist party who continued to
oppose the war after Pearl Harbor faced stiff censure from
their communities.

Although World War

II

produced less than

half as many conscientious objectors as World War

were treated as pariahs during the "Good War."

I,

COs

Most spent

the war in CO camps, virtual prisons where they performed

manual labor for the state.

More than 95 percent of the

men who refused to fight in World War II did so on religious
grounds.

Radicals who refused to fight belonged to the

Socialist party and were

a

hated minority within a hated

minority
Carl Walz, a graduate of Amherst College and member of

the Socialist party was one such CO.
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Walz taught German and

.

history at Turners Falls high school in a small factory
town
on the Connecticut River in western Massachusetts.

He

helped charter the Northfield branch of the American

Federation of Teachers,

a

left-leaning union alternative to

the National Educational Association.

Walz's principal and

school committee knew about his politics and told him he

could teach so long as he did not bring "socialist

propaganda" into the classroom.

From 1934 until 1942,

school authorities renewed his contract with annual $100
raises.

On weekends and when school was in recess, Walz

lived in Easthampton, closer to the radical community in

Springfield.

During the week he lodged at the Turners Falls

hotel
In October 1940,

Arthur

E.

Burke,

Superintendent of

Schools, called Walz into his office to verify a

"scandalous" rumor making the rounds of local barrooms.

According to the gossip, Walz had persuaded

a

local boy not

Walz denied advising anyone

to register for the draft.

about a matter he considered so "personal and important."

When asked his own draft status, Walz replied that he
intended to register as

a

conscientious objector.

Burke

told Walz that no true patriot could be a CO and asked him
to reconsider his position.
In May

1941,

20

the school committee held up renewal of

Walz's contract ostensibly because of declining enrollment
in the courses he taught.

Walz thought it was because of

his pacifism and sought the advice of Bernard Dirks, a
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school committeeman who had been a CO during World War

I.

Walz also contacted the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union
to line up legal support in case he was fired.

After

stalling for six weeks, the school committee finally renewed

Walz's contract for the 1941-42 academic year.^^
The following year, however, the school committee voted
not to renew Walz's contract.

By this time Walz had

officially registered as a CO.

Superintendent Burke

admitted calling his draft board in May 1942 to find out his
Walz learned about the school committee's

draft status.

action from the local newspaper.

When he confronted the

Superintendent, Burke told Walz no reason had been stated
for not renewing the contract.

Since Massachusetts tenure

law required school boards to give a reason for contract

non-renewal, Walz wrote the committee suggesting they seek
He also requested a leave of absence having

legal advice.

22
been ordered to report to a CO camp in New Hampshire.

On July

7,

1942,

the school committee held an emergency

session to consider the Walz case.

All eight members of the

committee were upper-middle-class residents.

The town's

factory workers were not represented at all.

Five of the

men ran local businesses—a drug store, a trucking company,
a furniture store,

company.

a building contractor,

and a coal

Two men were prof essionals— an architect and an

insurance salesman/newspaper reporter.
commercial farm.

One man ran a large

The two women on the school committee were

a
married to leading men in the community, one being

doctor's wife and the other a retired businessman's wife.^-^

Superintendent Burke attended all school committee meetings,

including the emergency meeting to discuss Walz.

According

to the chairman of the school board, Burke "guided and

directed" them "without attempting to usurp the legal powers
of the board itself."^*

At the emergency meeting, one school board member

suggested they simply drop German from the curriculum
thereby eliminating Walz's job without having to fire him.
Bernard Dirks, the World War

I

honest about their reasons.

When Dirks later testified in

CO,

urged board members to be

court about the meeting, he remembered saying "if the real

objection is to Walz himself, let us come out in the open as
to that reason."

One member said he did not like Walz's

pacifist beliefs; another said "a conscientious objector is
not a proper person to be in the public schools"; another

was very angry that Walz did not have to serve when his son
was in the Pacific aboard an air craft carrier.

Superintendent Burke told the committee

"I do not

want Walz

or any other conscientious objector working in my school
system. "^^

At the end of the meeting, the committee voted

to discontinue offering German classes and dismissed Walz

"with reason.

"^^

Walz sued the school board, seeking reinstatement of
his job and money damages for lost wages.

heard by Superior Court Judge Thomas
Yankee.

A Republican,

J.

Congregationalist

His case was

Hammond, an old line
,

Amherst College

and Harvard Law School graduate, veteran of World War

and

I,

former district attorney for western Massachusetts,
Hammond
was totally antagonistic to Walz's socialist beliefs.

During the hearing, he dismissed outright Walz's claim for
back wages on the grounds that Walz had been in a CO camp
and unable to work.

When Walz's lawyer explained to the

judge that conscientious objectors were allowed to leave

camp in order to perform community service. Judge Hammond
exploded.

He could not believe that the government would

allow COS to stay home and earn a living while other men had
to go overseas.

In September 1942, Hammond denied Walz's

petition in its entirety finding that the school board acted
properly when it dismissed Walz "with reason.

"^^

No higher

court ever reviewed the case.
The Walz case gives us a window on small town attitudes
in Massachusetts towards socialists who opposed military

service during World War II.

There was little sympathy for

these young men with pacifist political principles.

In

Turners Falls, school officials would not tolerate such
political deviance.
sufferance.

Walz taught at the high school at

He could engage in radical political work so

long it was far away and could not influence the town's high

school students.

When Walz's pacifist position became

publicly known in town, he was fired.
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Isolationism
Some people who believed the United States should stay

out of the war in Europe became avid McCarthyites a decade
later.

This should come as no surprise, since isolationist

ideology rested on twin pillars of anticommunism and antiSemitism.

After the war, revelations about the Holocaust

made anti-Semitism unpalatable

— at

least publicly.

Anticommunism, however, resurged with a vengeance.

By

looking at isolationists, we find another unbroken thread of

anticommunism in Massachusetts from the "little Red Scare"
to "McCarthyism. "^^

There were three sources of isolationism on the state
and local level:

the America First movement and the

Protestant far right, Catholic Church leaders and
politicians, and followers of Father Coughlin.

The

Christian Front, a direct action offshoot of Coughlin 's
Social Justice movement, flourished among some Catholics in
Boston.

The Front, which embraced the most vitriolic

expressions of anti-Semitism and anticommunism, began in
1939 and continued after Pearl Harbor, peaking in the winter
of 1943-1944.
In Massachusetts, the America First Committee and the

Protestant far right were the least important of these three
sources of isolationism.

The America First Committee

originated in the mid-West, among powerful industrialists
and Senators from Populist states.

Robert McCormick's

Chicago Tribune led the ideological battle against
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.

intervention.

Robert

E.

A group of Chicago industrialists, headed by

Wood of Sears, Roebuck and Thomas

S.

Hammond of

the Whiting Corporation, organized the committee
in 1940 to

keep the United States out of war.

They believed Germany

was going to win and that German economic hegemony in Europe

would lead to the fall of the Soviet Union.

They hoped

these events would create significant investment

opportunities for American industrialists.

The Committee

was initially well received in the business community and

among conservative newspaper publishers

.

Its leading

spokesman, Charles Lindberg, Senators Burton Wheeler from

Montana, Gerald Nye from North Dakota, and Bennett Champ

Clark from Missouri pushed the American First position to

Congress
Conservative Massachusetts Yankees, however, were not

associated with the America First Committee as they had been

during the depression with the conservative Liberty League
and the Sentinels of the Republic.

brand of conservatism.

In addition,

deep, personal ties to England.

Theirs was

a

different

the Yankee elite had

The most prominent

Massachusetts politicians associated with the America First
position were not conservative Yankees but rather Irish
Catholics

— Senator

David

I.

Walsh and Ambassador Joseph

Kennedy.

Although leadership of the America First Committee did
not include elite Yankees, other Bay Staters sympathized

with the organization's isolationist principles.

In May

3,000 people packed Boston's Symphony Hall to hear

1941,

Senator Burton address an America First rally.

The audience

booed loudly at the mention of President Roosevelt's LendLease program and cheered even louder at the mention of

Charles Lindberg."'^

A year earlier, in May 1940, the

American Mother's Neutrality League sponsored an outdoor
rally on the Boston Common.

Five thousand people came to

hear Representative Martin Dies denounce the newest "Trojan
horse"

— internationalists

leading the United Sates into war.

Boston's former district attorney, John Joseph Murphy acted
as moderator of the rally and later became a principal

organizer for the Christian Front.

Another speaker at the

rally was former Representative Tommy Dorgan, "father of the

teacher

•

s

oath. "^^

These rallies, however, did not draw on agrarian

populist support, as they did in the mid-West, but rather on

longstanding ethnic and class antagonism.

In Massachusetts,

support for isolationism was organized by the Catholic
Church, not by the America First Committee.

Political

scientist John Stack, in his study of Boston's Irish,
Italians and Jews during the war years, sees Irish and
Italian isolationism as ethnic conflict, most clearly

expressed as Anglophobia or pride for the mother country
To be sure, it was that.

Stack quotes the Italian News

denouncing justification for intervention as

a

"tide of

the
British falsehoods" brought by people "blinded by

shining glitter of British gold.""
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Irish hatred of the

32

.

British Empire goes centuries deep.

However, what Stack

misses is the political dimension of isolationism.

its

meaning was richer than just Anglophobia.
Isolationism embraced a conservative world view that
prized America and saw communists and Jews as enemies of
Americanism.

Indeed,

were synonymous.

for isolationists, communists and Jews

The problems facing the United Sates, they

argued, were not in Europe but at home.

Domestic communist

subversion threatened national security far more than
European imperialism.

Even after Pearl Harbor, with the

United States allied to the Soviet Union and Hitler's

atrocities against the Jewish people exposed, anti-Semitism
and anticommunism continued unabated among isolationists in

Massachusetts
Catholic Neutrality
The Catholic hierarchy in Massachusetts followed the
lead of Pope Pius who remained neutral throughout World War
II.

While the Pope denounced anti-Semitism, he denounced

communism even more strongly.

Redemptoris

,

His 1937 encyclical, Divini

warned that communism was the greatest menace

to the world, a position he repeated ad nauseam.

Just as

the Pope called for prayer to end the war, so did Boston's

Cardinal O'Connell.
In April 1940,

the Cardinal urged Catholic women to pay

no attention to "war propaganda" that was "exciting emotions

and delusions and fears" and "trying to make us think that
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one side or the other are fighting for sublime ideals."

The

Cardinal argued that "just because we are sorry [for people

being oppressed], we do not intend to make the same mistake
[and enter the war]."

Catholic women,

"The one thing we can do," he told

"is pray for peace.

""^'^

In June 1940,

as

Germany was closing in on Paris, O'Connell told Boston
College graduates at their commencement that "God still
rules the universe and God will protect France.
In contrast to Catholic neutrality.

"^^

Harvard graduates

and faculty in 1940 were endorsing President Conant

'

s

call

for "immediate and substantial assistance" for England and

her allies.

In a well publicized radio address,

Conant

called for a "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Allies."

Once again,

Irish Catholic leaders and Yankee

elite squared off on opposing sides of international issues.
On Mothers Day in 1941,

Senator Walsh, speaking at

a

communion breakfast in his hometown of Clinton, denounced
"moneyed interests, the college professors and the

idealists" who were leading the United States to war.

He

told the assembled Catholic mothers that if the U.S. went to
war, they could expect their fifteen, sixteen and seventeen
On the same day in Boston,

year old sons to be drafted.

Harvard Professor William Elliott addressed the annual

meeting of the Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs.
He told these Protestant mothers that America had a duty to

intervene because it was the only power left that could stop

Hitler and the rise of Fascism.
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The editors of the Boston Pilot, the influential

newspaper of the Boston Archdiocese, covered the war by
reporting on persecution of Catholics.

In March 1940, the

paper reported on "Hitler's Aims to Destroy Christianity";
in August 1940, it was "Seizure of Baltic States Heavy Blow
to Church."^®

The issue for the Church was never the

dangers of authoritarianism; it was how the Church fared
under these regimes.

"Probably the most barren spot on

earth, from a spiritual point of view is Russia.

Here war

against God never relents... Almost as bad is Germany...
Most irritating is the case of Mexico.

Here we have

religious peace endangered where an enlightened attitude by
39
our government would compel respect for all rights."

When compared to Nazis, according to the Pilot, Communists
came out worse.

Communists were sneaky and tricky like the

Japanese.

"While sometimes classified as Europeans," opined

the Pilot,

"it is a fact that Russians possess Asiatic

mentality

.

While public attention focused on Europe, the Pilot
continued to alert its readers to the danger of communist

subversion at home.

"Communism is the enemy of democracy.

How much more evidence shall we require before we accept
this fact that the authentic Communist can never be a

trustworthy ally of any democratic nation?"

40

In an

that
editorial titled "Fifth Column," the Pilot proclaimed

Nazi
Communist subversion was far more worrisome than

subversion.
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There is no considerable number of Americans in
this country who have any sympathy with Nazism.,.
Let us not forget that we have a very flourishing
Fifth Column already established... Our unity is
watered by the presence of a vast column made up
of Communists, fellow travelers and friends of
Soviet Russia... Brown Bolshevism undermined
Norway, Red Bolshevism seeks to undermine us.

Even after Pearl Harbor, when the United States was allied

with the Soviet Union, the Pilot continued to toll the
tocsin.

"We have declared war on Brown Bolshevism.

But

victory will mean little if we allow Red Bolshevists to
undermine us at home.
The Christian Front

Father Coughlin, the radio priest from Detroit,

continued to draw support in poor Irish Catholic

neighborhoods in Boston even as his star waned nationally
due to increasingly strident anti-Semitism.

When a Boston

radio station announced in 1939 that it would no longer air
Coughlin'

s

"sermons," one thousand people met at Mechanics

Hall to organize the Committee for Defense of American

Constitutional Rights.

The committee's three goals were to

defend free speech, to protest "radio monopoly," and to
demand government action against communism and "other un-

American activities.

These Coughlinites saw the hand of

"^^

communists behind the radio ban.
Three months later, in April 1939, seven thousand

people returned to Mechanics Hall to hear Father Edward
Lodge Curran, Coughlin'

s

principle disciple, debate

Granville Hicks, a Communist sympathizer and temporary

.

lecturer at Harvard University.**

Curran was pastor and

president of the International Catholic Truth society and
editor of the largest Catholic weekly in the United States,
the Brooklyn Tablet.

The topic they debated was "Resolved,

that Communism is the enemy of American democracy."

police sent 100 officers to keep order.

Boston

Hicks tried to

attack the Church by linking it to authoritarianism and
Nazism.
Z.

Curran fought back, taking his theme from William

Foster's quote "Religion is the opium of the people."

Judging on the basis of crowd reaction, Curran won the
debate handily.

Throughout the evening, the crowd cheered

Curran as loudly as it booed and hissed Hicks.
Father Curran 's visit laid the groundwork for Christian
Front organizing.

Indeed, Boston was one of only three

cities where the Christian Front took root, the others being
New York and Philadelphia.

In the fall 1939,

Boston's Front

organizers held a series of meetings that ended with

participants postering anti-Semitic stickers in Jewish
neighborhoods.*^

In January 1940,

the FBI's arrest of 18

men in Brooklyn, including several Christian Front members,

temporarily halted organizing.

Hoover was under pressure

47
from President Roosevelt to investigate Nazi sympathizers.

Six months later, when a Brooklyn jury acquitted 14 and hung
on the remaining defendants, Front organizing in Boston

resumed
A month after the Brooklyn trial ended. Rev. Ahern

chose the topic "What is the Christian Front?" for his
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weekly Sunday afternoon radio address on the Catholic Truth
Hour.

Cardinal O'Connell preapproved Ahern's remarks and

published them in the Pilot.

Ahern explained that groups of

Catholics and Protestants organized the Christian Front to
oppose "encroachments of Communism and other anti-Christian

activities."

While Catholics belonged to the Front, it was

not affiliated with the Church,

or Knights of Columbus.

like the Holy Name Society

"It is unfair," complained Ahern,

"to blame the Catholic church for any mistakes the Christian

Front may have made."

After distancing the Church from the

Front, Ahern concluded his address by attacking the

government and press for singling out the group.

"The real

culprits were not the 17 men arrested but the instigators of
the arrest."^®

On balance, Ahern treated the Front as a

legitimate organization fighting communism.

Since O'Connell

approved all radio programming, he must have agreed with

Ahern's assessment.
In June 1941,

the Nazi film,
in Roxbury.

the Christian Front organized showings of

"Victory in the West," at the Hibernian Hall

The events were "jammed with frenzied pro-

Fascism, hate-the-Jew sermons, and inflammatory speech

making."

The principal leader of the Front, Francis

P.

Moran, had helped organize the Committee For Defense of

American Constitutional Rights in 1939 to protest the

banning of Father Coughlin on the radio.

In his speeches at

and Churchill.
Front meetings, Moran attacked both Roosevelt

personal
Roosevelt, he charged, plotted to establish a

dictatorship in Washington and put 1,500 "non-Christians" in
the federal government.*^

Other Coughlinite offshoots, like

the Social Justice Guild of Boston and Mothers Neutrality

League, cosponsored Front events.
In early 1942, Coughlinites brought Father Curran back

to Boston for several appearances.

The most contentious

occasion was Evacuation Day, a Boston holiday that
commemorates the departure of the hated British troops in
1776.

Nearly two centuries after the event occurred,

Boston's Irish had appropriated this holiday as their own.
It marked a defeat for the British Army,

always a cause for

celebration in the Irish community, and fell on the eve of
Saint Patrick's day.

By merging the symbolism of these two

events, the Irish at once asserted their American patriotism

and ethnic identity.

By 1942, South Boston hosted the

city's Evacuation Day ceremonies.

When the South Boston Citizens Committee invited Father
Curran to be its principal speaker at the 166th anniversary
of Evacuation Day,

swift opposition developed.

The

controversy tapped into long-standing ethnic and class
divisions.

Liberals, Yankees and Jews saw Father Curran as

a vicious anti-Semite who revelled in the defeat of the

British army.

They felt his vitriol particularly

inappropriate when the United States was at war with Hitler
and allied with England.

Irish organizers of the event saw

Father Curran as a spokesman for the Irish perspective.
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A self-appointed committee tried to keep Curran out of

South Boston.

The Massachusetts CIO, a body dominated by

Jewish labor leaders, and its member locals called on state

politicians to boycott the ceremony; Donald Lothrup, pastor
of the liberal Community Church,

sent an urgent telegram to

Mayor Maurice Tobin, conveniently vacationing in Florida
during the controversy.

On Saturday, the day before the

event, opponents staged a vigil at City Hall while their

representatives tried to contact city officials.
Organizers from South Boston dismissed these protests as the

William Gallagher, president of the

work of communists.

Evacuation Day committee, told reporters objection to Father
Curran was "tinged with pink, gradually deepening into
red. "^^

When Father Curran arrived at South Boston High School,
5,000 people greeted him with thunderous applause.

first words, "I am here," said it all.

His

At the beginning of

his speech, he thanked Cardinal O'Connell for granting him

"ecclesiastical permission" to come to Boston.

Playing to

long standing animosity between Boston's Irish and Yankees,
or
he said "I don't care whether [my opponents] are common

episcopal bigots.

Boston likes me.
you want me to.""

I

don't care whether anyone else in

You do and I'll come back again any time

Curran spoke for 45 minutes, reviewing

War in detail
the history of Boston during the Revolutionary

while never once addressing the war in Europe.
stirring end to his speech, Curran warned:
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In a very

There are internal enemies in the United States of
America today... The internal enemies are those
who would repeal the Constitution, scrap the bill
of rights, destroy freedom of speech and surrender
America to worldwide atheistic revolution of
Communism...
[l]n the name of those who fought on
Dorchester Hill, we want no totalitarian form of
government in America. We want no Nazism and no
Fascism and no Communism.

Although most politicians ducked the controversy
because of "other commitments," South Boston's politicians

appeared in force.

Other speakers at the Evacuation Day

ceremony included Boston School Committeeman Patrick Foley,
Boston Public Welfare Commissioner William O'Hare, Acting

Mayor and Ward

7

Councilor Thomas Linehan, Chief Marshal

Patrick Gammon and Representative John

E.

Powers.

Some Irish Catholic leaders were appalled by Curran's

politics and protested his appearance at the Evacuation Day
ceremony.

Frances Sweeney, president of the American-Irish

Defense Association and outspoken Curran critic, joined the
vigil outside City Hall the day before Curran's visit.

She

attend the Evacuation Day event, sitting at the press table.
However, while the crowd waited for Curran to arrive,

William Gallagher, president of the Evacuation Day
committee, spotted Sweeney.

Two men, one of whom wore a

Legionnaire's uniform, confronted her and asked her to
leave.

When she refused, people in the front of the

auditorium rose to their feet shouting "put her out."

The

two men picked her up off the floor and "escorted" her out
of the hall.

One reporter said "scores of women hissed and

booed" as she was dragged down the center isle.

54

As if to underscore the independence of the Irish

community, the South Boston Citizens Committee invited

Father Curran back again the following year.

However, no

public outcry developed in 1943, and local newspapers did
not cover the event.

At the beginning of his speech, Curran

greeted "Christian Fronters" in the crowd thanking them for

their faithful support.

They included William Gallagher,

president of the Evacuation Day committee, and Captain John
Joseph Murphy.

Originally from South Boston, Murphy had

worked for Father Coughlin at his headquarters in Detroit.
He led Christian Front and American First organizing in
Boston, and published a newspaper titled "Save America Now:

A Bulletin of Massachusetts."^^
In his speech. Father Curran discussed the newest

domestic peril

— civilian

defense.

He warned the audience

that it was "communistic" and must be stopped.

Another

speaker at the 1943 Evacuation Day commemoration was Rep.

Hamilton Fish, a prominent Yankee who represented New York
in Washington.

Fish told the audience that it was an honor

to speak from the "theatre of the great British defeat."

He

urged the audience to work with his organization, America
First, to confront domestic dangers.

With "the Japs and

Nazis surrounded," the war in Europe was over.

Americans

needed to get back to the war at home, he warned, because
"there is more to fear from our enemies within.

"^^

Christian Front activities took place in the streets as
well as on public platforms.

In the fall of 1943,
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the Civil

Liberties Union of Massachusetts reported that, a "wave of

anti-Semitism forced Boston into an unsavory position of
leadership in national intolerance."^''

Until an October

1943 anti-Semitic incident brought national attention to

Boston,

local politicians, police and press ignored

complaints from Jewish leaders about the rising tide of
anti-Semitic violence.

A gang of Irish street toughs jumped

two Jewish boys, Jacob Hodas and Harvey Blaustein, and beat

them badly.

Police who arrived on the scene followed their

standard procedures and sent the attackers away without

taking names or making any arrests.
protested, the police arrested

them..

When Jacob and Harvey
At the Dorchester

precinct, a police officer beat Harvey with a rubber hose

while calling him

"yellow Jew."

A trial judge found Jacob

and Harvey guilty of participating in an "affray" and fined

each of them ten dollars.
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The Christian Science Monitor, the first Boston

newspaper to cover the "anti-Semitic hooliganism," pointed
the finger at the Christian Front and other Coughlinite

groups.

When other newspapers publicized allegations of

complicity by the Boston police. Governor Saltonstall asked
the state police to conduct an independent investigation of

Boston police practices.

The state police concluded that

some Boston police officers beat Jewish suspects they

stopped in the streets or brought to the precinct.

Governor

Saltonstall responded to the probe by firing Boston police

commissioner Joseph Timility.

The governor also appointed a

.

special task force to devise ways to confront neighborhood

anti-Semitic violence.
relations.

The event symbolized Yankee-Irish

Irish Boston added Saltonstall s imperious act
'

to the litany of abuses suffered at the hands of smug Yankee

overlords.

Yankee Boston renewed its vigilance over Irish

excesses
Street gangs and Boston police were not the only

perpetrators of anti-Semitic acts during the war.

Anti-

Semites distributed vicious, anti- Jewish propaganda at war
plants.

In fall 1943,

three workers at the Bethlehem Steel

plant in Hingham passed out anti-Semitic leaflets on the
shop floor.

When another worker reported the incident to

management and the FBI, he was laid off.

A month later,

anti-Semites posted flyers at their union's shop
headquarters that said "Pay your dues and pay the Jews."^°
Similar anti-Semitic leafletting took place at the Fore
River shipyard in Quincy.

Conclusion
By looking at anticommunism on the local and state

level in Massachusetts, we find a continuous thread of

anticommunist activity during the war years.
strands to this thread.

There were two

One came from people who found

opposition to the war unpatriotic.

Police and municipal

authorities did what they could to shut down Communist party
antiwar organizing.

When the party switched sides and

joined the war effort, attention shifted to conscientious
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objectors.

Small towns were unwilling to tolerate radicals

who opposed the war on political principles.
The other strand of anticoininunist activity originated
in Catholic isolationism.

The Church's position was a

principled one that followed the neutrality of the Pope.
The Church never argued with authoritarianism, but rather

with persecution of Catholics.

The Coughlinite position,

however, quickly degenerated into bigoted anti-Semitism.

Like many other gentiles in the United States, the Christian

Front equated Jews with communists.

An attack on a Jew was

an attack on an internationalist world view that

conservatives equated with communism.

133

.

Notes
John F. Stack, Jr. argues in his book, International
Conflict in an American City, Boston's Irish, Italians, and
Jews, 1935-1944 (Westport, Conn,: Greenwood Press, 1979),
that the extremism of the Coughlinite activities was the
"climax" of ethnic conflict building since the late 1930s in
reaction to international events.
Stack emphasizes the
anti-Semitic quality of "Coughlinites the Christian Front
and anti-Semitic hoodlums "
The focus of Stack s book is
ethnicity his goal is to argue against assimilation
I
have read the same sources from a different perspective and
find in them evidence of a continuing thread of
ant i communism
While Stack notes the ant i communist element
of Coughlinite isolationism in passing, I see it as
Indeed, the tv;o are completely
important as anti-Semitism.
linked
,

.

'

;

.

.

Heale, American Anticommunism, Combating the
Enemy Within, 1830-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1990), pp. 129-131; Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism,
A Brief History With Documents (Boston: Bedford Books of St.
In Schrecker's analysis,
Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 15-16.
the point is implied rather than stated explicitly.
M.

J.

^Equal Justice, International Labor Defense, February
1940, Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts Collection,
Box
Massachusetts Historical Society (hereinafter "CLUM"
2, Folder "Equal Justice."
)

,

^Ibid.

^Boston Globe, November

1939.

8,

^Equal Justice, International Labor Defense, February
1940, CLUM, Box 2, Folder "Equal Justice."
"^Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, April 11, 1940, CLUM,
2f

Box

Folder "CLUM Executive Committee Minutes, Jan-June,

1940.

"

^Boston Globe, May 13,

1940.

^Minutes of the Executive Committee, Civil Liberties
Folder
Union of Massachusetts, April 29, 1941, CLUM, Box 3,
1941."
"CLUM Executive Committee minutes, Jan-Dec
^°Undated Circular, CLUM, Box
"
Coolidge Correspondence, 1941
.

,

134

3,

Folder "Albert Sprague

^^Boston Globe, May 13,

^^Boston Globe, May

2,

1941.
1941.

^^Statement of Mrs. LaRue Brown on behalf of the
Massachusetts League of Women Voters, April 14, 1941, CLUM,
Box 3, Folder "Legislation, Mass. and national, 1941."

^^Massachusetts House of Representatives, House
Journal, May 12, 1941, p. 1150.
,

^^American Civil Liberties Union, In the Shadow of War:
The Story of Civil Liberty, 1939-1940 (New York: ACLU,
See also, Mary Sperling McAuliffe,
1940), pp. 6, 45-50.
Crisis on the Left, Cold War Politics and American Liberals,
1947-1954 (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1978), pp. 88-90.

Elizabeth Sanger to Roger M. Baldwin, October 15,
1946, CLUM, Box 6, Folder "CLUM General Correspondence,
^^M.

1946

.

"

Hamm to Alfred Sprague Coolidge, President,
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, April 21, 1942,
CLUM, Box 4, Folder "CLUM Committees, Correspondence, 1942."
^"^Henry W.

^^Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in
Modern America, From 1810 to the Present (Cambridge, Mass.:
Schenkman Publishing Co., 1978), p. 274.

3,

^^Carl Walz to Anne Paulsen, June 17,
Folder "Legal Committee, 1941."

CLUM, Box

1941,

2°lbid.

^hbid.
^"^Greenfield Recorder-Gazette

,

May 25, 1943

.

Directory
^^Greenfield, Turner's Falls, Miller's Falls
(Springfield, Mass.: H.A. Manning Co., 1940).
School
2*Town of Montague, Annual Report of the
Committee, December 31, 1941, p. 9

^^Greenfield Recorder-Gazette, May 26, 1943.
^^Greenfield Recorder-Gazette, May 25, 1943.
Superior Court,
27cari walz v. Albert E. Clark,
Recorder-Gazette, May
Greenfield
8461.
No.
County,
Franklin
27, 1943.
135

28

Leo P. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The
Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold
War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); Wayne S,
Cole, America First: The Battle against Intervention, 194041 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971).
29

Bert Cochran, Adlai Stevenson , Patrician Among the
Politicians (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 130-131.
^^Boston Globe, May

1941.

1,

^^Boston Globe, May 13,
32
33

1940.

Stack, International Conflict

,

passim.

Stack, International Conflict

,

p.

^^The Pilot, April 27,

1940.

^^Boston Globe, June 13,

1940.

^^Boston Globe, May 12,

1941.

Boston Globe, May 13,

1941.

^^The Pilot, March

^^The Pilot,

August 17,

9,

116.

1940.

January 27, 1940.

^°The Pilot, March 15,
^^The Pilot, May 25,

1941.

1940.

*^The Pilot, December 20,

1941.

^^Boston Globe, January 28,

1939.

As a student
^^Granville Hicks was a literary critic.
at Harvard in the 1920s, he belonged to the Liberal Club, a
In 1932, Hicks
fairly radical group given the time period.
signed a public document supporting Communist party
candidates in the presidential election. His one year
lectureship at Harvard in 1939-40 was his last academic job.
and
In 1953, Hicks testified before the HUAC, naming names
describing Communist Party activities at Harvard. See,
Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, McCarthyism and the
Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp.
27, 31, 33, 194-95.

*^Boston Globe, April

4

and

136

5,

1939.

"

^^Equal Justice, International Labor Defense, February
1940, CLUM, Box 2, Folder "Equal Justice."

*^Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss, J.
Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p. 149.
^^The Pilot,

July

6,

1940.

49

Executive Committee Minutes, June 5, 1941, CLUM, Box
3, Folder "CLUM Executive Committee Minutes, Jan-Dec 1941;"
Stack, International Conflict p. 130.
,

^^Boston Globe, March 15,
^^Boston Post, March 17,
^"^Boston Post,

1942.
1942.

March 16, 1942.

^^Boston Globe, March 16,

1942.

^^Boston Globe, March 16,

1942.

^^Boston City Reporter, March 1943, CLUM, Box
"CLUM Censorship 1943."

5,

Folder

^^Ibid.

^^Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Annual
Report, 1943-1944, CLUM, Box 6, Folder "CLUM Annual Report,
1943-44.
^^Stack, International Conflict, p.

137.

^^Stack, International Conflict, p.

139.

^°Elizabeth Sanger to Harland and Leticia Manchester,
You?
April 12, 1945, CLUM, Box 6, Folder "Are They Fooling
Correspondence, 1945."

137

^

CHAPTER

5

UNION FRATRICIDE

In the midst of economic collapse and depression, the

labor left challenged Roosevelt's Keynesian solution to the
crisis.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations led the

critique.

Its leadership and base was much broader than

that of the American Federation of Labor which continued to

organize only skilled craft workers.

For a brief period, in

the late 1930s and early 1940s, the CIO accommodated

Marxists within its ranks.

Labor moderates who advocated

mediation from an enlarged federal state temporally
coexisted with Marxists who organized on the basis of class
conflict.

Thus, the two great labor federations purged

communists a decade apart: the AFL in the late 1930s during
when it
the little Red Scare and the CIO in the late 1940s
labor's
fully embraced Roosevelt's statist solution to

problems.

labor
By purging its left wing, the house of

fully repudiated class struggle.

Without a Marxist

alone to preside
presence, moderate labor leaders were left
labor in the early
over the deradicalization of organized

postwar period.
TO date,

theories
labor historians have posited three

labor.
to explain the postwar rout of

^

Ronald Schatz argues

brought younger, less
patterns
demographic
changing
that
lacked the radicalizing
skilled workers into plants who
unions in the 1930s.
experience of having organized CIO
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Bert Cochrane posits a "historically contingent" model based
on labor's class collaboration during the war.^

Christopher

Tomlins finds the answer in the CIO's wartime
bureaucratization, growing reliance on the state, and

demobilization of rank and file workers.^
from these theories is anticommunism.

What is missing

In the cold war,

anticommunism defined Americanism; it gave Americans common
ground across class and ethnic boundaries.

However, in

order to embrace anticommunism, one had to renouce class

struggle

.

Labor leaders joined the anticommunist crusade to

further their immediate ends of gaining access to state

power or to beat out a rival union

.

In the long run labor

was irrevocably altered by cutting off its left wing and
losing its source of militant union organizing and dynamic
change.

Anticommunism precipated an ideological shift to

the right that voided class analysis.
The struggle within the labor movement over communist

leadership provides an excellent window from which to
identify sources of anticommunism on the state and local
level and to see how rank and file members responded to

their leadership's red baiting.
AFL and its American Federation of T eachers
Samuel Gompers founded the American Federation of Labor
in 1886 to promote "pure and simple unionism."

He

envisioned an alternative to radical unionism, safely
removed from state repression, that concentrated on
139

—
organizing skilled workers.

Since then, the AFL

consistently rejected radicals and communists.

Successive

AFL presidents purged radical and communist leaders from
locals of its affiliated unions.

In 1938, AFL President

William Green told delegates to the Massachusetts State
Federation of Labor :^

When we find [a communist], we don't try him, we
just kick him out.
There is no place in our
movement for them... They can't live with us. We
won't embrace their philosophy, nor will we allow
them to shape our policies.
The following year, Massachusetts AFL delegates passed a

resolution "continuing its opposition to nazism, fascism and
communism."^

At the same time, the AFL's national executive

committee pressured affiliated unions, like the American

Federation of Teachers (AFT), to clean house.
The AFT had a stormy relationship with the AFL since
its inception.^

The union originated in Chicago among

working class elementary school teachers
with family ties to the labor movement.

— mostly

women

Its union

principles contrasted sharply with those of the larger and
older National Education Association, a professional

organization servicing school administrators.

Initially,

Gompers ignored AFT organizers' request for a charter

because they advocated equal pay for women teachers while he

promoted the family wage.

Even after he relented in 1918,

Gompers and other AFL leaders felt closer to the

conservative NEA than to their affiliate, the AFT.

In the

younger,
early 1930s, AFT membership rolls swelled with
140

militant WPA teachers.

At the same time, a small group of

leftist teachers gained control of the AFT executive board.

Congressman Dies' House Committee on Un-American Activities
as well as the AFL executive board, disapproved of this

growing radical influence in the teacher's union.
In 1935, AFL president William Green pressured the AFT

to purge its communists.

He sent a telegram to the 1935 AFT

convention telling delegates to oust Local
City.

5

in New York

Although many conservatives in the AFT agreed with

Green, the teachers resisted being "dictated" to by the AFL.

Green intensified the pressure.

He cut off AFL funding for

more union organizers and fired all women organizers.

September 1939, the AFL executive committee passed

In

a

resolution stating the AFT was run by communists and hinting
that its charter would be revoked.

That same month, the

Saturday Evening Post ran an article exposing the AFT as
"Red" union.

In 1940,

a

Green told AFT Convention delegates

to "put your house in order."

Although the teachers booed

Green for interfering in their affairs, they followed
through.

A year later, delegates voted overwhelmingly to

revoke the charters of four locals in New York City and
Philadelphia.

AFT organizing in Massachusetts followed a similar
path.

Women high school teachers in Boston and women

elementary school teachers in Cambridge organized the first
two AFT locals in Massachusetts.

Shortly after receiving

their charters, the Boston police struck.

AFT organizers

decided not to hold any further organizing meetings because
the strike had given all of labor a "black eye."

They

preferred to lay low until the furor over the police died
In Lynn, the school committee chairman told the chief

down.

AFT organizer she would be fired from her teaching job
unless she quit union organizing among school teachers.

Negative reaction to the police strike created

a

hostile

antiunion climate throughout the state that thwarted these
early efforts to organize a teacher's union.
The depression, however, created a different set of

conditions that energized AFT organizing.

constituencies

— business

Two powerful

leaders and veterans

education for draconian budget cuts.

— targeted

As the depression

deepened, the business community pressed for reduction in
taxes.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's list of ten cost-

larger
cutting measures for municipal governments included
When
classrooms, shorter school days, and reduced salaries.

businessmen targeted veterans' benefits, the powerful
against waste in
American Legion launched a counterof f ensive
own budget
education to draw attention away from their
issues with its
demands.^ The Legion coupled school fiscal

attack on subversive teachers.
on education
Some teachers responded to these attacks

by embracing the AFT.

Lawrence's Local 244, chartered in

in the high school,
September 1932 to organize men teachers
From December 1932
month.
first
the
during
men
21
signed up
Lawrence did not pay its teachers.
to July 1933, the city of

According to Local 244

's

president, Walter A. Sidley,

Lawrence faced "a crisis beyond that of any other city in

New England excepting Fall River

.

.

because Mayor White is

.

in complete domination by the bankers and mill owners.

As the teachers went unpaid, membership in Local 244

doubled.

By the spring of 1935, when the controversy over

the teacher's oath erupted. Local 244

high of 81 members.

's

membership reached a

As Sidley spent more and more time on

the teachers' oath battle and statewide AFT organizing,

membership in Local 244 dropped off.

By the time the U.S.

entered World War II, seven dues-paying members remained.

After taking on the fight against the teachers' oath,
Sidley next turned to purging communists from the AFT in

Massachusetts.

Sidley was a cautious unionist.

He embraced

the AFT out of disgust with accommodationist policies of the
NEA,

a

view shared by his constituents

school teachers.

— underpaid

male high

He described the union as a "national,

non-strike organization of classroom teachers of
constructive, professional policy.

"^^

Sidley had little

tolerance for side issues promoted by popular front
unionists.

In 1937, he reported to the national office that

his efforts to organize a local in Lynn had failed because

"dissension over C.I.O. and 1936 Spanish Resolution have

prevented any real functioning."^^

After the war ended,

with
when Sidley tried to revive Local 244, he locked horns
from
Mary Cadigan, a dynamic elementary school teacher
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Boston who wanted the Lawrence local to include all teachers
and to embrace the principle of equal pay.'^^

Communists led AFT locals in Boston and Cambridge.
Forty Boston teachers chartered Local 441 in January 1936.

After an initial period of disorganization, Local 441
regrouped under George Faxon's leadership and recruited a
high of 100 members in 1940.

Faxon, who taught at Roxbury

high school, was first accused of being a communist in

January 1939 when he served as faculty sponsor for the

American Student Union (ASU).

HUAC "exposed" the ASU as a

communist front group in summer 1938.

Faxon's Roxbury ASU

meetings created a citywide fracas when the Boston School
Committee launched a noisy investigation of "communistic
subversion" in the public schools.

Even though none was

found, politicians, newspapermen and educators had a field

day with the incident publicly linking Faxon to the

Communist party.

•'"^

In 1940, with Faxon as president of Local 441, the

union organized a "Yanks are Not Coming" committee and

passed resolutions opposing U.S. intervention in the war and
President Roosevelt's preparedness plans.

These actions

followed the program of the Communist party during the

period of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

In 1939,

Faxon replaced

Walter Sidley as president of the Massachusetts State Branch
of the AFT.

With Sidley as president, the program for

such as
annual meetings included bread-and-butter topics
Law and How
"Should Teachers Join a Union," "A Real Tenure

.

With Faxon

to Get It," and "What Kind of Certification."^"^
as president,

a

political address by Mary Foley Grossman

titled "School Security in a World Crisis" highlighted the
annual meeting.

Grossman, an AFT vice-president, led one of

the locals expelled during the winter of 1940-41.

The

crisis she discussed was the growth of reactionary forces at
home and abroad.^®

In 1940, with Faxon still president,

Massachusetts State Branch of the AFT passed
condemning the maneuvering of Chicago Local

resolution

a
1

the

against the

four locals under attack by the anticommunist national

leadership

19

It is not clear from available evidence exactly how

Sidley ousted Faxon and other suspected communists from the
AFT in Massachusetts.
it.^°

He did, however, take credit for

In September 1943,

Sidley and his allies elected

Frances Masterson, an anticommunist loyal to the national
of the
executive board and a respected teacher, as president

Massachusetts State Branch.

When the AFL held its 1943

with Irvin
national convention in Boston, Masterson met
and John D.
Kuenzli, secretary-treasurer of the AFT,

committee, to discuss
Conners, a member of the AFL executive
••the

problem of the Boston local."

According to

Mary Cadigan, an
anticommunists, Faxon and his cohorts made
teacher, president of Local
Irish Catholic elementary school
group" that still
Stalinist
"small
the
for
"front"
441 as a
Cadigan
It appears, however, that
controlled the local.

other way around.
used the communists, not the
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Nobody

"

1

controlled the feisty Cadigan who succeeded in forcing a
split in the local between her supporters and Faxon's

supporters. 2

In 1945,

Cadigan maneuvered a vote dissolving

Local 441 that ended any influence Faxon may still have had.
She organized a new Boston local, controlled by women

classroom teachers who built an effective grievance board to
defend working conditions for members.

22

The other AFT local of concern to Walter Sidley and

anticommunists on the national executive board was at
Harvard University.

Chartered in 1935, Local 431 quickly

recruited junior faculty members.

Membership grew to 172 in

October 1939, right before Hitler and Stalin sealed their
pact, and declined steadily after that.

When the local

disbanded in 1950, its president reported that "the Union
never served a genuine economic need of its members here...
[T]he crusading spirits which used to join it now find ADA

political
or the Progressive Party more suitable for their

purposes

.

1.23

In the late 1930s,

the Communist party organized a

clandestine unit within Local 431.

Twenty years later,

before HUAC.^*
former communists in the unit testified
joined Local 431
Young instructors and teaching assistants
The AFT's national
and its Communist party caucus.

executive board

intervened in Local 431

-s

affairs in 1942

to speak at a meeting.
when the local invited Harry Bridges
causing much publicity
The American Legion protested loudly,
AFT President Fewkes
press.
national
the
in
and
in Boston

tried desperately to distance the national organization from
any association with Bridges.

At the next meeting of the

executive board, the Indiana Council of Teachers Unions

moved to revoke the Harvard charter.

Although the ouster

effort failed, the executive board passed a resolution

rebuking Local 431 for causing injury to the AFT "because of
unfavorable publicity." 26
The purge of communists from the AFT in Massachusetts

was less noisy and contentious than in New York City and
Philadelphia.

There were no trials, no national referenda

and no convention expulsion votes.

A much more organic

process succeeded in the commonwealth.

Local anticommunist

AFT organizers, like Walter Sidley and Frances Masterson,

worked behind the scenes to remove communists from statewide
leadership positions.

In the Boston local,

outmaneuvered communists.

a savvy

In other AFT locals,

unionist

communists

and progressives voluntarily quit to protest the purges.
Carl Walz's local, in western Massachusetts, voted to

withdraw from the AFT to protest lack of due process for
ousted locals.

Disgusted with the national executive

board's leadership, they believed the union "failed
before
signally, in a year of great, crucial issues

problems...""
education and the nation, to face national
In other locals,

the issue of communist influence

with the AFT.
combined with others making teachers uneasy
successful initial organizing
highly
a
after
Bedford,
New
In
out in 1936 over the
drive in 1933, members began dropping

"close relationship between the Teacher's Union and the

Central Labor Union.

Even though many public school

teachers came from working class families, they were not

completely comfortable with unions.

The NEA encouraged this

attitude with its emphasis on "professionalism."

Local

262 's secretary in New Bedford told national headquarters:

"The Union seems to be shaking down to those who believe in

Union principles, and those who joined for personal

advantages

.

"^^

Two years later, she reported that "pressure

and influence of certain clergy caused some of our best

workers to drop out and deterred others from joining.

"^°

Public school teachers were neither working class nor

professionals.

Even in New Bedford, a strong union city,

teachers shied away from building a union.

Hints of

communism scared them away completely.
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Industrial workers were a different story, particularly

those associated with the Congress of Industrial

Organizations.

The CIO grew out of the split in the AFL

over whether to charter industrial unions.

AFL president

William Green and a majority of its executive board members
represented an older model of craft unionism that excluded

unskilled workers.

The CIO championed a newer model of

industrial unionism combining all workers on the shop floor,
both skilled and unskilled, into one big unit.
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1

John

L.

Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of

America, founded the CIO in 1935 after walking out of the

AFL national convention to protest its refusal to charter
industrial unions.

It built militant unions during the

depression organizing the unorganized and drawing workers
away from the AFL in elections mandated by the National

Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

AFL president William Green

fought back with vicious anticommunism.

He blasted the CIO

in the press, worked with the Dies committee to discredit

CIO affiliates, and maneuvered to put anticommunists on the

Green claimed that Lewis led

NLRB.

a

movement directed by

the Communist International, the worldwide grouping of

communist parties controlled by the Soviet Union.

3

Communists did dominate the leadership of several CIO
unions.

CIO president Lewis and his successor, Philip

Murray, initially tolerated communists in their ranks

because they were good, hard working organizers and the CIO
needed all the help it could get.

When Murray finally

purged Communists from the CIO's affiliated unions in 1949,
file
more than a decade after the AFL, he found rank and

members deeply divided over the issue.

Anticommunism became a defining issue among CIO union
persistent
members in the late 1940s, but not without
outsiders
intervention from "outside agitators." These
committees, the
included the Catholic Church, congressional
FBI,

media, and
the Truman administration, national

conservative politicians.

Within the labor movement,
149

—

.

ambitious union officers used anticommunist rhetoric and red

baiting as

a tool to

eliminate their left wing rivals.

By

and large, such maneuvers fell on deaf ears among rank and
file workers who were more interested in their union's

record for improving working conditions than they were in
the political affiliation of their leaders.

However, as the

national drum roll against home-grown communists grew in the

postwar period, the effectiveness of targeted union leaders
diminished in the eyes of many rank and file members who
were then willing to jettison communist leaders.

Still, the

purge was very contentious, for a sizeable minority of

workers remained unmoved by the national anticommunist
hysteria swirling about them.
In Massachusetts,

anticommunists targeted the left-led

United Electrical, Radio
(UE)."^"^

32

&

Machine Workers of America

From any of the interpretive paradigms of

McCarthyism

— pluralist,

revisionist, or newer "long view"

one would expect to find working people very receptive to

anticommunism.

However, this is not what the evidence from

the UE in Massachusetts shows.

Contrary to what the

literature predicts, anticommunism was not

a

compelling

concern among rank and file union members until others made
it so

The only workers who fit the expected model were those

closest to the Catholic culture of anticommunism.

The 1949

tapped into all
UE purge came only when rival union officers
the
available resources— the Church, the press, the state,
150

CIO

— and

convinced workers that their present union

officials no longer represented their best interests.

In

other words, electrical and machine workers abandoned their
union because they were afraid of losing jobs not because
they were guarding national security.

Even so, a sizeable

minority of workers in the largest UE locals voted to retain
their tainted union, and workers in the smaller locals

remained loyal to the embattled UE.
Catholic Trade Unionism
Two papal encyclicals, written to counteract Marxist

doctrine at times when Catholic workers were drifting away
from their church, defined the Church's theory of labor.
Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum in 1891 in response to

modern industrialization.
and for class harmony.

He argued against class conflict

This could be achieved, Leo XIII

stated, if employers and workers respected each other's

natural rights and lived up to their reciprocal duties.

Employers must pay workers "just wages" in return for an
honest day's work.
and avoid violence.

Workers must respect private property
Leo XIII promoted labor guilds that

brought labor and management under the same roof; he also

endorsed conservative labor unions.

Pope Pius XI

's

1931

encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, reiterated Leo's corportist

approach to labor theory.

In the midst of worldwide

depression, Pius wrote that:

"Sound prosperity is to be

restored according to the true principles of

151

a sane

corporative system which respects the proper hierarchic
structure of society.

"^^

conservative texts.

They constituted a vigorous attack on

Both encyclicals were classic

socialism and Marxism, but also included
modern capitalism.

critique of

a

This element of anticapitalism made

Catholic labor doctrine relevant to workers in the 1930s and
early 1940s.

Theologians in each Catholic country were left to apply
papal authority to their own conditions.

In the United

States, Monsignor John A. Ryan of Catholic University in

Washington, D.C., became the leading social theoretician.
Ryan represented the moderate wing of the hierarchy.

He

managed to fit New Deal labor policy into the American
corporate order.

One of Ryan's strongest critics within

the church was Boston's Cardinal O'Connell.

Priests studied the encyclicals searching for a
Catholic response to pressing social problems confronting
Father Coughlin claimed Rerum

working class parishioners.

Novarum influenced his ideas more than any other religious
text.

Labor priests brought Catholic labor doctrine to the

parish level.

Some labor priests, such as Father Charles

Owen Rice in Pittsburgh, marched on picket lines, spoke at

union meetings and worked closely with influential labor
leaders.

Others ran labor schools, where workers learned

Catholic labor theory and organizing skills.

Some of these

were
schools were organized on the diocesan level and some
u
the product of activist parish
•

4.^
priests.
•

36

.

Lay activists in the New York Catholic Worker movement

were inspired by papal authority to organize the Association
of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU)

in 1937.

ACTU members

organized Catholic caucuses in labor unions.

ACTU chapters

soon opened in Detroit, Pittsburgh and Chicago.

Although

not officially sponsored by the Church, chaplains appointed
by local bishops led ACTU chapters.

Some local church

authorities, like Boston's Cardinal O'Connell, thought ACTU
too radical and hampered its development.
In the late 1930s, when these efforts were initiated.

Catholic labor theory was committed to industrial unionism.
It supported the right of workers to organize unions to

Catholic labor theory

fight for better working conditions.

included a critique of capitalism as well as
of communism.

two,

a

denunciation

It tried to steer a middle course between the

sometimes referred to as the third path.

By 1945,

however, the Church dropped its critique of capitalism and

focused exclusively on anticommunism

.

Before 1945, the

Church fought communism in order to build "economic
destroy
democracy"; after the war, the goal was simply to

communism

37

theory in
Rome signalled this change in Catholic labor

parties in Europe
response to the growing power of Communist
Catholic Church in
and the Soviet Union's attack on the

Eastern Europe.
schools,

In the U.S.,

the change led labor

crusade
labor priests, and ACTU to redouble their

CIO and its left-led
against communist labor leaders in the
153

,

unions.

For the UE, the cost was enormous.

By 1955,

a

rival union, the staunchly anticommunist International Union
of Electrical,

Radio and Machine Workers (lUE), represented

60 percent of its members.

Workers who remained in UE shops

no longer had a union with authority to bargain on behalf of

all workers in their industry.

Historians are still debating the importance of the
Church's role in bringing down the UE and other left-led
unions.

Douglas Seaton, a historian of ACTU, concludes the

Church played a "crucial role" in redirecting the labor

movement

m

a

conservative direction. 39

Neil Betten and

Michael Harrington, however, argue that UE leaders

overestimated the influence of ACTU.

They found ACTU to be

disorganized, often at loggerheads with the Catholic
hierarchy, and argued its success came from alliances with

other anticommunist elements. *°

Ronald Schatz, a recent

historian of electrical workers at GE and Westinghouse
argues that the effectiveness of the Church depended on "a

constellation of factors" including ethnic and religious
background of union members, effectiveness of local leaders,
and the "standing of anticommunist priests in the

community."*^

Other historians, such as Harvey Levenstein

and Ellen Schrecker, argue that the state was the crucial

factor not the Catholic church.*^
In Massachusetts,
a

Catholic opposition to the UE was not

coordinated statewide effort but rather sprang from local

initiatives led by union members and priests.
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St.

Mary's

parish in Lynn ran an influential labor school where

Catholic UE shop stewards and other unionists learned Church
labor doctrine as well as how to run meetings using Roberts

Rules of Order and debating techniques.

Graduates of St.

Mary's formed the nucleus of the rank and file Committee

Against Communism which held meetings in the Knights of
Columbus hall to plot the ouster of communist officers.
In Pittsfield,

Mary's parish, led
leadership.

Father Eugene Marshall, pastor of St.
a local

crusade against the national UE

Marshall's parish included the sprawling GE

plant as well the homes of most of its workers.

He spoke

from the pulpit on several occasions denouncing national UE
In 1949 he told parishioners that an upcoming

officers.

union election represented "a choice between Christ and
Stalin."

Marshall also sent letters to his parishioners

urging them to attend critical union meetings.
In the Springf ield-Holyoke area,

Catholic union leaders

from eight UE locals joined other UE dissidents to form

a

national anticommunist caucus within the UE called Members
for Democratic Action.

unseat national leaders.

The objective of the caucus was to
It opposed progressive resolutions

from the floor of national conventions and ran slates of
candidates.

The Springfield anticommunists were active in

the state CIO council and used that position as leverage

against UE locals loyal to the national officers.
In 1950,

Catholic anticommunists in Lynn, Pittsfield

left-led UE
and Springfield brought their locals out of the
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and into the anticommunist lUE.

In other Massachusetts

cities, such as New Bedford and Boston, Catholic UE

dissidents had less success.

The Church played an important

role in the factional fight between the UE and lUE.

Without

the Church, there would not have been much of a fight at
all

.

However

,

the crucial factor among electrical and

machine workers in Massachusetts was not whether their union
leaders were communist but whether they were effective.

consequences of the UE

'

s

The

expulsion from the CIO was more

important, to more UE members, than was the Church's

denunciation of godless communists.
United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America
Leaders from independent unions in the electrical
43
appliance and radio industry founded the UE in 1936.

Young Jim Carey from Philadelphia led the radio workers.
Carey worked as an inspector at the large Philco plant in
West Philadelphia.

In 1933,

he and a group of other male

inspectors at Philco organized a strike that forced the

company to recognize their union.

The unexpected success of

with no
the strike catapulted Carey into union leadership
shop floor work experience.

The Philco local affiliated

with the AFL as a "Federal Labor Union," an undefined
Carey to
category for non-craft unions, and the AFL hired

organize the radio and home appliance industry.

For the

the Northeast
next two years, Carey travelled throughout
AFL refused to
organizing unions in small shops. When the

,

grant Carey

a

charter for a new industrial union of

electrical workers, he approached independent union leaders
in heavy current plants to discuss a merger.
UE s early leaders
'

radical workers

— who

— organized

were skilled, high wage,

their industrial union on very

democratic principles that emphasized local autonomy much
more than other CIO unions, such as the United Auto Workers
or United Mine Workers.

The UE constitution decentralized

power in eleven districts that elected their own officers
and collected per capita dues directly from their locals.
It kept the number of staff members who could serve as

delegates to national conventions low and restricted
salaries of officers to the highest wage paid
the industry.

a

worker in

When UE anticommunists set about to purge

communists, they knew it would have to be done from the

bottom up, local by local, because of UE

•

s

twin traditions

of democracy and localism.

Delegates to the UE

'

s

founding convention elected 25

year old Jim Carey as their president.

Carey grew up in a

middle class, Irish Catholic family of Al Smith Democrats.
the papal
He knew Catholic labor doctrine having studied

encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno.

During the

relied
Philco strike and his early organizing days, Carey

anticommunist
heavily on the advice of more experienced,
Carey's
Socialist labor leaders in Philadelphia. Although
popular front
background was strongly anticommunist, in the
era,

UE leaders.
he worked side-by-side with radical
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Julius Emspak, the UE

•

s

secretary-treasurer, grew up in

a socialist household in Schnectady,

New York.

He learned

union organizing from John Turnbull, an English-born

socialist who founded the big GE local in Schenectady.
Emspak attended Union College on a GE scholarship and

graduate school at Brown University.

He quit graduate

school in the early 1930s to return to union organizing at
the GE plant.

Jim Matles, UE s director of organization, emigrated
'

from Rumania with his family in 1929 at the age of 19.

They

settled in Brooklyn where he worked in the metal trades as

union organizer.

during this time.

a

He probably joined the Communist party
In 1935,

Matles initiated negotiations to

bring the Brooklyn locals into the AFL's International

Association of Metalworkers (lAM).

In order to do this,

down played his own radical politics.

he

When the UE was

organized, Matles quickly abandoned the lAM and brought the

Brooklyn metal workers into the UE,

a

union where he felt

much more at home.
Carey, Emspak and Matles ran the UE in the late 1930s.
In 1938,

Carey became Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO as well

Most commentators argue that John

as president of the UE.

Lewis brought Carey into the CIO to appease its

anticommunist right wing.

Whatever Lewis's motivation may

have been, Carey posed no threat to his autocratic control
of the CIO.

Commentators agree that Carey was ambitious and

enjoyed the limelight.

In 1937,
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for example, while the

union's GE Conference Board negotiated with the biggest

employer in the industry, Carey grabbed headlines by holding
a press conference and

negotiations.

disclosing the content of closed door

The Conference Board, controlled by the big

Lynn and Schenectady GE locals, scolded Carey for "popping
off" to the press and barred him

further negotiations.**

— their

president

— from

By 1940, Carey was frequenting

Eleanor Roosevelt's salon in the White House, where he kept
her abreast of activities in the labor movement.

Ronald

Schatz describes Carey as "personable" while Harvey

Levenstein calls him "cocky."

Carey's contemporaries

probably reacted to him in a similar way.

Some tried to

grab onto his coattails and some wanted to strangle him.

Carey spent most of his time in Washington attending
functions, rubbing elbows and lobbying legislators while

Matles and Emspak ran the UE.

During the popular front era,

Carey co-existed with Matles and Emspak.

In 1938, when HUAC

attacked the UE, Carey, Matles and Emspak mounted a joint,
vigorous defense of the union, denying communist influence
and demanding the information on which Chairman Martin Dies

based his charges.

A HUAC dissenter revealed the

committee's two sources:

John Frey, a member of the AFL's

Executive Committee, and Joe Zack, a former communist turned
informant.

Carey sent a circular to all UE members

45
denouncing HUAC and its information.

Although Carey had differences with Emspak and Matles,
annual
he continued to work with them until the 1940 UE
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convention.

In July,

two months before the convention,

Carey endorsed Franklin D. Roosevelt for president allying

himself with other CIO liberals who supported Roosevelt's

preparedness plans.

UE News, the union's newspaper

advocated neutrality as did the Communist party during the
period of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

However, since CIO

President John Lewis and most rank and file members also

supported neutrality, it did not divide Carey from Emspak
and Matles.

Communist membership in the union became the dividing
issue.

In 1941,

a conservative New Jersey local wrote Carey

asking if it could pass

a rule

and fascists from membership.

Carey said that they could.

prohibiting communists, nazis
In his column in UE News,

At the next meeting of the

General Executive Board, Emspak vigorously opposed Carey's
position.

After a heated debate, Emspak 's motion carried.*^

Carey later recalled that he "fell into the position of

being something of a guarterback against the communists

- a

quarterback in the effort to throw the communists out of the
CIO."*^

At this point, Carey irrevocably split with Emspak

and Matles by going on the offensive against communists in
the labor movement.

In summer 1941,

after Hitler invaded

the Soviet Union, the UE News flipped back to supporting

Roosevelt and war preparedness.

Again, Carey used his

column to blast the left wing of his union.

"Political

acrobats in pink tights posing as labor leaders are
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a

.

disgrace to the union and insult the intelligence of the

membership
Delegates at the 1941 convention defeated Carey's

reelection bid for president by
to 539 (46 percent).

a

vote of 635 (54 percent)

Albert Fitzgerald, a respected member

of Local 201 at the big GE plant in Lynn, won.

Fitzgerald

had been elected steward, treasurer and president of the
local.

In 1940,

he joined the GE Conference Board as

District Council 2's representative.

Like Carey, Fitzgerald

was an Irish Catholic from an anticommunist background, and
a registered Republican who was considered a moderate.

Fitzgerald, however, was willing to work with Emspak and
Matles, and for this his detractors called him a communist
stooge.

Father Marshall of Pittsfield warned parishioners

that Fitzgerald "has a fine name that might disarm anyone,
but he's as Red as the flag of Russia."*^

Carey claimed he lost the 1941 election solely because
of the "communist issue," and spent the next ten years

trying to regain his position.

At first, he opposed raiding

UE locals and worked from within the union.

strategy was red-baiting.

In August 1946,

His sole
he joined forces

union
with ACTU, socialists, and other anticommunists in the
(MDA).^°
to form the UE-Members for Democratic Action

One

the
commentator places CIO President Philip Murray at

meeting as well.^^
1948,

Anticommunism united this coalition.

committee
Carey told a Congressional investigating

UE officers,
that the group aimed to remove all present
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In

s

members of the executive board, editors of the UE News,
office staff and national organizers

.

The group's

"statement of purpose" declared that UE members had

a

choice

between "returning the UE to the ranks of respectable CIO
unions with sound union objectives or allowing the UE to
hurry along to its own destruction as a front for the

American Communist Party and its program.

"^^

In keeping

with these principles, the MDA condemned the UE

'

contributions to the Civil Rights Congress and Southern
Conference for Human Welfare, groups they described as
"known Communist front organizations."

Harry Block told the press that UE members were

"overwhelmingly non-Communist."^^

He was right.

Yet

delegates at the 1946 annual convention resoundingly

defeated MDA's first slate of anticommunist candidates by
margins of 75 percent and 85 percent.

The delegates

defeated another MDA resolution, offered by Frank Hall,
business agent at Local 206 in Springfield, Massachusetts,
that would have barred communists from holding union
Such actions show that UE delegates were more

office.

concerned with the record of their leadership than they were

with their politics.
MDA members tried without success to get UE
Council

2

— the

•

s

District

New England district that included

Massachusetts— to take anticommunist positions.

In 1946,

communists from
Frank Hall introduced his resolution barring

membership at the District Council
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2

meeting after it had

.

.

been defeated at the national convention.

UE President

Albert Fitzgerald attended the meeting to argue against it.

Delegates soundly defeated the resolution
Carey and his allies, however, were determined to make
the politics of UE leaders a dividing line issue among

members.

Two months after the 1946 convention, Carey sent

the UE News a letter stating:

"The issue between me and the

present UE leadership goes solely to the proposition that
our great International Union has become known as a

transmission belt for the American Communist Party.

"^"^

Carey had plenty of help red baiting the UE leadership.

ACTU brought to MDA a network of identified anticommunist

union members, many of whom held office in their locals.
Labor priests advised local "Actists"
used to describe themselves

— while

— the

term ACTU members

Catholic labor schools

trained anticommunist UE members in parliamentary procedure
and debating skills.

Catholic labor doctrine provided the

ideological rationale for purging communists from the labor

movement
After the war, the CIO came under increasing national

pressure to "clean house."

Evening Post ran

a

In February 1947,

the Saturday

two-part expose by conservative

58
columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop on Reds in the CIO.

The UE was one of the featured unions.

The Alsops claimed

that 25 percent of all CIO members belonged to unions

controlled by communists, using the UE to explain how
communists seize control of unions.
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According to the

article, after Carey "built the electrical workers union up
into one of the strongest in the CIO," he was double-crossed
by cominunists and lost the presidency in a "close, bitter

election."

Communists got power, according to the Alsops,

because they forsook everything for the union and worked
harder than anyone else.

They recruited "dupes" by preying

on bored assembly line workers and helped them get elected
to local union offices.

Once elected, the "dupes" were

manipulated by communists to do their bidding.

The article

had all the markings of a planted FBI story.
The UE had been a target of congressional investigating

committees since Congressman Dies chaired HUAC.

After the

war, a conservative Congress redoubled pressure on the UE to

"clean house."

Ant icommunist MDA members worked closely

with these committees to discredit UE leadership and to
further their own position.

In 1947,

three months before

holding hearings on communism in Hollywood, HUAC

investigated communism in the UE
UE leaders testified.

Berescik,

Two,

.

Four anticommunist local

Joseph Julianelle and Michael

led Local 203 in Bridgeport, Connecticut.

When

a
they testified before HUAC, they were in the midst of

power struggle with the left wing of their local.

Testifying before HUAC was part of their strategy to
local.
eliminate their opposition and gain control of the
UE District
Julianelle and Berescik led the MDA movement in

Council 2.^^
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I

In July 1947,

District Council

2

debated a strongly

worded resolution condemning MDA and its red baiting
activities.

Julianelle and Berechik defended MDA at the

meeting, affirming that MDA "is committed to one thing, and
that is to work against the influence of Communism in the
UE."

Brother Hannigan, a member of Local 202 in

Springfield, condemned MDA, saying he never heard MDA people

talk about working conditions of people the union
represents.

Although MDA people called themselves "a

movement to save the people, really it is

a

movement to

crack the union wide open and put it in the hands of the
employers.

The District Council

2

resolution condemning

MDA passed "overwhelmingly."
In 1948,

Carey led off hearings to investigate

communist infiltration of the UE conducted by the House
Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and
Labor.

Carey told the committee about the formation of the

MDA and its anticommunist mission.

claiming they harassed MDA members.

He attacked UE leaders
He also made the

bizarre argument that employers favored communists as UE
stewards because they could not process grievances as

aggressively as anticommunist stewards.

Carey also

encouraged Senator Hubert Humphrey to investigate communists
in defense industry plants and sponsor legislation forcing
62
the
UE.
with
contracts
withdraw
to
contractors
defense

Congressional committees worked closely with UE

anticommunists throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.
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They

scheduled hearings on the eve of important union elections
to give anticoimnunists a boost in the local press;

subpoenaed local UE leaders to appear in Washington, taking
them out of the community just before crucial elections; and
held hearings in local communities creating a circus-like

atmosphere of charges and countercharges in the press that

coincided with UE contract negotiations or strike settlement
talks.

Congressional action was the most visible attack on the
UE by the federal government, but not the only.

The

Industrial Employee Review Board investigated dozens of GE
and Westinghouse workers it considered "poor security

risks."

Often their worst crime was opposing anticommunist

candidates for local UE leadership positions.

The Atomic

Energy Commission ordered GE to withdraw recognition of the
UE at an atomic power laboratory.^*

Carey used these

actions to scare UE members into thinking they would lose

their jobs unless all communists were purged from the union.
The Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits was another

powerful weapon Carey and his MDA allies used to drive

wedge between UE rank and file and their leaders.

a

The Taft-

Hartley Act, passed in 1947 over President Truman's veto,

mandated all union officers to file affidavits certifying
they were not members of the Communist party and did not
the
support any organization that advocated the overthrow of

government by any illegal means.

The law barred union

in
officers who did not file affidavits from participating
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National Labor Relations Board elections.

At first,

CIO

unions united in opposition to this and other antiunion

provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Their unity cracked

when AFL unions, whose officers filed affidavits and could
run in NLRB elections, began raiding CIO unions.

The UE and

other left-led unions were the last to sign the affidavits.
For UE and CIO leaders, not signing the affidavits was a

question of principle and union solidarity; for Carey, it
was another tactic to win over rank and file workers.
The CIO gave Carey and his MDA allies their most

important boost.

Even with all the outside interference

from the state, Carey still could not recapture the UE

presidency with the sole strategy of red baiting.

At the

September 1949 UE convention, he did not even bother to run
because he knew he did not have enough votes to win.

The

MDA candidate, Fred Kelly from Local 201 in Lynn, lost to
the incumbent president, Albert Fitzgerald, by a vote of
2335 (61 percent) to 1500 (39 percent).

Carey did not

become president of a union until 1950, when the CIO purged
the UE and chartered a new union, the lUE.

His strategy of

communist-led UE and

having workers decide between

a

anticommunist-led UE failed.

When the choice changed to the

unaffiliated UE and the lUE-CIO, he succeeded.
The CIO purged the UE and other left-led unions over

political issues, not labor issues.

The CIO and UE differed

on two policy issues: the Marshall Plan and Henry Wallace's

third party candidacy.

Secretary of State George
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C.

.

Marshall made a personal appeal for CIO support of his
foreign policy agenda at its 1947 annual convention held in
Boston.

Marshall was the first secretary of state to ever

address organized labor.

Because international leaders

studied Marshall's every word, he read from a carefully

worded prepared text.

George Baldanzi, the dynamic

president of the Textile Workers Union, had no such
limitation.

Speaking from the floor in support of the

Marshall Plan, he drew on delegates' heartstrings.

As part

of a labor delegation that toured Europe, Baldanzi

personally witnessed the devastating hunger and need which
he described to the convention.

fathers like you and
are part of them."

I.

"[I saw] mothers and

Our ancestors came from Europe.

We

He urged delegates to support the

Marshall Plan in order to prevent a communist takeover of
^

Europe
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Delegates also heard Boston's new Archbishop, Richard
Gushing.

Gushing' s style was vastly different from that of

his predecessor, Cardinal O'Gonnell.

Gushing opened his

remarks by noting the connections between the Ghurch and
labor,

ranging from Jesus the worker to the American

hierarchy, all sons of working men.

After giving the

American labor movement a hearty endorsement, Gushing
reminded GIO delegates that "everyone knows there are
potential traitors to America in our organizations in the
labor movement."

The solution rested with them, he argued.

"American Labor can solve the problem itself in an American
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"

way within the framework of American Law and in the
best
interests of the American people."*^
The CIO convention endorsed the Marshall Plan and

Truman's bid for re-election in 1948.

In January 1948,

CIO

President Philip Murray called on all working Americans to
support their legislative program/"^

This sent a message to

the UE and other left-led unions that they must toe the line
on the Marshall Plan and Truman's re-election.

Murray and

other labor leaders favored Truman over Henry Wallace, the

Progressive Party candidate.

Because of Congress's ugly,

antilabor mood, they desperately needed to keep
in the White House.

a

Democrat

Wallace stood little chance of being

elected and would only take votes away from Truman.

They

charged that communists supported Wallace because they

wanted to defeat Truman, leaving the country without a
moderating force on the national level and thus create
conditions ripe for revolution.

Joseph Salerno, president

of the Massachusetts CIO Council, charged that "The third

party movement of Wallace will accomplish nothing else but
assure the election of a reactionary President and national

administration.
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These issues were very important to CIO president
Murray.

The postwar strike wave unleashed a forceful,

conservative backlash against labor on the federal and state
level.

The Taft-Hartley Act promised to roll back labor's

New Deal gains and to strip it of power necessary to

confront management on a equal footing.

In Massachusetts,

the state legislature debated three antilabor bills

introduced in 1947 and 1948 by the Massachusetts Chamber of
Commerce.

One made it illegal to exclude workers from

employment for failing to join the union; another required
all votes for union officers to be taken by secret ballot;

and the third required strike votes to be taken by secret

ballot in an election overseen by the NLRB.

soundly defeated all three measures.

The legislature

Their proponents,

however, put them on the ballot as referenda.

State

organizations of the CIO, the AFL and Americans for
Democratic Action

antilabor bills. 6 9

(

ADA

)

,

joined forces to fight the

In November 1948,

defeated the measures by

a

Massachusetts voters

vote of two to one. 7 0

Murray tolerated communists and radicals in the CIO
because he needed them and respected their organizing work.
By 1948,

however, with so many powerful anticommunist

enemies in Congress, and with a growing anticommunist right

wing within the CIO itself, the UE and other left-led unions
became too much of

a

liability for Murray.

He acted by

That is, he failed to stop Walter Reuther's

omission.

strongly anticommunist United Auto Workers (UAW) from

raiding UE locals.

When the UE boycotted the 1949 CIO

convention to protest UAW raiding, Murray did nothing to
stop the anticommunists, led by Jim Carey, from expelling
the UE.

Carey also pushed through

declaring:

a

resolution passed

"UERMWA has been selected by the Communist Party

betray the
as its labor base from which it can operate to
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"

economic, political, and social welfare of the CIO, its

affiliates and members.

.

.

We can no longer tolerate within

the family of the CIO the Communist Party masquerading as a

labor union

.
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Thus began an internecine battle between the

unaffiliated UE and Carey's ClO-sponsored lUE that reached
into every local.

Because Carey's sole message was

anticommunism, it forced all rank and file members to take a

position on the red scare.

At the time, there were 36 UE

locals in Massachusetts representing approximately 44,000
workers.

Over half of all UE members in Massachusetts

belonged to one of two locals: Local 201 at the GE plants in
Lynn and Everett and Local 255 at the Pittsfield GE plant.
In June 1950,

after a bloody campaign, both locals voted to

affiliate with the lUE.

Table 5.1 shows the tallies.

Given the national and international context of these
elections, the UE did remarkably well in Lynn and

Table 5.1 NLRB election results from largest UE
locals in Massachusetts, June 1950

Local 201 (Lynn)
River Works/Everett
West Lynn

Number of
Voters

lUE

UE

11,523
3, 022

52%
61%

45%
35%

Local 255 (Pittsfield)

Lynn Telegram News, May 26, 1950; Be
Evening Eagle, May 25, 1950.
Source:
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Pittsfield.

Including data for all UE locals in the state,

the results are even more astonishing.

In spite of the

onslaught of anticommunist propaganda, more than half of the
locals stayed with the UE after it was expelled from the
CIO.

The smaller the local, the more likely it was to stay

in the UE

.

Table 5.2 shows this breakdown.

Table 5.2 Affiliation of UE locals
in Massachusetts, by size, 1952

Number of
members

lUE

Less than 100

1

100 - 500
500 - 1000
1000 - 2000
2000 - 3000
More than 3000

3
5
3
1
2

UE
7
9

2
1

1
0

An enormous amount of resources went into winning over
UE locals to the lUE.

The CIO contributed $800,000 to the

1950 election campaign; the Steelworkers gave $200,000.

UAW stopped raiding UE locals.

The

The CIO hired scores of

organizers for the lUE, many of whom were former MDA
members.

These resources were concentrated on winning over

the largest UE locals that would bring the largest number
of workers into the lUE.

Backed by this formidable array of

money and manpower, Carey finally convinced workers to
abandon the UE.
How then, did these national events play out on the
local level?

In order to understand how Carey and his MDA
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allies convinced workers to turn against the UE, we need to
look at what happened inside the locals.

First we will

consider the two biggest locals, 201 in Lynn and 255 in
Pittsfield, and then the grouping of locals in Springfield,

most of which voted to affiliate with the lUE.
Local 201, Lynn

Local 201 represented workers in GE

'

s

large heavy

current plants in Lynn and West Lynn, known as the River

Works plant, and in neighboring Everett.

By 1940,

the River

Works complex was the largest work site in Massachusetts.
The Everett plant manufactured superchargers and was much
Local 201 was the largest UE

smaller than the other site.

local in Massachusetts and in District Council

third largest local in the UE.

2,

and the

Its vote carried great

weight at national conventions.
GE workers in Lynn began meeting in August 1933 to

organize

a union.

led the effort.

Alfred Coulthard, a skilled patternmaker,

Coulthard was a socialist who emigrated

from England in 1920 and quickly found employment at the GE

plant in Lynn.

He worked with the Socialist party and the

Patternmakers League of North America,

a craft

union

affiliated with the AFL that survived at GE in the 1920s.
When the depression hit, Coulthard was one of the most
highly paid employees in the Lynn patternmaking shop.
1932,

GE laid off Coulthard for six months,

rehired him at a

reduced rate of pay, and then laid him off again.
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In

When

.

.

management ignored the grievance he filed with the company
union, he quit and turned to organizing

Coulthard and other union activists spent

year

a

organizing the plant and fighting for recognition from GE
In 1934,

the Lynn group became the first independent union

to bargain with GE

In 1936,

.

Lynn's big independent union

joined forces with Carey's Federal Labor Union to found the
UE

.

At its inaugural convention, delegates wanted Coulthard

to serve as secretary-treasurer, but he declined because he

wanted to spend his time organizing Local 201.
Emspak became UE

'

s

Julius

embattled secretary-treasurer.^"^

Instructors at a Catholic labor school run by St.

Mary's parish, Lynn's biggest Catholic church, first
introduced anticommunism as an issue in Local 201

's

affairs.

The Boston Archdiocese organized the labor school in 1941

when it decided to expand its labor school program into
industrial cities surrounding Boston.

Lynn was the only

city where a new labor school took root.
The Boston labor school program grew out of

unsuccessful efforts to organize an ACTU chapter.

Cardinal

the
O'Connell never approved of ACTU or its Boston sponsor,

Catholic Worker movement."'*

He gave them no monetary

their
support while retaining absolute control over
affairs.''^

In 1939,

the small Boston ACTU group decided not

organization because
to associate with the national ACTU
stabilized to be in a
they were "not so well organized or so

position to take an active part in
174

a

national

.

organization.

76
"

The Archdiocese responded by organizing

its own Catholic Labor Guild and by instituting a series of

labor school classes

-

Organizers within the Archdiocese planned the labor
school as an antidote to communist run labor schools that

attracted Boston workers in the popular front era.

The

school met one night a week, for three to four months.

At

first, organizers only recruited AFL unionists but, as

enrollment decreased in 1939-40, they also admitted CIO

unionists and women.

Enrollment peaked at 70 students in

At the Boston school,

1940.

on Catholic labor doctrine,

legislation

students listened to lectures
labor law and labor

77

The first session of the Lynn labor school opened

somewhat tentatively in November 1942.

Rev.

John

J.

Downey,

in early
a new schoolmaster appointed by Cardinal O'Connell

1943,

brought new energy to the program.

Classes in Lynn

men:
met on Sunday nights and were taught by three

Downey,

Macksey,
Augustus Keane, a high school teacher, and William
The Lynn school taught ethics
a "well known labor leader."

practical
and Catholic labor doctrine as well as more
procedure
subjects like public speaking and parliamentary

78

welcomed the
Lynn's Catholic workers and union leaders
message
They endorsed the school's principal
labor school.
and anticommunism.
of labor-management cooperation
1943,

In June

mark the closing of
the school held a gala banguet to

its second session.

Organized by Local 201 stewards, 150
175

supporters attended the banquet.

People who could not

attend listened to the speeches on the local radio station.
Father William

J.

Smith, a Jesuit, New York ACTU organizer,

and founder of the Crown Heights labor school in Brooklyn

gave the main speech.

He exhorted the audience to "build a

labor movement that is absolutely free of the spirit of
class conflict" and will fight against "sinister Communistic

influences

.

"^^

Local 201 leadership took a dim view of Father Smith
and St. Mary's labor school.

It reported to UE national

officers that Fathers Smith and Downey made

a "virulent"

attack on the leadership of Local 201, accusing the

executive board of being "90% communistic" and incompetent
According to the local, the public

in handling grievances.

attack from the labor school "coincides with a current

disruptive campaign of

group of [stewards] and members,

a

mainly from building 64, River Works, in the membership

meetings

.

"^°

At the opening banquet of the labor school's third

session in October 1943, 500 people showed up to hear guest
speaker Father William
Labor Relations Board.

J.

Kelly, a member of the New York

In the late 1930s,

Kelly served as

ACTU chaplain, mediated labor disputes for the New York
chapter, and taught at ACTU's labor school in Brooklyn.
Barber, president of Lynn's Central Labor Union and St.

Mary's Labor Association, served as toastmaster at the
banquet.

Kelly focused primarily on Catholic labor
176

Leo

"

1

doctrine, particularly Leo XIII

s

'

Rerum Novarum that

stressed labor-management cooperation.

Lynn Mayor Arthur

Frawley echoed the call for industrial peace, arguing that
there would be no need for strikes or lockouts if employer
8
and employee followed the teachings of Pope Leo XIII.

St. Mary's labor school disbanded, probably in the

summer of 1944, when the Boston Archdiocese withdrew its
support due to policy changes in the Chancery made by its
new Archbishop, Richard Gushing.

Father John

J.

Ryan, the

priest in the Chancery who supervised the Church's labor
activities, told Gushing that the Church's "normal and

traditional means of pulpit and press" reached far more

workers than the labor schools and was

a

more effective

method of teaching Catholic social doctrine.
argued,

In Church,

he

"we have them under ideal conditions, namely, under

the formality of Catholics, with workers, organized and

unorganized, as well as managers and employers, in the same

capacity

.

82

the
The closing of St. Mary's labor school illustrates

fighting
often ambiguous role of the Catholic church in

communism.

in
On the one hand, the school was effective

members to
organizing Catholic stewards and rank and file
Its
the local.
challenge the left-leaning leadership of
class lines to
banquets brought Catholics together across
The Archdiocese, on
oppose communism in the labor movement.

in building an
the other hand, seemed uninterested
control of union
organization to battle communists for
177

locals.

Church leadership required absolute control of its

projects.

Mary's labor school was too messy and too

St.

remote from Boston for that kind of control.

Father Downey

reported to the Chancery that the school

students

'

s 45

included "one communist, one very pink Jewish female lawyer,
and three non-Catholics."

83

The Church hierarchy wanted to

fight communism on its terms.

After St

.

Mary

*

s

labor school closed, the next

organized effort to combat communism in Local 201 surfaced
in March 1947 when a group of GE workers met at the Knights
of Columbus Hall to form the Committee Against Communism.

Archie Shields,

a

spokesperson for the committee told the

press that: 84
The purpose of this committee is to prevent a
communist from holding any elective office or
It is a known
appointive position in our local.
fact that we have them in our local, and in
It is felt, that
responsible positions at that.
with all the criticism being made against us, that
It is quite
we should clean up our own house...
possible that the results of this committee could
set a pattern that would be followed throughout
[The situation]
the nation, local by local...
demands that the spotlight be brought to bear on
those who seek to undermine our way of life.
the
Shields reported that many UE shop stewards attended

meeting, but none of the officers participated.

He

at
announced that the committee would hold its next meeting

Local 201

's

headquarters and invited the press to attend.

The origins of this committee are not clear.

Some

ties to the
organizers were Catholics with close enough

Knights of Columbus to use their hall.
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They may have

participated in the St. Mary's labor school
earlier.
of MDA,

a few

years

The goals of the committee are identical to those
the Carey-ACTU alliance formed in the summer of 1946

to oust the national leadership.

Perhaps Shields or some

other committee members attended MDA meetings.

The Lynn

anticommunists chose to use a different name, which suggests
that if there was a direct connection, they did not want to

reveal it.

Shields

's

use of the media was clever and calculated.

It is doubtful he had permission to hold the committee's

next meeting in Local 201

's

union hall.

By inviting the

press, he guaranteed coverage if the local officers denied

them use of the space.

Shields

's

reference to "all the

criticism being made against us" shows the impact of the
Alsop brothers anticommunist article in The Saturday Evening
Post.

Local 201 figures prominently in the article because

UE president Albert Fitzgerald came from the Lynn local.

Shields relied on the unfavorable national publicity to

generate local interest in the committee.
Local politicians also generated negative publicity

about the danger of communists in the labor movement.

Representative Kendall Sanderson from Marblehead,

a

wealthy

seaside resort town, neighboring working class, industrial
Lynn, worked with the Chamber of Commerce and other

conservatives to promote antilabor legislation.

Sanderson

of
claimed that the goal of his bills was to "rid unions

Communist domination.""

In March 1947,
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shortly after the

formation of Shields

's

Committee Against Communism,

Sanderson held hearings in Boston to investigate a Local 201
strike vote taken in January 1946

.

At the hearing,

Sanderson questioned labor representatives about the
Committee Against Communism.

Sanderson knew about the

anticommunist committee from Reverend Wilcox, the minister
of Lynn's Unitarian-Universalist Church who was leading a

local crusade against the UE.®^

Wilcox reported to the Lynn

87
Kiwanis Club that Local 201 was "Communist dominated."

Shields told the press that Local 201

's

business agent,

Fred Kelly, knew about the formation of the committee but
had nothing to do with it.

Kelly represented local UE

officers who initially opposed the anticommunist MDA as
before
being divisive to the labor movement, but jumped ship

their
1949 when they saw how red baiting could advance
career.

industry.

Kelly never worked in a factory in the electrical
While attending a local business school, he

a clerk in
worked as an usher in a local theatre and as

local grocery store.

His father belonged to Local 201

executive board in the late 1930s.

a

's

When Kelly graduated

him a job as a clerk in
from business school, his father got
the books and supervised
the local's office where he kept
Kelly began working
distribution of the local's newspaper.
of Local 201 's founders and
one
Coulthard,
Al
with
closely
of "Assistant to the
title
the
took
and
agent,
its business
member of Local 201 when
Business Agent." Kelly became a
permitting office staff
by-laws
its
revised
the membership
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.

to join the union.

As a member of Local 201,

office of "Assistant Business Agent."
in the Army during the war,

he ran for the

After serving

a

stint

he returned to Lynn and ran for

Coulthard's position as business agent when Coulthard left
Lynn to serve on the Massachusetts State Labor Commission
As Local 201 *s business agent, Kelly sat on the national GE

Negotiating Committee where he failed to distinguish
himself

.

®®

In July 1947, when District Council

2

debated a

resolution condemning MDA and its tactics, Kelly spoke out
strongly against anticommunists active in his local.

89

despise this stuff and have seen too much of
[MDA] people in my
I want the respect of
it...
Local, but I won't join them in a trade union
We should fight for the principles for
hall.
In the past six
which the trade union was formed.
months this group has spent time, energy, and
somebody's money to fight Communism, while we got
the Taft-Hartley Law.
I

Kelly also blasted James Carey, MDA

'

s

figurehead,

lacking interest in rank and file members.

for

"For the past

but let
ten years Carey wouldn't come to any union meeting,
and he attends."
a group of manufacturers come to town,

90

a
Sometime in the next year or so, Fred Kelly had

conversion.

By November 1948,

he was working with

officers
anticommunists in Local 201 to embarrass national
and drive

a

members.
wedge between them and rank and file

choice to stand in for
By June 1949, Kelly had become MDA's
for president of the union
Fitzgerald
against
run
and
Carey

promised to "clean
When he accepted the nomination, he
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1

house" of "left wing pinkos" and "undesirable like

Communists." 9

Kelly's conversion was part of Carey's

calculated strategy.

Carey had to win the support of big

locals in order to regain control of the UE.

Perhaps Carey

himself wooed Kelly.
The first break between Local 201 leadership and the

national office came in September 1948 when a majority of
the executive board voted to send UE national officers and

CIO president Philip Murray a telegram urging them to sign
the non-Communist af f idavits

At a general membership

.

meeting in November 1948, anticommunist members provoked
criticism of the editorial content of UE News.

The local

Communist party had distributed a leaflet in Lynn that was
similar in content to the front page editorial of UE News.
It called on workers to hold Truman to the campaign promises

he made in order to steal the thunder of third-party

candidate Henry Wallace.

Local 201 anticommunists argued

that the leaflet showed the Communist party dominated the
UE.

The membership instructed Kelly, their business agent,

to contact the national office and find out "how the paper
is operated and who is responsible for its editorial

policy."

They also wanted to know how to stop the paper

from being delivered to their homes.

93

Around this time, anticommunists at the Everett

supercharger plant introduced resolutions at membership
As a
UE.
meetings condemning communist infiltration in the
up a committee to
result of their complaints. Local 201 set
182

"

investigate the allegations and to make recommendations for
further action by the members.

In March 1949, the committee

recommended that Local 201 "urge national officers to use
all nationwide communication systems within their power to

combat charges that the UE is Communist dominated and to
insure the UE membership that they themselves are not

Communists

.

94

Anticommunists did a good job using national publicity
They continued

to stir up dissent among the rank and file.

to press for compliance with the Taft-Hartley non-Communist

affidavits, an issue that tended to make national officers
look guilty.

If they were not communists,

refuse to sign the oaths?

In March 1949,

why did they
Local 201

's

executive board sent a second telegram to national officers

demanding they file the af f idavits

.

At the same time,

anticommunists began tapping into international cold war
tensions as well.

In April 1949,

the membership voted to

wire the Massachusetts Congressional delegation and
the
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urging them to pressure

Mindzenty
United Nations to demand a new trial for Cardinal
from slave
of Hungary and to work for release of prisoners

labor camps in the Soviet Union.

Eastern European workers

and wanted
were particularly concerned about these issues

aggression.
their union to take a stand against Soviet
the
No one knew, however, how many converts

anticommunists recruited.

One vote suggested skilled

workers still backed the UE.

In April 1949,
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the AFL's

:

attempt to win over die sinkers at the River Works plant
came to

a

head when the NLRB scheduled an election.

The Die

Sinkers International Conference, an AFL craft organization,
was the only union on the ballot.

The UE could not be

listed because its officers refused to file the non-

Communist affidavits.

The UE mounted a vigorous "no union"

campaign to maintain the status guo.
(55 percent)

Sinkers.

for "no union" and 71

The final vote was 91
for the Die

(45 percent)

Although this was only an election among

a

small

fraction of the work force, it shows these highly skilled

workers were not ready to abandon the UE.
At a Dayton, Ohio meeting in May 1949, the MDA

nominated Fred Kelly to run against Fitzpatrick.
hundred delegates attended the meeting to plan
the left wingers.

a

Three
"war" on

Kelly told fellow anticommunists

"You've got to put up with Commies spying in your local.
Give them as little information as possible.
9
every inch of the way."

Fight them

8

first open battle
A week after he returned to Lynn, the

between Kelly and Fitzpatrick erupted in
meeting.

a

membership

referendum in
The Kelly forces wanted to hold a

should be elected
the local on whether Kelly or Fitzpatrick
lock all delegates
president of the UE. The outcome would
national convention,
into voting for the winner at the
and deliver a large
votes,
201
-s
Local
splitting
prevent
on winning the
gambled
Kelly
winner.
the
to
block of votes
referendum lost
The resolution calling for the
referendum.
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.

at the afternoon membership meeting attended by day shift

workers, but won at the evening meeting when Kelly

supporters packed the hall.

Throughout the day, the River

Works and Everett plants buzzed about the open split between
Kelly and Fitzpatrick who had been once been close
friends
The next day Fitzpatrick put out a flyer headlined

"What's Happening in Local 201?"

He claimed that nine out

of thirteen executive board members supported him, and that

the entire board had previously rejected unanimously the

idea of a referendum.

He accused Kelly of "staging a plot"

and described the resolution as unconstitutional.

Fitzpatrick

'

s

But

effort to shore up his position backfired.

Four executive board members said they had been tricked into

having their names used on the Fitzpatrick flyer.
Wilson, a National Guard captain said:

"I

Ray

hate Communism

and do not stand for the party-line Commies who are trying
to sabotage this union."

The executive board set a date for

the referendum election and a pre-election rally to which it

invited the press.

'^^^

Four weeks later. Local 201 members voted between Kelly
and Fitzpatrick.

The national office and Fred Kelly

for
exchanged angry telegrams, both sides blaming the other

disrupting the real work of the local.

Fitzgerald told

ambitions for
Kelly that he was "promoting [his] personal
Kelly
work.
office" instead of doing the business agent's
similar charges
pointed out that the Daily Worker published
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under

a

pirturo of Fitzgerald.
office set up

nat ional

oicjauizers

in

sate

a

He objected when tho

1

iLc ol

I

I

i

cu

in

to "disorganize the organized

and scrit

l.ynn

."

Kelly won 72 percent of tho vote; Fitzgerald won 28

Approximately 63 percent of eligible workct:. voted

percent.
in

Turnout for

the referendum.

elections hovorod
West

I.ynn

plant

to porr<Mit

,il)oid

p(^rront

(7.1
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(

finer and steward

in

Communistic inflnences that

very popul.n

support from

brou(jhl

Local

in

he ()iom()tc(l iicnty Wallace

wlKMi
ye.
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li()lit

Kelly

had h<'lp

al::o

Fitzpatrirk, accord inq to the

from ACTU organizers.
onc(.>

the I'lverott

"militant

a

both Catholic and Protestant clergy."

had

in the

hor.t

Lynn's local newspaper

repoitod Kelly won heeause he waged
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Kf^Uy ran

.

wcur.t
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)
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7
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Scptembui

In
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at

national

th.'

Kit/.pat.ick defeated Kelly by

vote

a

ui

UK

convnlion,
some

233B to 1500.

disret,arded tho
Local 201 delc.,.,tcs, includinci Fitzpatrirk,

referendum vote
month,

<li<l

ar.

Numeiically,

it

Kelly.
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lo.

ic.
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Ucjures

M
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1

1

b).-al,
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lo,

that

Kelly,

liowevi,
and

without

^

.n>

:;.'ymou.

split

Seymour,

I'aul

to uns.'at

y

was a veiy close vote.
hy

The |..IIowmu,

vote (nr Kelly.

.uvt

Kelly tried nnsucc<-.s

loyalist,

UK

an.l

a

.

loi

y

won handily:

53

voto.^°^

These

their

concentrated .uqani/inq hy

wrth
UE workers chose to reman,
1

R6

.

heai

un.ou

in spite of the red baiting.

They also point to the pattern

of the 1950 elections when the lUE won big locals where it

concentrated all its efforts and lost smaller locals that it
ignored.

Both elections attest to the underlying strength

of local control.

When Kelly lost to Seymour, he and his followers walked
out of the District Council meeting to openly plan a

secession movement.
Local 201
dues.

's

On October 28,

1949,

a

majority of

executive board voted to stop paying per capita

On November 13th, 2,000 people attended a meeting

called by Kelly to form a new union.

James Carey, the main

speaker, presented Kelly with a charter for Local 201,
CIO.

lUE-

While Carey spoke, hecklers challenged him to prove
Carey replied:

that UE leaders were communists.

"I

don't

The time has long since

have to prove it, the FBI will.

come when Communists must be cleaned out of the CIO and the

American labor movement ."
For the next six months, the UE and lUE worked

feverishly to position themselves for NLRB elections in all
GE plants scheduled for May 1950.

anticommunism and red-baiting.

Kelly's sole message was

In a flurry of campaigning

just before the election. Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin,
to
CIO president Philip Murray, and Jim Carey came to Lynn

pitch the same message.

Tobin broke precedent by taking

represented
sides in a labor dispute because the election
trade unionism.
vital issue of Americanism, not an issue of
communism.
He came to Lynn as an American fighting
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"No

other issue exists here... It is my political duty to drive

Communists out of the unions."

Murray said

Communism because it speaks evil.
antithesis of democracy."

"I hate

Communism is the very

He told the crowd he had talked

to Fitzgerald, Emspak and Matles many times trying to

convince them to change their ways, but they refused.

Alfred Coulthard was the UE

'

s

most prominent speaker.

When Tobin announced he would visit Lynn on behalf of the
lUE,

Coulthard agreed to break his silence and openly side

with the UE.

To do this, he resigned from his position on

the Massachusetts State Labor Board.

Coulthard was highly

regarded in Lynn; UE members named their union hall after
him.

Two thousand members jammed the hall to hear him

speak.

He talked about the formation of the union, how mucl

it had meant to workers in the plant,

accomplished.

and how much it had

He stressed that communism was a false issue

the real issue being which union would do a better job

representing workers.
In 1941,

Coulthard surprised many old timers.

he wrote a harsh editorial in the local's newspape

equating communism with nazism and condemning communists in
the labor movement.

"Men are not free if they are members

out o
of the Communist or Nazi Party... This writer will go
a limb.

There should be no room for leadership in a

Democratic set-up for an avowed disbeliever in
Democracy. "^^^

Coulthard's 1950 endorsement of the left-

for the
led UE carried great weight and helps account

closeness of the vote in Lynn.
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Fred Kelly reaped many rewards for changing sides.

Murray appointed him to fill Fitzgerald's seat on the CIO

executive council after the UE ouster.

Within the lUE,

Kelly had to step aside for Carey who was elected president.
However, he was elected president of lUE's District Council
2,

a

position which he turned into

a

full-time job.^°^

The split between the lUE and the UE in the River
Works, West Lynn and Everett production units remained

fairly constant in the early 1950s.

the vote

In May 1950,

was 55 percent (lUE) to 44 percent (UE); in December 1953,
in another NLRB election,
46 percent

(UE).

the tally was 54 percent (lUE) to

The lUE did not win over more workers even

after the full gale force of McCarthyism hit Massachusetts.

Anticommunism among workers in Local 201 grew slowly
throughout the 1940s.

The Catholic church was

a

constant

force in promoting anticommunism and attacking local UE

leadership.

St.

Mary's labor school trained Catholic UE

stewards and activists in ant icommunist Catholic labor

doctrine and organizing skills.

The labor school had ties

to active ACTU chapters in New York.

Some Local 201

anticommunists also worked with MDA, the national Careywithin.
ACTU alliance formed to oust the UE leadership from

Anticommunist activists used Local 201 membership meetings
foreign and its
to criticize national UE leadership on its

failure to sign the Taft-Hartley affidavits.
Kelly, Local 201

's

When Fred

business agent, was converted,
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,

anticommunists could coordinate better local attacks on UE
leadership with statewide and national UE efforts.

Kelly's most important ally in Massachusetts was John
Callahan, business agent of Local 255 in Pittsfield.
Local 255, Pittsfield
Local 255 also represented GE workers.

The electrical

giant came to Pittsfield in 1903 when it bought out Stanley

Electric

a local

,

,

well-established company that

manufactured alternating current generators.
War

Prior to World

6,000 Yankees and "old immigrant" Irish and Germans

I,

worked at GE

.

War-time production opened up jobs to newer

immigrants, primarily Italians, Poles and other eastern

Europeans.

World War II brought women into the plant.

At

peak production in the early 1940s, 12,000 people worked at
GE in Pittsfield.

Working men and women from industrial

towns all over the Berkshires considered GE jobs to be the
best in the area.

108

The UE chartered Local 255 in 1939, three years after
its founding.

Union men from the big GE local in

Schenectady, one of UE
local.

•

s

pioneers, organized the Pittsfield

As in Lynn, Pittsfield workers most receptive to

skilled
these early organizing efforts were high paid, high

welders and winders.
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John Callahan, Local 255

's

leading anticommunist

steward and
helped organize the GE local serving as shop
He was an
officer before becoming business agent in 1945.
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embattled leader, who frequently feuded with local leaders
and national officers.

Unpredictable, he often surprised

other union leaders with sudden policy changes.

Callahan

was also impressionable and thin-skinned, and a willing

anticommunist when influenced by like minded people.
UE loyalists in Pittsfield believed Callahan began

working with Carey as early as the 1943 annual convention,
which he attended as

a

delegate for Local 255.

convention that year was

a

The

spectacle of patriotic unity

until the issue of James Carey was raised.

By 1943,

national officers had broken irrevocably with Carey.

Convention delegates voted down

a

resolution endorsing Carey

for another term as secretary-treasurer of the CIO.

Local 255

's

When

convention delegates reported back to the

membership meeting, they failed to mention the anti-Carey
resolution.

Callahan took the floor, disclaiming

accusations he said were made at the convention that he was

working for Carey.

Callahan made

a

motion requesting a

national officer attend their next membership meeting and

defend him.-^^°
character.

This episode helps us understand Callahan's

If he was not working with Carey,

as he claimed,

why make an issue out of it?
Father Eugene Marshall, pastor of St. Mary's, the
largest Catholic church in Pittsfield, led the anticommunist

crusade in Pittsfield.

His church overlooked the sprawling

and their
GE plant and serviced most Catholic GE workers

families.

Marshall admired Father Charles Owen Rice of
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Pittsburgh, the most well known labor priest in America.
Rice led the ACTU movement in Pittsburgh, and was Carey's

most valuable ally in MDA even though Rice did not think

very highly of Carey's leadership ability.

Rice had a

popular weekly radio broadcast in Pittsburgh from which he

preached an uncompromising message of anticommunism.

masterminded the ouster of communists from UE

'

s

He

big

Pittsburgh local and was Marshall's mentor.
Marshall used the pulpit to warn GE workers about the
One sermon, delivered

dangers of communism within the UE.

in June 1946, compared the "two ways of life

Communistic."

In it,

— Christian

and

he preached that parishioners should

be concerned about the spread of communism.

He explained

that communist minorities exercise influence because other

people were lazy and did not bother to get involved.

This

is how communists took over in Spain, Mexico and Russia,

according to Marshall.

Allowing Reds to remain within the

borders of the United State threatened national security.

Marshall's words echoed the concerns of eastern
European workers.

In February 1948,

Local 255 passed

unanimously a resolution "condemning the Hungarian
The
Government for their treatment of Cardinal Mindzenty."
events in eastern
lack of opposition shows the importance of
under Soviet
Europe to workers with relatives now living
officers to
The resolution called on UE s national
rule.
public statement in
take the same position and to publish a
to respond to the
UE News.''^^ National officers failed
•
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resolution and UE News editorial policy continued to attack
the Marshall Plan, positions that increased the pull of
ant i communism among eastern European workers.

Marshall told his parishioners to help the cause by

fighting communist influence in the UE.

He cautioned the

working class audience not to be fooled by union leaders.
Albert Fitzgerald "has

a fine name that

might disarm anyone,

but he's as Red as the flag of Russia."

that local leaders were also communists.

Marshall implied
"I

suppose not

more than three percent of the union here is Communistic,
but the delegates they sent to the convention in Milwaukee
last month voted to support the Red top."^^"^

Callahan was one of those delegates.

Upset by

Marshall's implication, he issued a statement to the
Berkshire Eagle:

"I

cannot possibly conceive of any basis,

other than vicious rumor, on which such charges are made.
It is as ridiculous to say that our national organization is

dominated by communists as it is to imply that there are
communists within our local which are dominating its
activities. "^^*

Two months later, however, at the State CIO

Council meeting, Callahan worked with the constitutional

committee to pass an amendment prohibiting members of the

Communist party, or any communist, fascist, or nazi
organization, from holding office.

When Callahan returned

press conference
to Pittsfield from the meeting, he held a
to take credit for the amendment
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''^^

Callahan acted on his own at the state CIO convention,

shocking Local 255 officers who also attended the meeting.
Pete Jacquot, president of Local 255, called an emergency

meeting at his house as soon as he returned from the CIO
convention to tell other union leaders about Callahan's
actions.

He opposed the Callahan amendment; other officers

who did not attend the meeting agreed with Jacquot.

They

wanted to take action against Callahan and his wife, who
worked in the union office and had considerable influence
over him.

Jacquot argued against it.

He convinced the

group it was more important to maintain unity in the face of

scheduled discussions with GE on the "wage-price question."
He only wanted to warn them about what Callahan was doing in

case he tried to push through a similar amendment to the

local's constitution.

Callahan reversed his position the following summer

when he supported a strongly worded resolution condemning
the anticommunist MDA at a District Council meeting.

were
Callahan said the MDA, Father Marshall and the press
to
"smearing the UE" and making it difficult for them

collect PAC contributions from members.

He reported that

disrupting our meetings
"now people are coming down who are
improving because some
and we can't do our business. We are
involved with [MDA] and
good friends of mine who have been
Perhaps
up."^^'
attended some of their meetings, are fed
with his
Callahan learned local officers disagreed
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anticommunist activities at the state CIO meeting and
decided to pull back.
The disruption Callahan reported probably came from

Catholic anticommunists.

Marshall recruited GE workers in

Church-sponsored groups, like the Holy Name Society, and
helped them organize an anticommunist bloc within Local 255.
They aimed to drive a wedge between UE members and national
leaders.

They spread rumors that other CIO leaders said UE

Secretary-Treasurer Matles "sold them down the river" with
the latest contract; and they urged members not to

contribute to the UE
Russia.

'

s

PAC because the money went to

-^^^

By 1948,

year before.

Callahan joined the people he condemned the
Partly, it was to retaliate against the

national office.

During the six-week nationwide strike

against GE in early 1946, the UE national office sent Ed

Turkowski to Pittsfield to assist Local 255.
chafed at Turkowski

'

s

Callahan

presence, believing the national

office did not trust him to conduct a militant strike.

He

denied the charge, claiming the national office failed to
credit "the fine job that has been done here and the fact
1 19
that we enjoyed unusually strong community support."

Callahan also joined the anticommunists because, like Fred
Kelly in Lynn, he too had a "conversion."

President Truman

met with Callahan and helped woo him to the anticommunist

cause during a whistle-stop campaign swing through

Massachusetts in 1948.
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Callahan and other anticommunists in Local 255 used the

Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavits as an issue to
discredit the national leadership.

In October 1948,

a month

after Local 201 in Lynn demanded compliance, Local 255

's

executive board demanded that national officers "explain
In November, members passed a

their position

resolution denouncing the editorial policies of the UE News
for never criticizing the Soviet Union, for failing to

congratulate Truman on his victory, and for opposing the
Marshall plan.-^^^

Local 201 in Lynn made similar complaints

during the same month.

Whether Callahan and Kelly followed

a nationwide MDA strategy or simply coordinated efforts,

it

was not a coincidence that both locals took similar actions
at the same time.

Father Marshall played a key role in this period as
well.

Supporters of the national office wanted to get the

November anti-L7E News resolution rescinded.

In January

stationery
1949, Marshall wrote parishioners on St. Mary's

meeting and
urging them to attend an up-coming membership
would "uphold
"vote your convictions." He said the meeting
courage to be real
or denounce the men who had the moral
the time for] the
Americans and stand by the USA... [Now is
its presence felt."'^
right wing [to] be organized and make

through a
The Callahan-Marshall forces pushed
and District
resolution asking all Local 255 officers
sign non-Communist
council president Paul Seymour to
affidavits.

Anticommunists claimed they wanted the
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.

affidavits "solely for our own reassurance" and not to force
compliance with Taft-Hartley

.

'^^^

Father Marshall

distributed postcards to UE parisioners telling them to
"Vote American

— Vote

for Christ. "^^*

The meeting marked the

beginning of the open split between anticommunists (right

wingers as they called themselves) and unionists loyal to
the national officers (left wingers as they called

themselves

)

Two weeks later, anticommunists sponsored a resolution

condemning UE Field Organizer Gerard Steinberg for trying
"to disrupt the affairs of Local 255 by seeking to persuade

certain of its members to act in a manner that would be

detrimental to the welfare of the local."

Anticommunist

officers barred Steinberg and Albert Smith, UE International
Representative, who still refused to sign non-Communist
affidavits.

Callahan called a press conference after the

meeting to denounce Smith and Steinberg as "troublemakers"
and "disrupters."^"

A week later, the Springfield Union

published an editorial written by Callahan demanding UE
He claimed
national officers sign non-Communist affidavits.
because it had a "red
GE workers were not joining the union
tag" on it.-^^^

orchestrated the
in spring 1949, while Fred Kelly
pressed
referendum idea for the Lynn local, Callahan

national officers to sign the affidavits.

Callahan called a

Fitzgerald, Matles, and
press conference to announce that
26th general membership
Emspak had been invited to the May

meeting where they would be asked to sign the affidavits "in
the presence of the assembly."

The next day, May 24th,

Callahan informed the national officers of the meeting by
Callahan timed the letters to arrive in

registered letter.

New York on May 25th, one day before the meeting.

wired back:

They

"None of the UE National Officers will

participate in any such staged monkeyshines with you and
Fred Kelly

"^^"^
.

In June 1949,

Callahan surprised everyone with an "off

the cuff" talk to the Pittsfield Rotary Club on the "inside
story" of the 1946 strike.

Callahan accused the national

office of wanting to incite violence by sending a "known

Communist from St. Louis" to help the UE field

representative organize a "goon squad" to overturn cars and
use lead pipes against police.

He divulged to the Rotarians

that only his level headed leadership and close cooperation
the
with the Pittsfield police chief prevented the violence

communists wanted.

Callahan's remarks.
of the information,

National news media reported
GE s publicity department made good use
•

reporting in their newsletter that:

goon squads."
"Reds were sent to Pittsfield to organize
and quickly to
The UE national office reacted angrily
union,
In order to save face within the
Callahan's speech.

Callahan made a retraction in the press.

After denying that

"wanted or encouraged
he said the UE national officers
launched into a
violence during the strike period," he

renewed attack on the UE leadership:
198
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Communists thrive on bloodshed, disorder and
unemployment... for a number of years the national
office of our union has been influenced and
controlled by persons who are either Communists or
Communist sympathizers.
I
did not charge that all
our national officers are Communists, just two out
But the reputation of the third for
of three.
following the Commy line is well established.

Callahan was

In May 1949, when he

loose cannon.

a

joined the national GE Negotiating Committee, he wrote

Charles Wilson, GE

'

s

president, offering to withdraw the

Conference Board's wage demands in response for
maintain current job levels.

a

promise to

Callahan wrote privately,

without authorization from or knowledge of the Conference
Board.

Wilson rejected the deal

^"^^
.

Callahan's unauthorized communication with Wilson

outraged the rest of the GE Negotiating Committee, which
immediately removed him from the committee.
Council

2,

District

however, had to ratify the removal.

proved more of

a

The vote

referendum on the open split between right

wingers and left wingers than on Callahan's actions.

Fred

the motion was
Kelly, Callahan's strongest defender, argued
a

right
subterfuge to "smear a guy who has turned to the

wing."

District Council

2

ouster motion, 281 to 311.

delegates narrowly rejected the
Local 255, Local 201 in Lynn,

locals in Bridgeport,
and smaller, strongly anticommunist
meeting,
Connecticut supported Callahan. At the same
and defeated
Callahan and Kelly combined their votes
and UE national
District council president, Paul Seymour,
to the national
representative Albert Smith as delegates
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convention.

It was the first time either man had been

opposed for election as delegate.
Both sides fought hard in the struggle for control of
the UE.

Since its formation, UE built a reputation for

solidarity with its striking locals.

In District 2, the big

Lynn and Pittsfield locals gave generously to small locals
on strike.

As the right wing/left wing split deepened,

local leaders had to choose whether to support a striking
local based on the politics of its leaders.

Workers at

Keystone Manufacturing Company, a small shop outside Boston,

waged a long bitter strike in spring 1949.

Local 261,

Boston's big amalgamated that remained loyal to national
officers, represented Keystone.

workers a mere $62.47.

Local 255 sent Keystone

A local officer explained the

collection was so meager because "our people resent the fact
that [Local 261] Business Agent, Hannegan, was sent to

picket the [MDA] conference, where that money could have

helped feed some of the strikers.

"^^^

Callahan participated

right
in that MDA conference and helped get Fred Kelly the

wingers' endorsement to run against Fitzgerald.

In sharp

contrast, when striking workers at Singer Sewing Machine
Local 255
Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut asked for help.

sent $2,500.^^^

Officers of the Singer local were firmly in

the anticommunist

,

right wing camp.

Callahan and his allies copied Kelly's unit-vote
candidates.
strategy to deliver more votes for anticommunist
convention, right
When Local 255 met following the 1949
200

wingers sponsored a motion instructing Local 255 delegates
to vote for Fred Kelly as president of District Council

2.

The motion finessed direct election of delegates by

empowering the executive board, now controlled by right
wingers, to appoint the delegates.

At a later meeting,

right wingers pushed through a motion stating "any delegate

who violates the wishes of the membership will be

immediately removed from office."

When District Council

2

met, Kelly lost to incumbent president Paul Seymour by a

narrow margin.

Pete Jacquot, Local 255 president, voted

against Kelly in defiance of the right wingers' mandate.
to this point, Jacquot had remained neutral.

the District Council meeting. Local 255

's

Up

The day after

executive board

suspended Jacquot from the union he helped build by a vote
of 21 to 12.-^^^

Once the CIO expelled the UE, the split between right

wingers and left wingers within Local 255 turned into
battle between the UE and the lUE.
his weight behind the lUE.
1949,

a

Father Marshall threw

At Sunday mass on November 20,

the day of a membership meeting to discuss seceding

from the UE, Marshall preached from the pulpit:
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Do you want to belong to a bona fide American
trade union or do you wish to belong to a party
line union... I don't think there is any
alternative for a loyal American citizen... Any
man who prefers to follow the Messrs. Fitzpatrick,
Emspak and Matles is in absolute disobedience to
the directives of the Holy Father, lacks the
common sense of a patriotic citizen and is a
It's a choice between
Catholic in name only.
Christ and Stalin.
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There was no uncertainty in Marshall's position.

James

Carey spoke that afternoon praising Callahan for working "to
oust the Communist influence from the National and local

organization."
baiting.

Like Marshall, Carey's only message was red-

He criticized UE national officers on foreign

policy issues without ever mentioning any trade union
issues.

"This is a fight between the American worker and

the Communist Party."

Callahan echoed Carey's message,

telling members "we're preventing you from turning over our
money to the Communist Party.

"^'^^

The NLRB scheduled a

Local 255 split into rival camps.

representation election for May 1950.

As in Lynn, both

sides campaigned feverishly in the final days.

Father

Marshall did everything he could to defeat the UE.

Ten days

before the vote, he brought Father Charles Owen Rice, ACTU's
national chaplain and pre-eminent labor priest, to
Pittsfield.

The program, sponsored by the Knights of

Columbus, was broadcast over a local radio station.

Rice

praised Marshall as "one of the most outspoken and
the
courageous priests in the United States" before tracing

development of Catholic labor doctrine.

When asked about

were fortunate
the UE-IUE election, he said GE workers
grips with the
because they had the opportunity to "come to
was the
Communist menace." According to Rice, communism

only issue in the election.
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influence of Fathers
Left wingers understood well the
Hoping to outflank
Rice and Marshall among union members.
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the priests, a UE delegation called on Marshall's bishop in

Springfield, a man with more moderate views.

They asked him

to assure GE workers they were free to vote their conscience
in the election.

With such a statement in hand, they

planned to tell union members the election was a personal
matter, not a "choice between Stalin and Christ."

plan backfired.

But the

The two hour meeting ended with no public

statement from the UE delegation or the Bishop.
The Sunday before the election, Marshall and the pastor
at the other Catholic church in Pittsfield preached against

the UE

.

Both priests quoted liberally from two documents:

Albany's Bishop Gibbons 's statement denouncing the UE as
"Communist controlled and Communist dominated" and

J.

Edgar

Hoover's report finding "every member of the Communist party
is pledged to sabotage our country if war should come with

Russia."

While Marshall preached, the women of St. Mary's

annual breakfast gathering heard Regina Kirkpatrick,

publicity director of the National Catholic Lay Women's
Retreat Movement, denounce the UE.

"You are either going to

be on Our Lady's side or Satan's side."
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The final drive of the campaign brought James Carey

back to Pittsfield.

Two days before the election, he

"revealed" new information that local UE field organizer

Gerard Steinberg was a "dangerous Communist... and traitor
to our nation."

In a new twist on red-baiting,

he invited

if
Steinberg to sue him for defamation of character implying

Steinberg did not sue, then the charge must be true.
203

Callahan repeated the Steinberg charge at a noontime gate
rally the day of the election.

He quoted a report prepared

by a CIO investigating committee that was staffed with UE

dissidents, and distributed a leaflet detailing the charges.
"We have more Jerry," he taunted,

"We welcome a suit."

It

was impossible for Steinberg to refute the charges on such
short notice.

The tactic served to bring the issue of

communist infiltration home to Local 255.

It worked well,

and gave Callahan and his anticommunist allies

a

new issue

to present as workers filed into polling places to vote.

The anticommunist lUE carried Local 255 with 70 percent
of the vote,

Undoubtedly,

a larger margin than in Lynn.

Father Marshall was an important factor in the victory.

After the vote, the winners paraded past St. Mary's Church
w ith a casket labelled "UE" and waved to Father Marshall who

beamed back from the steps of his parish.
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His message

was particularly well received among eastern European

immigrants concerned about the Soviet takeover of Poland and

persecution of Catholics in that region.

Another factor was

the lack of a leftist tradition in the local.

UE loyalists

in Lynn came closer to staving off anticommunists than their

counterparts in Pittsfield because of the endorsement they
received from Alfred Coulthard.
There was only one issue in Pittsfield, and it was not
a trade union issue.

At the victory celebration, Callahan

reminded supporters: "Communism has been repudiated in
Pittsfield.

The issue in this fight was communism."
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Callahan did not gain professionally when the lUE was
formed, as Kelly and other anticommunist organizers did.

He

built his personal image by embracing anticommunism.

Through it, he gained the endorsement of Father Marshall,
rubbed elbows with famous people like President Truman and

Philip Murray, and worked directly with James Carey.

Local

business leaders in the Rotary listened raptly when he
spoke,

I

and they praised his leadership.
(

Sprinaf ield/Holyoke Locals

Springfield is the largest urban area in western
Massachusetts.

It sits on the Connecticut River, which

provided both power and transportation necessary to develop
a robust,

diversified manufacturing economy in the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Armory anchored the local economy.

The Springfield

Established in 1776, it

manufactured weapons for successive wars, and fostered metal

working and machine tool building throughout the region.
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By 1949, there were ten UE locals at metalworking and

machine shops in Springfield and Holyoke, its sister city.
Combined, these ten UE locals represented over 8,000

workers.

j

The largest. Local 202, represented 3,000 workers

at a Westinghouse plant that manufactured electrical,

and automotive machine parts.

radio,

The other locals scattered

among machine shops varied in size from 1,300 to 25 workers.
Local 206 represented 1,300 workers at American Bosch, a

machine shop that manufactured magnets and diesel injection
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'

.

.

equipment; Local 278 represented 1,200 workers at Chapman
Valve, a machine shop that manufactured valves for fire

hydrants.

The rest of the locals represented 700 or fewer

workers
Organizers at the big Westinghouse local helped found
the UE.

They secured a Federal Labor Union charter from the

AFL and followed Carey into the UE.

Matt Campbell, an

older, skilled toolmaker and Scottish immigrant, led the

Westinghouse local.

According to labor historian Ronald

Schatz, the Westinghouse union enjoyed a "cozy" relationship

with management, an experience that shaped Campbell's
attitude toward organizing.

At the 1937 convention, he

questioned whether the union needed to spend union its funds
on organizing.

Campbell served on the UE

•

s

national executive board

and as president of District Council
1941.

2

until his death in

Carey, Campbell and Harry Block (Carey's friend and

ally from the Philadelphia Philco local) formed the

conservative wing of the UE executive committee.

Campbell

supported the young Carey, nominating him at the 1937

convention and seconding his nomination in 1940.

Campbell

could
told delegates he had never met a man or woman who

take Carey's place.

At national conventions, Campbell led

sponsored by
floor fights against foreign policy resolutions
locals to
left-wing UE officers and supported the right of

membership
exclude communists, fascists and nazis from
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Historians Ronald Schatz and Ronald Filippelli
characterize Campbell as a cautious unionist, allied with
the anticommunist wing.

In a more recent work,

Forrant challenges this description.

In 1935,

Robert
Campbell ran

for mayor of Springfield on a third party labor ticket.

The

party's electoral strategy hoped to recruit homeowners,
small businessmen, office workers as well as workers.

In a

period of popular front politics, Campbell and his labor
party allies refused to work with the Communist party.

philosophy followed Leo XIII

's

His

vision of labor-management

cooperation and fervent anticommunist.''"**
Campbell's conservative unionism and anticommunism
rubbed off on UE locals in the Springf ield/Holyoke area, or

perhaps he simply mirrored the beliefs of Springfield's
metalworkers.

After his death in 1941, others continued

fighting for the conservative tradition he represented.
John Paran, an assembler turned business agent for the

Westinghouse local, consistently voted for Carey and the
right wing slate of national officers.

He served as

spokesman for opposition to foreign policy resolutions

sponsored by the left wing.

At the 1948 convention, the

national press guoted Paran when he questioned the
"Americanism" of speakers favoring the majority report.

"I

United
am sick and tired of hearing about the faults of the

States," he told the delegates.
faults of Russia.

"^*^
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"I'd like to hear about the

,

Springfield UE anticommunists worked together to
advance their agenda.

When the Chapman Valve local

sponsored a resolution in 1946 barring communists from

holding office in the union, they picked Frank Hall,
business agent at the Bosch local to speak for them at the
national convention

.

Although convention delegates

defeated the resolution, Hall reintroduced it at the next
District Council
down.^*^

2

meeting where delegates again voted it

By 1949, Tony Cimino, an assembler at

Westinghouse

,

led the Springfield right wing group.

Cimino

attended national MDA meetings and belonged to its executive
In summer 1949,

committee.

Springfield with the slogan

he passed out buttons in
"I

helped build UE-CIO, not UE-

CP.M148
In most Springfield locals,

entrenched.

the right wing was firmly

Members of Local 220 at Package Machinery

elected Leo Messier, an assembler and leading anticommunist
to thirteen consecutive terms as their president.

In other

locals, however, the right wing and left wing battled for

control.

The Bosch local,

for instance, equivocated in

relationship to the national office.
In September 1946, the national office launched an

ambitious program to present its views on national economic
affairs to its members.

Julius Emspak impressed delegates

at
with the importance of distributing UE literature

a

time

to the peace
"when distortion of the news become a threat
"^^^
and security of ourselves and the world.
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The leaflets

were easy to read with clear graphics and cartoon
characters.

The national office sent its first UE Leaflet

of the Week,

"Why High Food Prices?", to Bosch in November

A handwritten notation on the circular read

1946.

"Table. "^^°

Five months later, the national office wrote

the Bosch local announcing a reduction in the price of

pamphlets and noting that the local had not ordered any
copies.

A handwritten notation on this circular read

"Reject. "^^^

The Bosch local rejected other literature as

well, including the revised edition of the UE Handbook and a

pamphlet written by James Matles titled "The Members Run
This Union

—

An Answer to The Saturday Evening Post."
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At the same time, however, the Bosch local asked the

national office for assistance with its negotiations.

When

the membership rejected a Company proposal on wage

increases, it voted to ask a national representative to sit
Two months later, Bosch

in on all future negotiations.

members voted to thank Jack Davis,

a UE

national organizer,

for his "valuable advice" to their contract committee and

assistance during negotiations

.

-^^-^

What the Bosch local

wanted from the national office was trade union assistance,
not propaganda.

Ralph Forsstrom,

wing within the local.
war,

a

toolmaker at Bosch, led the left
He came to the company during the

serving as steward and then as president in 1946.

Frank Hall,

a

When

leader of the anticommunist UE group in

Springfield, left Bosch in 1947, Forsstrom ran for Hall's
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•

.

position as business agent narrowly defeating Ralph
Chicketti, an anticommunist rival.

Forsstrom remained loyal

to the national office throughout the 1948 presidential

election campaign.

His endorsement of the Wallace candidacy

and opposition to the Marshall plan cost him support among
the rank and

f

ile

.

At a general membership meeting in

September 1948, Forsstrom'

s

detractors pushed through

a

resolution calling on the local's president to "instruct the
Business Agent in his duties in line with out policies, that
^^"^

of the National CIO policies

Even so, Forsstrom won

reelection as business agent in 1948 again defeating
Chicketti
At the GE local in Holyoke,

ant icommunists led a

similar effort to purge local officers loyal to the national
office.

In January 1949,

anticommunist members tried to

oust their business agent, Leon Massa,

have extreme left tendencies."

"who is considered to

The effort failed, however,

and Massa was reelected with 68 percent of the vote.

Anticommunists also accused their president, Robert
Halliday, of leaning to the left, and tried to prevent his

election as

a

delegate to the UE national convention.

Halliday denounced the red-baiting insisting he was
"bitterly opposed Communism, its philosophy and its

principles."
not communism

The battle, he argued, was about seniority,
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to
While Forsstrom, Massa and Halliday struggled

maintain

a

in
principled position, other local UE officers
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the greater Springfield area bolted to the anticommunist
camp.

William Lieberman, an assembler and president of the

Westinghouse local, was one of the turn-coats.

Although

anticommunists maintained a strong presence in his local,
other Westinghouse members and officers supported the UE

national office on its record of trade union achievements.
The animosity between men on each side of the issue ran

When Lieberman suddenly embraced anticommunism in

deep.

October 1949, right before the CIO ouster, union members
were puzzled.

One Westinghouse worker told a reporter that

Lieberman "always used to go along with the national
officers, then all of a sudden he switches against them and
is all for the right wing.

He and Paran have been anything

but buddies for ten years.

Now they are pals.

come?"^^^

How

Like Callahan and Kelly, Lieberman wanted to be

on the winning team.

When the split between the CIO and the UE finally
occurred, anticommunists in greater Springfield, led by Tony
Locals firmly controlled by

Cimino, sprang into action.

anticommunists immediately announced membership meetings to
vote on seceding from the UE

.

Westinghouse, Chapman Valve,

Van Norman, Montsanto and Package Company held meetings for

"members only," thus excluding UE national representatives
the
and organizers and preventing any meaningful debate on

issue.

An officer of the Westinghouse local said they

barred outsiders so no one could "dictate how the vote
should go."

All of these locals opted out of the UE by a
211

unanimous or an "overwhelming" vote.

At some, the executive

board had already voted to secede and members merely
ratified their decision.

-^^^

UE international representative Albert Smith

acknowledged the union had little chance of keeping any
Springfield locals except for the Bosch local and a small GE
local in Holyoke.^^^

At Bosch, UE leaders banked on the

leadership of business agent Ralph Forsstrom.

However,

Bosch hamstrung Forsstrom 's efforts to shore up support for
the UE.

While Forsstrom was running for reelection as

business agent in November 1949, right after the CIO ousted
UE,

Bosch officials jumped right into the breach.

The

company sent workers a notice announcing that they
"decline

[d]

to participate in any formal dealings, such as

negotiations or arbitration" with UE representatives.

According to UE loyalists, Bosch was scheduled to bring an
offer to the table on seniority right when they broke off
negotiations.

Completing these negotiations would have

boosted Forsstrom 's standing among union members.

A few

days before the election, Bosch fired Forsstrom for "being
away from his job on union business" and barred him from

entering the plant.

His anticommunist opponent Ralph

Chicketti hammered away at Forsstrom 's failure to negotiate
contract provisions on seniority and a pay raise.

The

Chicketti campaign leaflet charged that other Springfield UE
shops received raises while workers at Bosch only got "talk
and promises because [our] leaders spend all their time

.

talking about Henry Wallace."

Bosch workers elected

Chicketti by a narrow margin of 693 (53 percent) to 620 (47

percent

)

The victory emboldened Chicketti to put the issue of

secession before the membership.

Tony Cimino, now field

director for the lUE in New England and leader of the

anticommunist forces in greater Springfield, backed
Chicketti

's

Cimino

move.

's

new lUE job was full time,

allowing him to quit working as an assembler at Westinghouse
and devote himself fully to union organizing.

Cimino

spoke at Bosch gate rallies urging workers to attend the

scheduled membership meeting and vote for secession.

He

stressed the importance of remaining affiliated with the

anticommunist CIO, saying the Red UE could not protect their
interests.

The lUE relied exclusively on red-baiting.

Its

flyer proclaimed that "the old UE is the last major

stronghold of communism in the United States.

If a decision

must be made between labor policy and Communist policy, the
old UE always follows the commie line."

A UE flyer called

for unity, pointing out all the ways Bosch was using the

breach to stifle contract demands.
The local Communist party cell in Springfield played

right into the lUE

'

s

hands.

It distributed "An Open Letter

to Tony Cimino" at the Bosch plant backing the UE and

attacking the lUE for colluding with Big Business to "get

workers behind the cold war program."

It predicted that

a
"honest rank and filers" who know class struggle requires

213

strong, united labor movement will reject the lUE.

UE

leaders reacted quickly distancing themselves as far as they

could from the Communist party flyer.

They circulated their

own flyer condemning the party leaflets and warning members

against them.

"We reject and condemn," wrote the UE

,

"such

open interference in the internal affairs of our union by
the Communist Party, and warn them to cease their disruption
of our union. "^^^

The damage was done, however.

Six hundred Bosch

workers voted to withdraw from the UE and join the lUE.
When the lUE collected enough cards, the NLRB scheduled

representation election for June 1950.

a

The UE ran as the

incumbent, arguing that management would not bargain with
the lUE.

This did not make sense, however, since Bosch

already refused to bargain with either side.
the sole issue of anticommunism

.

The lUE ran on

Tony Cimino helped shape

He organized a United Front Committee in

the message.

greater Springfield that coordinated anti-UE propaganda.
Its banner read:

distributed

a

"Vote Communism Out!"

Chicketti

speech by Congressman Foster Furcolo about

"Communist Infiltration in Labor Unions" to all stewards and
officers.

He borrowed $2500 from the national lUE office to

print flyers and newspapers during the campaign.
end,

964

In the

red-baiting worked, and the lUE carried the election
(57 percent)

to 724

(43 percent

).

The following day,

anticommunists moved to consolidate their position by

pushing through an amendment to the local's by-laws barring
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anyone from office "who actively opposed the creation of the
lUE-CIO."^^*

The other local UE organizers hoped to retain was the
GE plant in Holyoke.

Robert Halliday, president of Local

264 and a UE loyalist, downplayed any right wing/left wing

split in the local.

According to Halliday, "if any

distinction exists, it is between staunch labor supporters
and company stooges."

He thus tried to draw attention away

from the issue of communism.

However, an active

anticommunist group within the local "welcomed the

opportunity to divorce themselves from communist leaders in
the UE."^^^

In early November 1949, when left wing officers

still ran the local, members voted "overwhelmingly" to

remain in the UE

.

Halliday charged that "political

ambitions of people seeking paid jobs at our expense"
jeopardized their hard won contract.

He referred to people

like Tony Cimino, now on the lUE payroll.

The NLRB scheduled an election in May 1950.

As in the

rest of the commonwealth, UE and lUE forces pulled out all
the stops in their campaign efforts.

Jim Carey, the

principal speaker at a pre-election rally at the GE plant,

predictably hammered home the issue of communist
infiltration in the UE.

The UE, nevertheless, remained

would
confident of victory, announcing when and where it
hold a victory dance.

celebrated victory.

It was the lUE,

however, which

a
In a "complete upset," the lUE won by
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vote of 233 (55 percent) to 190 (45 percent ).

''^^

Once

again, red-baiting carried the day.

The lUE swept all but two small Springfield locals.

It

won at Westinghouse by a vote of 2,335 (72 percent) to 862
(27 percent)

and at Chapman Valve by a vote of 794 (73

percent) to 298 (27 percent).

At Package Machinery, Blair

Manufacturing, Montsano and Van Norman, the UE conceded

before representation elections and was not even on the
ballot.

The only two shops the UE retained were at

Worthington Pump, with 400 workers, and Stacey
Manufacturing, with 50 workers.

Tony Cimino, lUE's new

Field Organizer, summed up the outcome well:

"The fight to

clean the Communists out of our union started here in
Springfield.

It is fitting that every major plant in this

area has seen fit to stay with the CIO and reject decisively
the phony balm of Communism.

" ^^"^

Matt Campbell's legacy of

prudent unionism, support for Carey, and uncompromising

opposition to communism continued to make sense to a

majority of electrical and machine shop workers in greater
Springfield
In his study of UE organizing at GE and Westinghouse,

labor historian Ronald Schatz found that older, skilled
workers
workers supported the UE while younger, unskilled

supported the lUE.

Robert Forrant, in his study of the

Springfield Bosch local, concurs.
support Schatz

-s

Some data from this study

contention as well, but not all.

When the

December 1949, 31
Bosch local voted to secede from the UE in
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members opposed the move.

Of the 17 UE loyalists whose job

classification is ascertainable,

11

skilled workers,

including five machinists, two mechanics, two toolmakers,
one grinder and one calibrator,

joined six unskilled

workers, including four machine operators and two

inspectors, to oppose secession from the UE.

According to

this small sample, skilled UE loyalists outnumbered

unskilled UE loyalists two to one.

Of the 11 anticommunist

lUE organizers whose names appeared in newspaper accounts

and whose job classification is ascertainable, six were

skilled workers, including three machinists, one toolmaker,
one steamfitter and one engineer, and five were unskilled

workers, including four assemblers and one inspector.

These

data suggest lUE organizers split evenly between skilled and

unskilled workers.
Forrant's work also adds
Schatz's thesis.

a

descriptive dimension to

Forrant found a higher proportion of

skilled workers among all workers in Springfield than in

comparative Massachusetts cities, as well as

a high ratio of

skilled to unskilled workers in Springfield's metal trades.

Among Springfield's labor leaders, Forrant identified

proportion of highly skilled workers.
Forrant's description do not match.

a

high

Schatz's thesis and
If Schatz is correct,

with all
we would expect Springfield to be a UE stronghold
its skilled metal workers.

On the contrary, anticommunism

gained an early foothold in Springfield.
every large local bolted from the UE.
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In 1949 and 1950,

Perhaps the problem

.

is that Schatz»s thesis fails to credit two other important

sources of anticommunisin, Catholic labor theory and Soviet

aggression in eastern Europe, that may have more saliency
than skill level.
The scanty hard data from Pittsfield tend to confirm
the Schatz thesis.

As a whole, GE workers in Pittsfield

were less skilled than Springfield's metal workers.

In

Pittsfield, the ratio of skilled to unskilled union

organizers was 1:3; in Springfield, the ratio was 3:2.

As

Schatz predicts, in Pittsfield the percentage of skilled

organizers in the UE was higher than in the lUE.

Among UE

loyalists were seven skilled workers, including a winder,
machinist, press operator, lathe operator, taper and two
welders, and ten unskilled "employees."

Among lUE

organizers were three skilled workers, including a
machinist, toolmaker and electrician, and 18 unskilled
"employees."

Unfortunately, there is no ascertainable data

for Lynn's GE workers.

Conclusion
The fratricidal struggle between UE loyalists and lUE

dissidents vividly illustrates how anticommunism operated
the state and local level in Massachusetts.

Anticommunism

until
was not an issue among rank and file union members

others made it so.

Ambitious labor leaders, like

partisan
politicians, latched onto red-baiting to promote

goals
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Workers were not easily won over.

The strong localist

tradition within the UE blocked Jim Carey and his
anticoininunist MDA allies from capturing the UE from within.

UE members cared more about their leaders' trade union

record than their political beliefs.
the UE turned the tide for Carey.

The CIO's expulsion of

For union members, this

was a real issue that affected their working lives.
CIO support weakened the UE.

Losing

Before the split, workers

chose between communist and anticommunist leaders, a

political issue not a trade union issue; after the split,

workers had to chose between the UE and the CIO.
Three factors account for rank and file affinity with
the lUE and its program of virulent anticommunism.

The

Catholic church persuaded many workers to embrace Pope Leo
XIII

's

vision of labor peace, mediation between labor and

management, and denunciation of class conflict.

For some

workers, the moral force of Catholic labor theory carried

more weight than labor union principles.

Eastern European

workers, who may been Catholic as well, linked domestic

communism to Soviet agression in their homelands.
lUE attracted younger,

Also, the

less skilled workers who had not

worked with communist organizers during the popular front
era.

Anticommunism provided common ground for Americans.
Green and Murray, who disagreed on organizing industrial
workers, agreed class antagonism hurt labor.

CIO labor

leaders and the Catholic hierarchy, who disagreed on the
219

role of the state, agreed that conununists disrupted their

vision of mediated labor-management relations.

Catholic

workers who promoted anticommunism did so on a moral or
spiritual basis, not a material basis.

anticommunism was anticlassism.
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CHAPTER

6

COLD WAR ANTI COMMUNISM

Domestic anticommunism became virulent in the postwar
era when the cold war upgraded the Communist party from a

national menace to a national enemy.

Americans believed

party members belonged to an international communist
conspiracy plotting to overthrow the government of the

United States.

When the United States, Canada and England

uncovered domestic spies in their midst, Americans began

agreeing with conservatives who had been worrying about
internal subversion for decades.

Historians continue to debate the primary or principal
source of national postwar domestic anticommunism, usually

referred to as McCarthyism.

McCarthyism as

a

Robert Griffith sees

product of party rivalry; Athan Theoharis

argues President Truman needed domestic anticommunism to

silence critics and mobilize public support for his foreign
policy; Kenneth O'Reilly credits

Federal Bureau of Investigation.-^

J.

Edgar Hoover and the

Whatever the cause,

anticommunism became and continues to be
American political culture.

a

staple of

This chapter looks at that

process through the lens of localism.
In Massachusetts,

except for the labor movement, direct

consequences of McCarthyism were relatively mild.

No one

their
went to jail; a handful of teachers and workers lost

legislature were
jobs; and draconian laws passed by the
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declared unconstitutional.

A noisy state investigating

commission parroted charges already made by federal

investigating committees.

The commission did shut down the

Communist party, but failed to silence liberal critics.

The

relative mildness of McCarthyism in Massachusetts attests to
the strength of the liberal lobby.
The same groups of people sponsored anticommunist

initiatives during the cold war as had during the depression
and war years: rank and file Democrats from Boston,

conservative Republicans, Legionnaires

,

veterans groups

Catholic Church and professional anticommunists

.

,

the

In that

respect, nothing changed over the three decades of this
study.

change.

However, other manifestations of anticommunism did
In the early cold war,

anticommunist legislators

introduced substantially more bills.

When national and

international events tipped the balance of public opinion in
their favor, they succeeded in gaining passage of their
bills.

Historian Robert Griffith and others argue that state
anticommunist initiatives in the 1950s were "derivative" of
national initiatives and that state legislatures "responded

almost slavishly to the force of federal law and precedent
and to the anxieties aroused by national leaders."^

This

demonstrates
local study of anticommunism in Massachusetts
how much Griffith overstates the case.

Socially

the
conservative Irish Catholics hardly needed to model

generations
federal government; their anticommunism ran
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deep.

In the 1950s, young solons fighting "Reducators" at

Harvard and MIT revered South Boston's Tommy Dorgan,

a key

anticommunist player from the depression era and "father of
the teachers' oath," as an elder statesman.
as in the 1930s,

In the 1950s,

liberal Yankees and conservative Irish

Bostonians continued to act out a century old morality play.

McCarthyism was simply a new context.
Village McCarthyism
In the postwar period,

local anticommunists shut down

politically unpopular activities in their neighborhoods.
These village McCarthys cast a wide net in their search for

subversive people.

To them, the Progressive party fronted

for the Communist party; books about the Soviet Union

tainted libraries; and a party member's basement woodworking
shop subverted neighborhood boys.

Most of these local

anticommunist initiatives occurred in and around Boston
before Senator Joseph McCarthy's rise to power.

State and

local factors, in conjunction with national and

international events, spawned postwar anticommunism in
Massachusetts.

What McCarthy sparked was a revival of far

right wing groups.
stop
Individuals worked with local public officials to
town.
the Communist menace in their neighborhood or

Boston

anticommunist
continued to be the stronghold of local
involving Otis
sentiment and activism. A 1952 incident
Massachusetts, epitomizes
Hood, Communist party chief in
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such attitudes.

Hood and his family lived in row house in

Boston's Roxbury section.

He liked working with his hands

and set up a woodworking shop in his basement.

On spare

evenings and weekends, Hood invited neighborhood boys to the
shop and taught them how to use the tools.

As they became

more proficient, he let them use the shop whenever they
wanted.

A school teacher who lived with her family in

Hood's neighborhood learned about the informal woodworking
shop.

Knowing who Hood was, she reported it to her school

principal who called the FBI and Boston police.

It is not

clear what happened next; Hood did close his workshop

although he said it was because he "lost too many tools."
For Tommy Dorgan, unofficial spokesman for Boston's

anticommunist crusaders, the school teacher was
heroine.

a local

"Think of the danger [Hood] might have done had

not an alert and patriotic school teacher learned of his

plan.

But for her, the minds of many Roxbury children might

be twisted by the poison our enemies are spreading.""'
In the postwar period,

all radical groups were suspect,

not just the Communist party.

the Mayor's office

In 1946,

denied permits for the Socialist party to hold political

meetings on the Boston Common and Boston police arrested
picketers demonstrating in favor of granting amnesty to

conscientious objectors.*

In 1947,

Boston City councilmen

voted to ask Mayor Curley to shut down
Mrs. Gerhardt Eisler.

a

meeting featuring

Eisler was filling in for her husband

authorities
who had been detained by federal immigration
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.

when he refused to cooperate with HUAC.

The meeting took

place at the New England Conservatory of Music as scheduled.
In Curley's absence,

acting Mayor John

B.

Kelley rejected

Had Curley decided, he may

the City Council's suggestion.

well have sided with the City Council as he would later do
in February 1949.^

The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts (CLUM)

lobbied officials at the New England Conservatory of Music
on behalf of Mrs. Eisler.

Conservatory officials reported

to CLUM that "we always work very closely with the FBI when

this sort of program comes up and they have requested us to

allow these meetings to be held in Brown Hall as they would
rather have them here instead of having to look them up in
dark allies or back lots."^

Two years later, the FBI

Instead of just observing what it deemed

changed tactics.

to be Communist party or front activities, it shut rhem

down
In January 1949,

the party's Worker's School postponed

had rented
its opening when the owner of the hall they

revoked the lease.
him to cancel.

The owner claimed FBI agents pressured

When CLUM investigated on behalf of the

denied any
school, the FBI's Special Agent-in-Charge
pressure came from
involvement. There is some evidence that
a local VFW commander as well.'

Whatever the source, it

and groups on the
became harder and harder for the party

organizations list to find
Attorney General's subversive

auditoriums to hold meetings.
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In January 1949,

the Tremont Temple Baptist Church

revoked an agreement to rent its Lorimer Hall to the Civil
Rights Congress the night before a scheduled meeting.

The

(

church's attorney claimed organizers' failure to disclose
CRC was a "communist organization" when applying to use the
hall voided the agreement.®

In May 1949, the Boston YWCA

cancelled a contract with the Spanish Refugee Appeal, a
group affiliated with the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee, to use their facilities for a meeting.^

In

August 1950, the manager of Ruggles Hall in Roxbury locked
the door on a rally sponsored by the Civil Rights Congress,

claiming the police ordered him not to open the doors.

'^^

In

March 1951, the Boston City Council voted to ask the Mayor
to prohibit use of a Masonic Temple for a meeting featuring

Harry Bridges.

Although Acting Mayor Hurley rejected the

Council's petition, the owner of the building was too

frightened to let Bridges into the

hall.'''^

In June 1951,

the Hotel Bradford cancelled a meeting sponsored by the New

Englanders Concerned for Peace.
In November 1951,
a bill

12

the Massachusetts legislature passed

outlawing the Communist party.

One provision of the

act made it illegal to rent halls to subversive groups.

From this point on, there is no evidence of last minute
cancellations, as there had been since 1946, probably

because the party and groups close to the party stopped

trying to use large public halls.
January 1954.

One exception occurred in

i

The Boston Freedom of the Press Committee
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i

hired a hall within the Boston Conservatory of Music for a
song recital by Albert Alphin.

When Conservatory officials

learned the Committee was a front for the party's newspaper,
The Daily Worker, they agreed to let the event take place

and announced that the FBI and Boston police would be on
hand.

American Legion commander, John

his troops as well.

P.

Swift, called out

He announced Legionnaires would picket

the auditorium bringing search lights to take moving
At that

pictures of everyone going in and out of the hall.

point. Conservatory officers voted to cancel the recital and

the Charles Street Meeting House hosted the event.
To many Bay State anticommunists

,

'^"^

the Progressive party

was synonymous with the Communist party.

The Lawrence chief

of police denied local Progressive party candidates a permit

to operate a sound truck during the 1948 campaign.-^*

Boston

police arrested Walter O'Brien, state chairman of the

Progressive party, as he spoke from a sound truck

m

1950.

15

In the summer of 1950, police arrested Arthur Jones and

Robert Dubin, state leaders of Young Progressives of
America, for picketing at Revere Beach, a popular bathing

beach just north of Boston.

Jones and Dubin decided to

speech.
fight their case asserting their right to free

When

leaned over
Jones took the stand to testify, the trial judge
Jones's lawyer
the bench and asked: "Are you a Communist?"
judge overruled
objected on the grounds of relevancy but the

the objection.

When Jones refused to answer the guestion.
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the judge held him in contempt of court.

A higher court

later reversed the trial court's finding of contempt.

'^^

Local anticommunists targeted schools and libraries as

well as unpopular political organizing.

Again, this

activity took place before 1953, the height of McCarthy's
In 1948, the Lynn school board passed a regulation

power.

requiring all teachers to take an oath swearing they were
not members of the Communist party.
Sisk,

a

Board member Philip

popular young Catholic attorney and veteran,

sponsored the regulation.

He had won election to the board

by a greater margin than any other candidate on the ballot

including the Mayor.

When the Lynn League of Women Voters,

the Public School Association of Lynn and the Lynn

Progressive party flooded the board with letters of protest,
it agreed to reconsider the issue at the next monthly

meeting.

Sisk defended the regulation.

"Communism isn't a

political party or belief," he argued, "it's
ideology."

a

world

The school board upheld the regulation by a 5-2

vote.
In Scituate,

the school board passed a regulation

to
requiring sponsors of meetings held in school facilities

speak.
ensure people with "certain opinions" would not

A

response to an
group of veterans initiated the regulation in
Forum, to
event organized by a liberal group, the Scituate
the veterans
discuss the situation in Korea. Apparently

The
unpatriotic views.
felt some of the speakers expressed
local residents to
Scituate Forum organized a delegation of
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meet privately with the school board.

regulation was too vague.

They argued the new

In response,

the board prepared a

statement for meeting sponsors to sign affirming they "do
not individually or as an organization advocate the

overthrow of the government by force" and are not
"affiliated with any organization that does so advocate."^®
At the same time as veterans monitored Scituate Forum

meetings

,

veterans in Brookline investigated their public
In August 1950,

library.

Dr. McGrath,

a

Brookline dentist

and head of the Americanism Commission at his local American

Legion post, inguired how many copies of Seeds of Treason
the library held.

Seeds of Treason was an anticommunist

tract about the Alger Hiss case written by Victor Lasky.

young library assistant informed Dr
library

'

s

.

A

McGrath that the

book selection committee rejected the book based

on unfavorable reviews such as the one appearing in the New

York Times describing the book as "biased and prejudiced."
Dr. McGrath was incensed.

His legion post sent a letter to

the library's board of trustees with copies to the press.
The incident guickly became a national cause celebre among

anticommunist publishers.
The Chicago Tribune headlined its story "Library Favors

Commie Books in Boston Area; Refuses to Circulate Seeds of
Treason."

The story described Brookline as "embroiled in

cold ideological war.""
"banned" the book.

Boston papers reported the library

Publisher's Weekly picked up the story
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and the American Library Association launched an

investigation.
The incident amounted to a tempest in a teapot.

The

library assistant had given Dr. McGrath inaccurate
information.

The book committee had merely postponed its

decision whether to buy the book in order to review another
book on the same subject due out in September.

Because of

all the publicity, the town librarian herself read both
20
books and recommended both be purchased.

Two years later, the Boston Post's new owner, John Fox,

picked the Boston Public Library as the first target of his
anticommunist crusade.

In September 1952, the library urged

patrons to inform themselves about communism by mounting

a

lobby display of materials on the Soviet Union available in
the reference section.

The Boston Post blasted the library

for holding "Red literature" that set off a chain reaction

among anticommunists

.

The Boston City Council summoned the

library's trustees to appear in council chambers to explain

their policy; the American Legion voted to ban all proSoviet materials at the library; and Boston's Catholic

newspaper questioned whether the library was adequately
"supervising" patrons who requested the material.

In the

of trustees
midst of all this scrutiny, the library's board
Patrick
policy.
voted three to two to maintain the present
of the Council of
McDonald, a steel merchant and president
Judge Frank J.
National Catholic Laymen's Societies, and

Donahue cast the two dissenting votes.
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As controversy over the Boston Public Library mounted,
ant i communists in Cambridge rushed to investigate their

library's holdings.

They found that the Cambridge library

had been banning all "Communist tinged material" for the

past ten years and that the seven member board of trustees
and town librarian were in complete agreement about the

policy
The FBI played a shadowy role throughout this early

period of cold war anticommunism.

Its presence in Boston

pressuring building owners not to rent facilities to radical
groups has already been noted.

There is some evidence that

the FBI were active in other parts of the state as well.

In

January 1947, Worcester's mayor, Charles Sullivan confided
in library director Philip Morgan that he was suspicious of

Thurston Taylor, one of Morgan's librarians.

In 1944,

Taylor gained some notoriety when he prepared a book list on
the Soviet Union, then an ally of the United States.

In

book
1945, the Communist party invited Taylor to bring a
he
display on the Soviet Union to one of its meetings, which

did.

he
Two years later. Mayor Sullivan told Taylor's boss

investigated.
thought Taylor was a subversive and should be

assessment but
The library director agreed with the Mayor's

heard nothing further.

A year later, in 1948, charges

Catholic
concerning Taylor's loyalty resurfaced in the

Worcester
Messenger, the weekly newspaper of the
Archdiocese.

reveal
When the Messenger's editor refused to

council decided it better
his sources, the Worcester city

.

investigate.

They asked Mayor Sullivan for information but

he referred them to the "original sources."

In December

1948, Taylor appeared before the council and was questioned

by Democratic aldermen George Wells and Harry McGrath.

After hearing Taylor, and with no substantiation of the
charges, the council gave Taylor a unanimous vote of
22

confidence

Around this same time, FBI activity was also reported
in Ashby,

a small town north of

Hampshire border.

Worcester on the New

Dorothy Wilder, a local schoolteacher,

subscribed to the Nation, World Events, the Guardian, and
the Call.

Wilder belonged to the Socialist party but was

not current with her dues, and had donated money to the

Progressive party in 1948.

When the FBI sent Ashby

of police a list of local communists,

that her name was the first one.

'

s

chief

he reported to Wilder

Wilder was furious.

"Does

[my choice of reading material] make me an FBI Communist?

We ought to challenge such irresponsible charges of village

McCarthys.

"^"^

Rumors about FBI lists circulated in other communities
as well.

In June 1950, the Cambridge city council decided

and working in
to investigate the loyalty of everyone living

Cambridge.

have
The council instructed the city manager to

of Cambridge
the chief of police obtain the FBI's list

Communists.

lists
But the FBI demurred, replying that their

disclosed.
were confidential and had never been
sources.
Cambridge anticommunists turned to other
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Undeterred,

Police

chief John King had already compiled a list of more than 100

people based on information from the American Legion and
twenty citizen informants.

The list included a minister,

two Harvard professors, and a prominent attorney.

King said

everyone on the list was "in the upper social strata.
single common worker is mentioned."^*

Not a

City councilman John

Lynch asked for funds to reprint the pamphlet "Reducators at

Harvard University" sent to him by Robert Conner of Colorado
Springs.

In 1951,

Lynch sponsored a resolution calling for

the purge of 50 suspected "Reds" at Harvard including

President Conant and historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
it had in the 1930s,

As

Cambridge's cultural struggle between

working class residents and Harvard's elite spilled over
into local politics.

Another shadowy source of local anticommunist
initiatives is what historian Ellen Schrecker characterizes
as a "wide-ranging anti-Communist network" whose members

"came into their own during the McCarthy period, staffing

the main organizations in the field and imposing their

agenda on the rest of the nation.

"^^

Well known figures

associated with this network spoke in Boston on several
occasion.

In 1947,

Joseph

R.

Matthews, HUAC s former
'

research director, testified at a state legislative hearing
as an expert on domestic Communism.

about communists at Harvard.

He spoke at length

Cambridge Mayor Michael

Neville introduced Matthews to the committee.

26

Matthews

returned to Boston in 1954 to participate in an "anti245

subversive seminar" sponsored by the American Legion.

Another network speaker at the seminar was Bella Dodd,

a

former Communist party member in New York and one of a

coterie of professional witnesses.
In 1953,

Louis Budenz gave an "educational talk" to the

newly formed state commission investigating communism and

subversion in the commonwealth.

Budenz, a former editor of

the Daily Worker, made countless appearances at trials and

before federal and state investigating committees.

The

Massachusetts commission asked him for advice on how to
28
"ferret out hidden communists."

When Budenz renounced the evils of "godless Communism,"
he returned to the folds of the Catholic Church.

Archbishop Cushing embraced Budenz
faith.

'

s

Boston's

return to the Catholic

When Budenz came to Boston in 1953 to testify before

the state investigating commission, Cushing announced he

would ask Budenz to help him form "anticommunist cells" in
Boston.

Cushing called on Budenz again in 1959 to help

him write a pamphlet for high school students outlining
"Nine Rules For Fighting Communism."

According to Cushing,

level textbook
he and Budenz also collaborated on a college

to expose the dangers of communism.

There is no evidence

that these plans came to fruition.
he
Later in 1959, Cushing ran into problems when

and Answers
hastily put together a series titled "Questions
American, a Hearst
on Communism" that ran in the Boston
Soviet
The series was timed to coincide with
publication.
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Premier Nikita Khruchev's visit to the United States.
Gushing relied on priests in the Archdiocesan office to

research and write the series.

They relied on familiar

sources from the anticommunist network that smeared liberal

groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and that were
very anti-Semitic.

One Gushing article criticized

"international bankers" and recommended Gatholics read the

American Mercury, a anti-Semitic publication that claimed
the Jewish religion was un-American.

Gushing apologized

profusely to Jewish and liberal leaders, taking
responsibility for not reviewing the articles more
closely.

The incident shows how connected local activist

priests were to the national anticommunist network.

Another older network promoted local McGarthyism as
well.

This grouping consisted of anti-Semitic ultra

conservatives, including some who had been active since the
1930s.

During the 1954 election campaign, as criticism of

McCarthy mounted nationally, these local conservative
A group calling itself

zealots rushed to his defense.

Democrats for American Action,

a

parody on the liberal group

Americans for Democratic Action, sent

Massachusetts Democrats.

a flier to

"On Guard!" it warned.

selected
"Keep

favorite son
Senator McCarthy on the job... The ADA and its
We are
Adlai Stevenson are enemies of Senator McCarthy...

captive of the
enrolled Democrats who do not want our party

phony liberals."
ADA, the welfare staters, pinks and
organized by the same
Another group. Citizens for McCarthy,
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.

.

people, sponsored a pro-McCarthy rally featuring HUAC

counsel Roy Cohn and Rabbi Benjamin Schultz as speakers
The crowd filled Boston's Fanueil Hall and wildly cheered a

proposal to hold a bigger pro-McCarthy rally in the Boston
Garden.
Mrs.

John Beaumont of Cambridge, vice president of

Citizens for McCarthy, belonged to the National Council for

American Education, a group founded by Allen Zoll.

Zoll

also founded the American Patriots, an anti-Semitic group
that featured speaking tours for Gerald L.K. Smith,

Elizabeth Dilling, and leaders of the Bundt.

In 1947,

when

the Attorney General put Zoll's group on the subversive
list,

he founded the National Council.

In 1949,

the

National Council published the pamphlet "Reducators at
Bernard McCabe, secretary-treasurer of

Harvard University."

Citizens for McCarthy, founded America First of

Massachusetts in 1954.
former Coughlinites

Other officers of America First were

33

McCarthyism in the State House
Anticominunist initiatives resurfaced in the

Massachusetts legislature after the crisis of World War
passed.
70 bills,

II

over
Between 1947 and 1962, legislators introduced

resolves and resolutions to thwart the perceived

cominunist threat in Massachusetts.

Rank and file urban

initiatives.
Democrats sponsored ninety percent of these
Irish wards
coterie of Boston Democrats from heavily
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A

.

introduced two-thirds of the bills.

The wards they

represented included all income levels.

Wards

6,

and

7

10/11 were predominantly low-income Irish; Wards 16 and 17

were predominantly middle-income Irish; and Ward 20 was the
only high-income Irish ward in Boston.

Anticommunism was

common ground for Boston's Irish Democrats.

Only one of

Boston's two Italian wards elected representatives who
joined the anticommunist activists.

It was Ward

3

where a

mix of Italians and newer immigrants from Eastern Europe
lived.

The latter supported their representatives'

anticommunist bills much more enthusiastically than the
former

34

Democrats from Cambridge, Somerville, Worcester, New

Bedford and Fitchburg introduced one-quarter of the
anticommunist bills.

The Cambridge and Somerville

legislators, like their Boston counterparts, represented

predominantly Irish constituencies.

The Cambridge city

council was as active as Cambridge's state representatives
in promoting anticommunist initiatives.

FBI informants

named Worcester, Fitchburg and New Bedford as strongholds

communist labor organizers.
statewide attention on

a

When the media focused

particular area, local

anticommunist officials jumped into the spotlight by
A small
sponsoring bills to meet the perceived danger.
legislators
group of conservative, suburban Republican
anticommunist
introduced the remaining ten percent of the

bills and resolves.

c

Ant i communist legislators sponsored bills and resolves
to expose communists; keep communists out of schools, public

office and public jobs; and shut down the Communist party.

One-third of the bills and resolves concerned state

investigating commissions

— establishing

One-quarter of the bills

them, or expanding their powers.

concerned education

— firing

them, continuing

teachers who were members of the

Communist party, firing teachers who took the 5th Amendment,

increasing the penalty for violating the 1935 teachers' oath
law,

and taxing schools that refused to fire communists.

Anticommunist legislators did not always agree on the best
strategy.

One education bill would have forbidden the

teaching of "atheistic Communism" while two education bills

would have required it.

Twenty percent of the bills aimed

at keeping communists and fellow travelers out of public

office and public jobs.

One of these bills would have

required all candidates to file

a

non-Communist oath;

another would have required all voters to file a non-

Communist oath.

Only ten percent of the bills aimed to

outlaw the Communist party or prevent it from organizing
publicly.
represent new
These postwar bills and resolves did not
Irish Democrats and
concerns to Massachusetts legislators.
bills and
conservative Republicans had sponsored similar

resolves during the depression.

Two had been enacted: the

Special Commission to
1935 teacher's oath law and the 1937
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Investigate Subversive Activities in the Commonwealth.

What

was different was the increased number of bills introduced.

Democratic party leaders did not share the same

enthusiasm for these anticommunist initiatives.

Of all the

bills introduced by rank and file Democrats, none was
enacted.

In Massachusetts,

a bill or

resolve does not

become law unless it is supported by party leadership.

Most

bills were never reported out of committee; others were
reported out with the recommendation that they ought not be
adopted or that they be referred to the next session.

From

the mid-1950s on, most of the anticommunist bills were

simply referred to the state investigating commission for

further study.

Boston Democrats did succeed in winning

passage of their resolves to establish special investigating
commissions, although party leaders insisted on procedural

safeguards and limited powers.

Both commissions came at

times of intense national pressure

— the

first when U.S.

when
troops were fighting communists in Korea and the second
of
three federal investigating committees focused a blaze

Harvard,
national media attention on alleged communists at

MIT and Boston public schools.

The first commission met

during the
over the winter of 1950-51 but was not revived
from
The second commission lasted for ten years,
next term.
1953 to 1963.

The legislature did pass three significant
all before the
anticommunist bills in 1948, 1949 and 1951,

the state or the nation.
full gale force of McCarthyism hit
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Republicans sponsored two of these bills and the first

investigating commission sponsored one.

The first law dealt

with communist teachers, the second with communists holding
public office, and the third outlawed the Communist party.
The last, a sweeping measure, was modeled after Maryland's

Ober Act.
Barnes Bill, 1948
Rep. Kendall A.

Sanderson, a conservative Republican,

sponsored this bill on behalf of Attorney General Clarence
A.

Barnes.

The proposed law aimed to ban teachers at public

and private educational institutions suspected of being

communists or teaching communist doctrine.
lawyer,

Sanderson, a

lived in Marblehead, a wealthy Yankee seaside resort

town sandwiched between two industrialized, immigrant towns,
Lynn and Peabody.

In 1946 and 1947,

Sanderson strongly

supported three very regressive bills designed to cripple
unions.

When the antilabor bills failed to pass in the

legislature, Sanderson and his allies in the Chamber of

Commerce brought them directly to the voters by referendum.
All three measures were soundly defeated in 1948.

Clarence A. Barnes, the Massachusetts Attorney General,

initiated the bill.

Barnes was also a lawyer and a

conservative Republican.

At a hearing before the Committee

on Education, Barnes said the bill was only a first step.
To stop subversion in the commonwealth, he argued

"Communists must be driven underground."
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Barnes acted from

his own prejudices, not from any factual basis of concern.

When asked at the hearing why laws already on the books were
not sufficient to protect students from communist

subversion, Barnes replied that he had never tried to

enforce them.

When pressed further, Barnes admitted that

nothing had ever come up to even spark an investigation.
The American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars also

testified in favor of the bill.
educators,

A host of prominent

led by President Conant of Harvard, opposed the

biii.^^

The Committee on Education rejected the original Barnes
bill.

In its place,

the committee sent out two milder

amendments to existing laws: one prohibited persons
convicted of violating the 1919 state sedition law from

teaching and the other imposed $1,000 fine for violating the
1935 teachers' oath law.

the House, Edmond

J.

When the bill reached the floor of

Donlan, dean of the Boston

mandating
anticommunists in the House, proposed an amendment
monthly bulletin
the Department of Education to publish a
subversive or
"naming teachers who are teaching treasonous,
The House
seditious doctrine or using books that do."
Barnes bill,
rejected the Donlan amendment and the original
Education Committee's
and passed, along with the Senate, the
of Massachusetts
amendments. 3^ The Civil Liberties Union

breathed a collective sigh of relief.

"CLUM ... felt that

in contrast to the
character
in
mild
were
amendments
the
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original Bill which could have wrecked freedom in

educational institutions."^'''
The Barnes bill was one of seven anticoinmunist bills

introduced in the 1948 legislative session.

Democrats sponsored all the rest.

Various Boston

Five of the six were

either withdrawn by their sponsors or referred to the next
session.

Only one, a bill to establish a special commission

to investigate communists and other subversive groups, made
it to the House floor.

A similar bill had been introduced

the year before but had died in committee.

Boston Democrats, John

F.

A triumvirate of

Collins from Ward 11, William

J.

Fitzsimmons from Ward 16, and Gabriel Francis Piemonte from
Ward

3,

sponsored these bills.

At a hearing in 1947,

Collins, who would become Mayor of Boston in 1958, told the

Committee on Constitutional Law that "Communism in America
today is a festering sore gnawing away at the vitals of our

American way of life."^^
Joseph

R.

The Committee also heard from

Matthews, former research director of HUAC, who

testified as an "expert on Communism."

Matthews told the

Committee that Harvard was one of three national

universities whose professors had the "most significant
record of supporting Communist fronts."

Harvard geology professor Kirtley

F.

He singled out

Mather and MIT

mathematician Dirk Struik as prime examples of his charge.
In 1948,

an even larger group of anticommunist

proponents testified before the Committee on Constitutional
Law in favor of the resolve to establish a state
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I

investigating committee.

Ten Boston Democrats appeared for

the bill along with Tommy Dorgan,

"father of the 1935

teachers' oath" and now Clerk of the Probate Court in

Suffolk County.

Other witness included representatives from

the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American

Veterans and the Boston Civic League.

The Committee,

however, was unwilling to endorse a probe of communists in
the state and voted ten to four to refer the bill to the

next session.

'

The House concurred.

Why did the 1948 legislature pass the Barnes bill but
not the Coll ins/Fit zsimmons/Piemonte bill?

because Republicans favored it

.

One reason is

To get an anticommunist

initiative just out of committee, it had to be supported by

Republicans as well as Democrats.

Democrats, it seems,

supported Republican anticommunist initiatives but

Republicans did not support Democratic ones.

Perhaps

Republican animosity toward Boston Democrats overrode shared
concern about substantive issues.
less sweeping in scope as well.

Union could live with it.

The Barnes bill was much

Even the Civil Liberties

Thus, the Barnes bill was an easy

way for legislators to placate media critics and fend off
the call for a state investigating commission.

Sanderson Bill, 1949
Kendall Sanderson returned in 1949 with

a bill to

prohibit members of the Communist party and other subversive

organizations from holding public office.
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The bill

'

languished in the Committee on Public Service for five
months, a sure sign that party leaders wanted to kill the
bill.

In early June,

the Committee brought it to the House

floor with the recommendation that it be referred to the
next session.

The House rejected the Committee's

recommendation and passed an amended version of the bill,

proposed by Charles W. Hedges, a Republican from Quincy,
that added a provision requiring all public servants to take
an oath promising to defend the Constitution and oppose the

overthrow of state or federal government.

There were no

recorded votes on the House amendments.*^
Senate Democrats tried to amend the Sanderson bill to

require registration of communists, but failed.

Senate

Republicans tried to amend the Sanderson bill by striking
out the words "a member of the communist party."

Had the

amendment passed, the law would have applied only to
"members of an organization that advocate the overthrow of
the government by force or violence."*^

The distinction

would have preserved first amendment rights of Communist
party members, at least until it was determined to be

subversive organization.

a

This amendment failed too and the

bill passed by a narrow margin of 23 to 17.
The House considered two other bills introduced by

Boston Democrats in 1949.

Both failed.

Ralph Sullivan,

teaching
from Boston's Ward 17, proposed a bill to "prevent
ideals in
of atheistic communism and safeguard Christian

American education."

The bill passed the house but died in
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.

Sullivan worried about the threat communism

the Senate.

posed to religion and community values.

Vincent Mannering,

from Boston's Ward 10, worried about the political threat of

communism.

He proposed legislation to outlaw the Communist

party as a political party and to require registration of

party members.

Although party leaders succeeded in keeping

Mannering 's bill bottled up in committee, the proposal to
outlaw the Communist party did not go away.*^
In 1949,

as in 1948, one difference between the bill

that passed and bills that did not pass was party

affiliation of the sponsors.

Kendall Sanderson was the key

Republican legislator promoting anticommunist initiatives in
the House both years.

He must have had some support from

Republican party leaders to get these two bills through the
House.

Sanderson's bill also came on the heels of the

federal government's exposure of communists in public

employment.

Since passage of President Truman's Federal

Loyalty Program, the FBI uncovered people it claimed were

Communists working for the federal government in the Bay
State
were
Whatever the truth of the charges, these people
fire of
harmless souls, caught in the anticommunist cross

national politics.

John Galardi, a fifty year old

machinist, worked at the Boston Navy Yard.

At a hearing

admitted subscribing
before the Civil Service Commission, he
belonging to the Communist
to the Daily Worker but denied
Board rejected
The Commission and Loyalty Review
party.
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Galardi

'

s

denial and fired him. 4 5

The Boston Navy Yard

fired Leon Galandzy because belonged to a faction within the

Ukrainian Association that supported the Soviet Union.
Galandzy denied the charge and exposed the government's
source as the disgruntled wife of his arch-rival within the
association.^^

The FBI also investigated Frank Baker, a

Frank was

mail carrier from Brockton in the summer of 1948.

an eccentric character who threw himself into organizing for
a series of

The federal

left wing religious groups.

government fired another postal employee, William Eubanks of
Cambridge, after 25 years of service because he belonged to
the N.A.A.C.P.,

subscribed to the Nation, and attended

Scott Hearing lecture and

a Paul

a

Robeson concert. He also

bought copies of the Daily Worker "from

because it was easier than saying no.

a

persistent girl"

48

Other, more dramatic evidence of communist infiltration
the Sanderson
in Massachusetts helped generate support for

bill as well.

In April

1949,

Herbert Philbrick,

a

member of

the Bay State,
the Communist party in Massachusetts, stunned
as an FBI informant
as well as the nation, when he surfaced

top CP leaders.
and testified in New York City against

Philbrick exposed

a

small group of college professors and

the Boston
professionals that comprised a party cell in

Struik of MIT.
His biggest fish was Professor Dirk
stronger ant icommunist
Philbrick 's testimony helped build a

area.

in the Boston area.
climate in Massachusetts, especially
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Committee to Curb Communism, 1950-51
In 1950,

Boston Democrats submitted two petitions for

resolves to establish special investigating committees.

Reverberations from Philbrick's revelations and the outbreak
of war in Korea pushed the legislature to adopt one.

It was

a messy fight with rank and file anticommunist legislators

pitted against party leaders, the governor's office and
influential liberal lobbying groups.
later recalled,

controversy."^^

As one participant

"[the committee] was born in a storm of

The fighting, however, took place outside

public view; once it came time for a roll call vote, the

measure carried by an impressive 91 percent.
Bernard Lally, representing Boston's Ward 17,

introduced the first petition in January.

It called for

appointment of a special commission to "investigate the

infiltration of communist doctrine into teaching systems and
persons sympathetic to such doctrines."

The Committee on

Constitutional Law promptly reported the petition out,

recommending that it be referred to the next session.

Once

however,
the Lally petition reached the floor of the House,

legislators jumped to support it.

Clarence Telford, a

Berkshires,
Republican from Plainville, a small town in the
to "all
moved to increase the scope of the commission
Legislators
communistic activities in the commonwealth."
to 35 and
adopted this amendment by a lopsided vote of 95

Committee.
sent the petition to the Joint Rules
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Here,

however, party leaders exerted more influence and the

petition died in committee.
In early February,

50

Donlan, who represented Boston's

wealthiest Irish ward, introduced the second petition to
establish an investigation committee.
a

His Order called for

special committee to investigate the Communist party and

communist-front activities in the commonwealth.

petition languished in committee until July.

The

A month after

North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, prompting President

Truman to order U.S. air and naval units into action,
committee members voted nine to six to send the Donlan Order
to the floor of the House.

Seizing the moment, Donlan

immediately moved to suspend the rules and begin debate.
Both Democrats and Republicans rushed in to help shape the

Sherman Miles, a Republican from the Boston's

legislation.

Yankee Ward

5,

wanted the committee to investigate groups

"which are actively engaged in communist indoctrination or
the United
in propaganda against the military efforts of

States in support of the United Nations."

Charles Hedges, a

the
Republican from Quincy, offered an amendment to have
Joseph
committee investigate individuals as well as groups.
give the committee
Ward, a Democrat from Fitchburg, moved to

$100,000 to conduct their investigation.

51

debated.
While these and other amendments were being
tried to derail the
Democratic and Republican party leaders
argued
Democratic floor leader Robert Murphy
legislation.
was much better suited to
to his colleagues that the FBI
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handle this kind of investigation and urged them not to open
up this can of worms.

Republican floor leader Charles

Gibbons tried various parliamentary maneuvers to suspend

consideration of the petition, and finally succeeded in
getting the bill referred to the committee on Ways and
Means.

At

p.m., the House recessed without having voted

7

on the measure.

The next afternoon, the committee on Ways and Means

reported the Donlan Order out of committee with the

recommendation that the $100,000 appropriation be stricken.

With no further debate, legislators adopted the committee's
amendment and Order by a vote of 190 to

19.

The party

leadership had lost their battle and they knew it.

Only

twelve Republicans and seven Democrats went on record in
^"^
opposition to the Committee to Curb Communism.

Vigorous opposition from the liberal lobby made
legislators wary enough to include procedural safeguards in
the legislation.

The committee was required to tell

witnesses the subject of their investigation and to seek
only evidence "relevant and germane" to the subject.

Witnesses had the right to counsel and the right to
would be
supplement their testimony with a statement that
People named in committee hearings
made part of the record.
appear before the
had the right to file statements or
a
The House version of the Order required

committee.

the Senate struck
stenographic record of all testimony, but
.

•

this provision.

54
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The Speaker of the House and the President of the

Senate appointed four Republicans and four Democrats to the
committee.

Philip Bowker, a Republican Senator from

Brookline, became chairman of the committee.

A career

politician, Bowker served in the House from 1933 to 1940

before being elected to the Senate.

When not performing his

legislative duties, Bowker sold voting equipment for the

Automatic Voting Machine Corporation.

Bowker quickly

assured liberal critics that the committee would not engage
in "witch hunting. "^^

Donlan, the Order's sponsor and the

only other Boston legislator named to the committee was the
only member publicly identified as an anticommunist
crusader.

The committee hired William Costello, a former

FBI agent, as its counsel and went to work.

The committee's first order of business was to send a

delegation to Washington, D.C. to gather information.
Representatives Donlan, Michael Batal,

a

Democrat from

Lawrence, and Edward DeSaulnier, a Republican from

Chelmsford, spent three days in Washington where they met

with the officials from the U.S. Attorney General's office,
the FBI, and HUAC.

According to Donlan, they returned to

Boston with "a whole suitcase of material.

"^^

The committee began meeting in January,
its report on March 30,

1951 and issued

It was a cautious committee,

1951.

wary of being in the spotlight.

Cornelius Dalton, a

for
conservative political columnist, blasted the committee

"letting themselves be frightened by the letterhead
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liberals." 57

The committee held no public hearings and

heard all witnesses in executive session.

It summoned

leaders of the Communist party but all invoked their

privilege against self-incrimination.
complained it was hampered by

The committee

a lack of information.

Since

no state body compiled information about local communist

activity, the committee depended on whatever information the
FBI and HUAC were willing to share.

^®

Thus, the committee

had no startling new information to disclose in its report.
The committee reported the Communist party in

Massachusetts had approximately 900 members concentrated in
Boston, a cluster of industrial towns north of Boston (Lynn,

Peabody and Salem), and the twin textile cities of New
Bedford and Fall River.

It concluded the Communist party

was "not a legitimate political party, nor [was] it a

movement whose goal is Socialism or some modification of our
present political system."

The report named ten top leaders

each
of the party, giving brief biographical sketches of

underground.^^
one, and concluded that the party had gone
front
The report focused its fire on two communist
the "Peace
groups, the Professional Club of Boston and

earlier in his
Front," groups Philbrick exposed two years

According to the

testimony at the New York Smith Act trial.

most important
report, the Professional Club was "the
Massachusetts" because its
section of the Communist party in

program of

out
members were "instrumental in carrying

a

psychological and intellectual sabotage."

Drawing on a

•

favorite local metaphor that places Boston at the "hub" of
the nation, the committee described the Boston Professional

Club as a "focal point from which Communist influence in our

cultural community radiates throughout the nation

.

.

influencing or duping others in positions of influence."
The committee described this phenomenon as a "matter of

great concern. "^°
The committee also blasted the "Peace Front" in Boston,
the "intellectual and psychological sabotage campaign of the

Communist

*

s

Fifth Column.

"

Peace Front propaganda "softened

the American people" making them unsympathetic to national

defense efforts in Europe and Far East.

It aimed to create

public opinion favoring withdrawal of troops in Europe and
South Korea.

According to the committee, this was not a

legitimate peace initiative but a ruse to pave the way for a

Communist takeover.
The committee did not investigate communism in labor or

industry, probably because the FBI and HUAC did not give it
any information in these areas.

It did note the

"comparative ineffectiveness of the Communist drive in the
textile industry" and claimed it needed more time to examine

communist infiltration in the United Electrical, Radio and

Machine Workers Union of America (UE) and the Union of
Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA).

As for

probing communist subversion in the defense industry, the
committee said the FBI was better qualified to carry out
62
that work.
1
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Massachusetts "Ober" Act, 1952
The Committee to Curb Communism proposed sweeping

legislation to deal with the menace of communist subversion
in Massachusetts.

At the heart of the bill was a provision,

similar to Maryland's Ober Act, outlawing the Communist
party.

^"^

Other provisions established a special subversive

activities division in the attorney general's office; beefed
up the already existing Barnes bill and Sanderson bill; and

proposed a loyalty oath for attorneys.

The committee also

recommended that it be continued for another year.^*
These recommendations were not unanimous.

Two

Republicans and one Democrat filed dissenting reports.

William Hayes, a Republican lawyer from Waltham, believed
the pressing need was not new legislation "but a well-

informed public."

Federal laws, he argued, were sufficient

to deal with subversive activity in the state.

disagreed with singling out lawyers.

Hayes also

Sumner Whittier, a

Republican patrician from Everett, one of the hotbeds of
communist activity according to the report, and Donlan felt
it was too soon to pass an Ober Act type law while its

central premise was still being tested in the courts.
The crucial legal issue was whether the first amendment
If it was a political party,

protected the Communist party.

then its
like the Democratic Party or the Republican Party,
but, if
members were entitled to constitutional protection;
it was a dangerous conspiracy,

then government was free to
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act.

after the committee filed its report, the

In 1951,

Supreme Court settled the issue by upholding convictions of
top Communist party leaders in United States

v.

Dennis .^^

Citing world events, the Court found that the CP met the
"clear and present danger" test.

It also relied on the fact

that the CP was an organized political party.

"It is the

existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger," wrote
Once the Supreme Court ruled, the

Chief Justice Vinson.

door opened for federal and state governments to curtail
speech and associational rights of communists.
The committee filed its report and recommendations for

legislation on April

2,

1951.

failed to derail the bills.

Party leaders again tried and

Both the House and the Senate

rejected proposals to have the Committee on Constitutional
Law consider the bills during recess.

Donlan, apparently

still concerned about the constitutionality of the bill,

moved to substitute it with an order to revive the
The House rejected Donlan 's amendment and passed

committee.

the committee's legislation by a vote of 201 to 17.

The

Conte, a
bill stalled in the Senate until Senator Silvio

proposed a
liberal Republican from western Massachusetts,
Conte

substitute.

•

s

bill trimmed back the worst excesses of

provision
the committee bill but retained its central
On November
outlawing membership in the Communist party.
16,

1951,

Senate
the last day the legislature sat, the

passed Conte

'

s

bill.
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The new law attacked the Communist party head on.

It

defined subversive organizations as "any form of association
of three or more persons

.

.

.

established

purpose of advocating, advising
or violence ...

illegal
a

.

[of]

...

.

.

.

for the common

[the] overthrow by force

the government..," and declared them

The law specifically named the Communist party as

subversive organization and set up a mechanism for state

courts to determine whether other groups were subversive.

People who remained members of a subversive organization
faced three years in jail and a $1,000 fine.

Anyone who

destroyed books or records of a subversive organization
faced one year in jail and a fine of $1,000.

Renting

a hall

to a subversive organization carried a maximum penalty of

one year in jail and a fine of $1,000.

68

The same day the Senate passed this sweeping bill, it

rejected another bill that had already made it through the
House.

The other bill was brought on behalf of Boston's

Tommy Dorgan, sponsor of the 1935 teachers' oath.

Dorgan's

private
petition instructed college presidents at public and

institutions to expel communists and communist sympathizers
from their teaching staffs.

The bill remained bottled up in

House
committee until October, 1951 when it reached the
vote.
floor and guickly passed without a voice

The Senate,

after it
however, rejected the Dorgan bill just moments
legislation.
passed the Committee to Curb Communism's

69

least, the liberal
This suggests that in the Senate, at

lobby still had some clout.

It also suggests that the
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Communist party had become an easy target for legislators

warily looking over their shoulders at bad press.

When it

came to private education, however, Harvard and other elite

universities in the state were still off limits.
for the House.

As Donlan said,

But not

"President Conant gives aid

and comfort to the enemy when he leaves the impression that

Communism is just an 'unpopular political opinion.'" 70
The commonwealth brought only two indictments pursuant
to the new law: the first in 1951 against Professor Dirk

Struik of MIT and the second in 1954 against the Otis Hood
and seven Communist party leaders in Massachusetts.

Both

indictments were dismissed in 1956 when the Supreme Court
ruled the federal government had preempted the field of
sedition.

Although the legislature passed this sweeping law
proposed by the Committee to Curb Communism in 1951, it did
not agree to revive and continue the committee the next
year.

Boston Democrat Timothy Mclnerney introduced a

petition to reestablish the committee, but it died in
committee. "^^

Boston Democrat William Keenan introduced the

would
only other anticommunist initiative in 1952. His bill
communist
require college presidents to fire communists and

sympathizers.

When the Committee on Education recommended

House quietly
it be referred to the next session, the

acquiesced. ''^

Without the pressure of being at war with

succeeded in
communist North Korea and China, party leaders

containing localist anticommunist sentiment.
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Massachusetts S pecial Commission On Communism.
Subvers ive Activities and Related Matters
Within the Commonwealth. 1953-1963
In 1953,

however, the tide turned once again and the

legislature launched a new commission.

This time outside

pressure came from congressional investigating committees.
In the first half of 1953,

the Velde Committee (HUAC),

Jenner Committee (SISS) and McCarthy Subcommittee all held

hearings in Boston.

The Velde and Jenner committees focused

on "subversion in higher education" and competed with each

other to land the most prestigious witnesses and make the
most sensational charges.

Beginning in February 1953,

Robert Gorham Davis, Granville Hicks and Daniel Boorstin
gave dramatic testimony to HUAC about Communist party

activities at Harvard in the 1930s.

Another ten witnesses

also testified, about half cooperated with the committee.

Witnesses who refused to name names in executive session
were called back to testify at public hearings so that they
could be "exposed."

Wendell Furry was the only

uncooperative witness still teaching at Harvard in 1953.

Anticommunists inside and outside the university called for
Furry 's dismissal.

After much maneuvering, the Harvard

Corporation suspended Furry for three years rather than
73
firing him outright.

In March,

1953,

the Jenner Committee (SISS) began

hearings in Boston on the same issue.

Two more Harvard

teachers, Helen Deane Markham and Leon Kamin, took the
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Fifth.

Again, the Harvard Corporation did not fire them

outright, angering federal inquisitors and local

anticommunists alike.

A week after Harvard's announcement

suspending Markham and Kamin, the Jenner committee called

Markham back for further testimony.

When she continued to

assert her fifth amendment privilege, Jenner called Herbert

Philbrick to "prove" she was a Communist.

All Philbrick

could do, however, was repeat hearsay information from

someone he "believed to be a Communist party member" who had
told him Markham was a member of the party.
Other,

less famous Massachusetts educators also refused

to cooperate with the Jenner committee.

Since the state

employed these teachers, however, they were fired as soon as
they asserted their privilege against self-incrimination.
One was George Faxon, a Boston high school teacher and a

target of local anticommunists since 1939 when he organized
a

meeting for the American Student Union.

Elizabeth

Guarnaccia, another teacher who took the Fifth before the

Jenner committee, resigned before she was fired.

Mary

Knowles, the Norwood town librarian, also resigned following

her appearance before the Jenner committee.
The legislature reacted to this spotlight of national

publicity by establishing its own investigating commission.
Boston Democrats, James Burke, Edmond Donlan and John
McMorrow, and

Cambridge Democrat, Francis Good introduced

three different bills in 1953.

Good was fulfilling his

campaign pledge to fight subversion.
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An advertisement he

ran in the 1952 campaign assured voters a vote for him
would
"Aid In The Fight Against Communism"''^

In May,

Senate and

House leaders appointed a committee to consolidate the bills
into one.

This committee included Senator Bowker, former

chairman of the Committee to Curb Communism, Senator John
Powers, a Boston Democrat, and Representative Paul McCarthy

from Somerville.

commission.

All three would be appointed to the new

Bowker assured his colleagues the committee

would draft a resolve creating "the broadest type of
investigation we have ever had in the Commonwealth."
Projected targets were "communist infiltration in religion,
education,

legal profession and labor.

"^^

This committee drafted a resolve broader in scope than
that the 1950 Committee to Curb Communism.

They modeled

this new investigating commission after that of the House

Un-American Activities Committee, copying language directly
from the federal legislation to define the scope of the

state's investigation.

Unlike HUAC, however, they included

safeguards similar to those adopted for the Committee to
Curb Communism.

The resolve was introduced in the Senate in

late June,

and flew through both chambers in less than

1953,

78
ten days without one word of opposition.

Members of the Massachusetts Special Commission on
Communism, Subversive Activities and Other Related Matters
met for the first time on September 15,

1953.

Although

dependent on the legislature for renewal each year and for
funds to conduct investigations, the special commission
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quickly took on a life of its own.

Before examining the

workings and impact of the commission, we will look at the
legislature's response to the special commission.
1954 and 1955 were the high water mark of number of

anticommunist bills and petitions introduced in the
legislature.
most.

As in the past,

Boston Democrats sponsored

Democrats from Worcester, Fitchburg, Lawrence and New

Bedford also introduced anticommunist bills.

Many

overlapped; many copied previous bills; some proposed to

increase penalties of existing legislation; and none was
enacted.

With the exception of legislation dealing

specifically with the special commission, the legislature
passed no new anticommunist initiatives after 1953.

Most

bills never made it out of committee; many were referred to
the special commission for further study.
The first change in the mission of the special

commission came

a

year after it began meeting.

Angered by

watered down, generalized first report, Joseph Ward,

a

a

Fitchburg Democrat, proposed an amendment mandating the
special commission to name names.

On a voice vote, the

House voted Ward's amendment down, 42 to 69.

But, when Ward

by
called for a roll call vote, his amendment passed
of 114 to 69.

Clearly,

a

vote

lawmakers had some misgivings about

its chairman,
the new investigating commission, including
The
amendment.
Philip Bowker, who moved to strike Ward's

calling for
House revised the language of Ward's amendment,
had "credible evidence"
the commission to name names when it
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the person belonged to the Communist party.

This satisfied

legislators in both houses and it passed.
The legislature also agreed to help out the special

commission with unruly witnesses.

Some leaders of the

Communist party were particularly rude and scornful of
commissions.

Because they took the Fifth, however, the

commission had no power to punish them.

The legislature

created a new misdemeanor for "behaving in a disorderly or

contemptuous manner before [the special commission]."

No

one was ever prosecuted under this provision.®^

Anticommunist legislators continued to be frustrated

with the commission's inability to force uncooperative

witnesses to testify.

In 1955 and 1956,

Representatives

Charles lanello and Edmond Donlan, ardent Boston
anticommunists, introduced legislation empowering the

commission to grant immunity to witnesses who took the
Fifth.

Once witnesses are granted immunity, they can no

longer invoke the privilege against self incrimination and

further refusal to answer questions is punishable with
contempt.

However, the legislature was unwilling to grant

made
the special commission this much power and neither bill
it out of committee.
In 1954,

81

1955 and 1956,

resolves continuing the special

commission for another year passed quickly and without
incident.

However, from 1957 on, opponents and supporters

continue the
squared off against each other at hearings to

commission.

The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts,
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Massachusetts Council of Churches (representing Protestant
churches), and Boston Bar Association opposed continuation
of the special commission.

Members of the commission,

veterans organizations and Catholic lay groups favored
continuation.

In 1959,

Bowker boasted that "nest after nest

of Communists in Massachusetts were cleared out...

Recruiting among Communists in Massachusetts has reached
new low and

I

a

ascribe it to the work of the Commission."

Henry Lyons, appearing on behalf of the Archdiocese Council
of Catholic Men and Women, argued it was "foolish to spend

millions in Europe and the Near East
the guard at home

.

.

.

.

and then let down

82

The commission's supporters and opponents exchanged

bitter, acrimonious charges during hearings in 1957 and
1958.

Anticommunist legislators were entrenched in their

position.
a

As Donlan said,

basketball game."

"It's a fight against death, not

When the chairman of the committee

holding hearings on the resolve to continue the special
commission rapped the gavel to get order, people in the
audience shouted back "Shut up" and "Let's investigate him.'
The audience jeered Howard Whiteside, Jr., attorney for the

Civil Liberties Union.

Christopher lanello, a particularly

fervent Boston anticommunist, yelled: "He's the one who

appeared for all the Communists.

I

think we should

83
investigate him."

The Boston Archdiocese of the Catholic Church

commission
vigorously supported continuation of the special
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.

The Archdiocese Council of Catholic Women, the Archdiocese

Council of Catholic Men, Catholic Daughters of America and
the Holy Name Society all sent representatives.

Henry Leen

appeared as the personal representative of Archbishop

Cushing to testify in favor of continuing the special

commission
A few legislators voiced opposition to the commission.
In 1958,

Isaac Hogden, a Republican from Belchertown, moved

to refer the resolve to the next session, but his motion

lost 24 to 59.

The next year, Mary B. Newman, a Republican

from Cambridge and former member of the special commission,

moved to refer the resolve continuing the commission to the
next session.

84
Her motion failed by a vote of 18 to 81.

During the 1959 session, the legislature did reject
request from the commission for more funding.

a

In 1962, Mrs.

Newman tried again to end the commission; once again, the
House passed up a chance to disband the commission.
Cracks appeared in the special commission too.

William

Randall, a Republican commissioner from Framingham, moved to

change the language of 1954 provision mandating the

commission to name names from "shall" to "may."
amendment carried; no vote was recorded.

Randall's

From then on, the

to
commission was authorized to name names, but not required

name names.
the
Instead of just terminating the special commission,
the Senate
legislature let it die a slow death. Even though

Court had ruled the
had censured McCarthy and the Supreme
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federal government preempted the field of subversion, the

Massachusetts legislature needed to keep up the appearance
of opposing communist infiltration in the state.

The

legislature waited until 1963 to let go of its commission to

investigate subversion.

That year, the resolve to continue

the commission quietly died in committee.

Investigating Communists

Members of the Special Commission on Communism,
Subversive Activities and Related Matters Within the

Commonwealth assembled for the first time on September
1953.

15,

Two senators, three representatives and two

"civilians" sat on the "Red Probe Committee."

Over the next

decade, they investigated subversion in schools and

universities, labor unions, churches, and liberal "front"
groups.

The commission called hundreds of witnesses and

issued lengthy reports on the "Peace Lobby" and other

Communist "front" groups (1955), the International Fur and

Leather Workers' Union (1955), the Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America (1955), Dirk Struik
(1957),

and the Communist party (1958).

In these reports,

the commission named 134 Communists and fellow travelers.

Most of the people named refused to cooperate with the
were
commission; some had left the party years earlier and
to
willing to discuss their own activities but refused

disclose names of their associates.
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The apex of the

,

commission's activities and influence lasted from the fall
of 1953 through 1955.

The Senate sent Philip Bowker, a Republican from

Brookline, and John Powers, a Democrat from Boston.

Bowker,

who had served as chairman of the Committee to Curb
Communism, was elected chairman of the special commission as
well.

Powers, an Irish Democrat from South Boston, served

in the House from 1939 until 1946 when he was elected to the

Senate and quickly became Democratic floor leader.

He was

an aspiring party politician, sometimes compared to James

Michael Curley in his rise from poverty to political power
broker.

Like Curley, his roots were deep in anticommunist

Irish Catholic Boston.

He served on the special commission

until 1958 when he left the Senate to run for Mayor of
Boston, an election he was favored to win but lost in the

closing days when newspapers tied his campaign to Boston's
latest financial scandal.

When Powers left the special

commission, the Senate President appointed James W.

Hannigan, Jr. to replace him.
The House sent two Republicans, William Randall of

Framingham and Mary Newman of Cambridge, and one Democrat,
Paul McCarthy of Somerville.

Randall served on the special

commission until 1959 when he resigned.

He started his

service as an enthusiastic communist investigator.

In 1954,

he boasted to his hometown Rotary Club that the special

commission held frequent conferences with Senator Joseph

McCarthy who he described as "a hard worker and very
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tenacious." 85
enough.

Five years later, however, Randall had

He dissented from the special commission's annual

request for extension because "[t]he whole subject of

communism in this state has been thoroughly looked at and
further investigation is not called for."

When the

legislature revived the special commission, he resigned.
George Thompson, a Republican from Swamscott, replaced

Randall
Paul McCarthy represented Somerville in the House for

nearly 20 years when he was appointed to the commission.
strong anticommunist

,

A

he served with Bowker and Powers on

the joint committee that drafted the resolve establishing
the special commission.

When he died in 1955, Roger Sala, a

Democrat from North Adams, took his place.

In 1959,

Ralph

Cartwright, a Republican from Randolph replaced Sala.

Cartwright resigned a year later and was replaced by John
Barry, a Democrat from Peabody.

Mary Newman was replaced in 1955 when she lost a bid
for reelection.

After regaining her seat, she became one of

down the
the few legislators willing to take a stand to shut

special committee.

John T. Tynan, an activist anticommunist

Democrat from Boston's Ward

6,

replaced Newman serving on

the special commission until 1963.

Tynan shepherded annual

through the
resolves to continue the special commission
late 1950s an
legislature as public support waned in the

early 1960s.
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The governor appointed two "citizen" members to the

special commission, George Cashman, a lawyer and former
judge from Wellesley, and Richard Buckley.

involved himself in the

Cashman actively

work, of the commission.

He often

served as spokesman for the commission, bringing the

prestige of his judicial office to the work of the
commission.

In December 1953, he made the first trip to

Washington on behalf of the commission to coordinate work
with federal agencies and congressional committees.

Cashman

proposed a "mutual assistance pact" to the Jenner, Velde and
McCarthy committees.

When he returned to Boston, the

special commission met with the governor, speaker of the
87
House, and Senate president to hear his report.

Richard Buckley, the governor's other appointee, acted
as the commission's unofficial liaison with the American

Legion.

A former commander of the Massachusetts Department

to the
of the American Legion, Buckley maintained close ties

organization.

Unaccountably, his name disappeared from

his
commission reports in 1957 and no new appointee took

place
Once assembled in September,

1953,

the special

counsel.
commission's first order of business was to hire
and Boston
After seeking suggestions from the Massachusetts

Bresnahan of Newton,
bar associations, they selected Thomas
a willing anticommunist

.

Like his counterparts on

his talents as a
congressional committees, Bresnahan honed
witnesses appear in the
cross examiner to make uncooperative
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worst light possible.

Once a witness took the Fifth,

Bresnahan followed up with a series of preposterous
questions knowing the witness could not deny them outright.

Claiming the privilege against self incrimination made

witnesses look like they had something to hide.

Bresnahan

examined most witnesses and wrote the commission's reports.

Although personnel on the special commission changed
during the decade of its existence, a core group of ardent
anticommunists remained to shape its work and output.
Powers, Tynan, Cashman and Bresnahan formed this bloc.

Bowker's role remained somewhat ambiguous since he sometimes
For

appeared to be concerned about criticism from liberals.
instance, on the floor of the Senate in 1954, he moved to

strike the House amendment requiring the special commission
to name names.

The following year, however, he responded to

a lawsuit filed by five prominent attorneys to enjoin the

commission from naming names by threatening to tear up the
summons and read the names from the Senate floor where he
®®
would be immune from contempt charges.

It is hard to tell

whether Bowker was concerned with his image or with civil
and
As time went on, however, he identified more

liberties.

more with the anticommunist crusaders.
Once assembled, the commission sought a close

relationship with federal investigating committees,

reserving

a

special place of awe for Senator McCarthy.

The

however, often
commission remained a very junior partner,
disclosures to
sensational
given
never
and
dark
the
in
left
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release.

McCarthy always kept those for himself.

November 1953, William Teto,

a

In

machinist from the Fitchburg

General Electric plant and former UE employee, surfaced as
an FBI informant before McCarthy's subcommittee holding

hearings in New York City.

McCarthy kept the Massachusetts

commission on pins and needles refusing to release Teto to
testify in Boston.

Meanwhile, McCarthy grabbed the

headlines on communist subversion in Massachusetts defense
plants by releasing Teto

'

s

information about Communist party

cells among UE loyalists in Lynn, Everett, and Fitchburg.

After making outlandish promises about Teto

'

s

revelations,

the special commission called Ernest Stolba as a stand-in
for Teto.

Stolba was Teto's "close friend and confidant"

who had no direct knowledge of "subversive" GE workers and

could only give the commission names he had heard Teto

mention over the kitchen table. ®^

Eventually Teto made it

to Boston but not until McCarthy had shifted the spotlight

onto other targets.
Such shabby treatment did not seem to bother the

special commission.

In January 1954,

when McCarthy

invited
scheduled hearings in Boston, the special commission

him to confer with them in executive session.

McCarthy

inviting
declined, because his "schedule was too tight,"

them to attend his hearings instead.

Wanting to appear

commission was
cooperative, McCarthy told the press the
Communists in
"welcome to any information we have about
attended
Massachusetts." Members of the commission
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.

McCarthy's public hearing the morning of January 16 and then
took him out to lunch at the Boston Club.

Bowker and one of

the commission's investigators also attended the afternoon

executive session.

According to Bowker, "[McCarthy]

provided us with much data that we needed and we told him
what we have been doing.

We correlated information

During 1954, both McCarthy and special commission
members took pains to play up their mutual cooperation in
the press.

In June, McCarthy held hearings in Lynn to

follow up on "subversion" in the defense industry.

Again,

he told the press he "wanted to work closely with the

Massachusetts Commission" and "was turning over data from
9
some of his files relating to Communism in this state..."

For their part, commission members reported following up

leads from information furnished by McCarthy and Jenner.
The subcommittee on education summoned public school

officials based on information from the Jenner committee.
Powers said his subcommittee investigating unions had

"coordinated its efforts with McCarthy

'

s

.

"^^

Information provided by federal investigating

committees came primarily from four FBI informants.

All

were Massachusetts residents who had voluntarily initiated
contact with the FBI.

The first informant to surface was

Herbert Philbrick who had infiltrated the Communist party in

Massachusetts in 1940.

According to his account, he first

entered the Cambridge Youth Council office to solicit

business for the advertising company he represented.
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.

pacifist at the time, he was attracted by the Council

member's youthful idealism and peace work.
later,

however, Philbrick was disillusioned.

Six months
He had risen

rapidly to become chairman of the Cambridge Council, but was

disturbed when leaders of affiliated groups used his name
without first getting permission and when the national board
of the American Youth Congress overturned decisions made by

the local group

.

Philbrick concluded the Council was

"nothing but a manipulated front for the plans and programs
of a few behind-the-scenes operators" and called the FBI.

For the next nine years,

first as a member of the Young

Communist League and then as

a

member of the Communist

party, he reported on his activities to the FBI

.

His role

as an FBI informant climaxed in April 1949, when he appeared
as a surprise witness at the New York Smith Act trial of top

Communist party leaders

93

During his nine years as an FBI informant, Philbrick
His mother, sister and wife

never confided in his family.

were as surprised as everyone else when he took the stand in
New York.

Philbrick

's

mother believed he was trying to make

up for having been rejected by the Army.

Once his cover

was revealed, Philbrick joined the select group of
professional witnesses.

He was a very good witness.

Philbrick had never embraced the Communist party the way
Bella
other professional witnesses like Louis Budenz and

grounds of
Dodd had, so he could not be discredited on the

personal revenge or animosity.
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Ant i communists in Massachusetts embraced Philbrick as a
local hero.

The Boston City Council declared November 21,

1951 to be "Herbert Philbrick Day."

The American Legion

feted Philbrick at a dinner banquet bringing in Frank
Gordon, one of the lead prosecutors from the Dennis trial,

Gordon praised Philbrick 's

as the principal speaker.

heroism and valuable contribution to the conviction of CP
Before Hollywood made a movie based on

leaders.

Philbrick'

s

life, one of the Boston television stations

broadcast a serialized dramatization of his story.
Philbrick

's

publicity generated an interesting
Both William Teto and Armand

phenomenon of copycat spies.

Penha, two other informants, admired Philbrick enough to

Teto

follow his example.

'

s

claim is more suspect.

There is

some evidence that animosity toward local UE officers

motivated his action as much as Philbrick 's patriotism.
Albert Fitzgerald, UE

'

s

president, claimed Teto had been

and a
fired by his UE local "because he was a heavy drinker

screwball."

When Teto surfaced through McCarthy's

connection to
committee, the FBI initially disclaimed any
him.

a "FBI
Teto however claimed he was inspired to become

counterspy" when he heard about Philbrick.

According to

suspected UE
one report, Teto gave names of thirty

communists to the commission.
Like
in 1958.
Armand Penha emerged as an FBI informant
inspired by Philbrick 's
Teto, he was a union organizer
He served with
persuasive.
more
is
claim
's
Penha
example.
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Army Intelligence during the war and attended law school at
night after his discharge.

Eventually he returned to

Fairhaven, his hometown, to take a job as an inspector in a
local plant

In the early 19 50s

.

,

he volunteered his

services to the FBI and began informing the government about

Communist party activities in New Bedford and Fairhaven.

When Penha surfaced in 1958, however, he had only limited,
out of date information to give to the special commission

97

Ann Ruth Steinberg, a young Boston University student,

was the fourth FBI informant.

Like the others, she

initially surfaced at a federal investigating committee
hearing.

The commission patiently waited for her to finish

in Washington before hearing her testimony.

commission about the Labor Youth League,
described as

a

a

She told the

group she

Communist party front that organized in the

Roxbury and Dorchester sections of Boston.

She identified

eleven communists in the group, all of whom were summoned to
against self
the commission where they invoked the privilege

incrimination

98

information
The cominission also reported receiving
In
volunteered by patriotic individuals and groups.
investigating
December 1953, Bowker said the commission was
names were
"hundreds" of Massachusetts residents whose
The American
supplied by twenty "voluntary informants."
In January
names.
Legion produced the biggest cache of
the commission
Department Commander Coleman Nee gave

1954,

Communists" and "names of
"case histories of 413 alleged
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hundred of suspected Communists and left-wing sympathizers."
Bowker and Powers praised the Legion's fine work claiming
"the Commission now has a network into the cities and towns
of the Commonwealth on a par with the underground network

operated by the Communists themselves
The commission s investigators also supplied
'

information.

They followed known Communist party members

and surveilled meetings of the party's front groups hoping
to identify people attending meetings and associating with

leaders.

Once identified, investigators worked up

a

dossier

on the person, probably relying on information from

Philbrick and Teto.
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The special commission adopted many McCarthyite

tactics. It tried to intimidate witnesses by having

summonses served in the middle of the night.

Witnesses had

to appear with only several hours notice, making it very

Witnesses first testified in

difficult to secure counsel.

executive session.

If they refused to cooperate with the

commission, they found newspaper photographers waiting in
the hall outside the hearing room.

Uncooperative witnesses

privilege
were invariably called back to invoke publicly the

against self incrimination.
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by lawyers
Like McCarthy, commissioners felt frustrated

who represented uncooperative witnesses.

Powers charged

attempts of federal
that a "dozen lawyers who have thwarted
Communists and
committees to check activities of alleged
state's commission
subversive organization are wrecking the
286

as well."

According to Powers, these lawyers were "the

number one problem confronting the commission ."
Bresnahan, the commission's counsel, reported: "We can tell
the minute we see a witness come in with one of the

partyline lawyers we're going to get nothing but the Fifth

Amendment ."

Bowker wanted to know if "counsel for the

hundreds of witnesses coming before us have been assigned by
invisible forces.
The special commission issued its first substantive
It targeted three organizations,

report in June 1955.-^°^

the New England Citizens Concerned for Peace, New England

Conference for Peace, and the Committee for the Bill of
Rights, the holding company for the Communist party's

newspaper, the Daily Worker.
and fellow travelers.

The report named 84 members

For some, their involvement occurred

years before and that was noted.

The report included

transcripts of testimony from the eight "Peace Advocates"
who had taken the Fifth.

Publicizing this testimony may

browbeating
have backfired a bit because it shows Bresnahan
witnesses.

where
For instance, Bresnahan asked one witness

she lived.

She replied that he had her address from

previous testimony in executive session.

Bresnahan

to say it in
persisted; she asked if it was really necessary
He then read her address out loud and
a public session.

asked if she lived there.
the firing of Boston
The commission's report called for

Russell.
University instructor Charles Hoover
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When he

appeared before the commission and took the Fifth, it

promptly informed B.U. officials.
of the B.U.

transcript.

The Executive Committee

Board of Trustees requested a copy of the

After reviewing it, they announced Russell

would not be fired because they were "satisfied Russell
appeared, spoke freely and answered all questions."

The

commission disagreed, intimating the trustees were disloyal.
The special commission had a keen interest in the labor

movement and saw itself as a catalyst to assist rank and
file members in removing communist leaders.
1953,

In December

the commission jumped into the battle between UE

loyalists and lUE anticommunists five days before a NLRB

election at the big GE local in Lynn.

James Carey,

anticommunist president of the lUE, was in Boston to address
the state CIO convention and asked to testify before the

commission.

In a public session,

names of 200 communists in the UE.

he gave the commission

He used his appearance

for
as a campaign platform blasting the federal government

nonfailing to prosecute UE leaders for perjury in filing

Communist affidavits, for failing to put the UE on the
withdraw
subversive organizations list, and for failing to
workers,
defense work from plants where the UE represented
his testimony before
in his speech to the CIO convention and

employers who
the commission, Carey strongly criticized
after taking the
allowed workers to remain on their payroll
party.
Fifth about membership in the Communist

Carey

because of the
charged communism flourished in Massachusetts
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"vicious anti-democratic role that some employers play in

perpetuating a Communist conspiracy in their own plants.
Carey's fire was aimed at General Electric.

Four days

later, and the day before the Lynn election, GE announced a

Employees who admitted being a member of the

new policy.

Communist party would be fired and employees who took the

Fifth when asked about membership in the party would be
The commission applauded GE

suspended.

'

s

decision.

Bowker

"Witnesses

said the new policy would help the commission.

may not be so quick to invoke their constitutional rights if
they fear that such action will mean their suspension from

employment

.

In January 1954,

Local 1282 of the Distributive,

Processing and Office Workers Union of America (DPOWA) was
negotiating with John Hancock Life Insurance Company for
renewal of a contract that had expired.

represented 375 insurance agents.

Local 1282

As negotiations bogged

a
down, union members took a strike vote that carried by

margin of

7

to

1.

With a strike deadline set for March, the

to
president of the company asked the special commission

investigate communist influence in the union.
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Frank
The commission summoned union leaders including
Siegel, president of the local.

When Siegel took the Fifth,

off the strike.
rank and file members floundered and called
to leave the union and
In May, the insurance agents voted
The company never renewed
the company withdrew recognition.
.

per week pay cut.
the contract and the agents got a $15
289
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A few months later, the commission intervened in

another labor dispute.

Local 21 of the International Fur

and Leather Workers Union was negotiating for a new contract
on behalf of 3,600 workers at the A.

C.

Lawrence plant in

Peabody when Ben Gold, IFLWU's president, was convicted of
perjury in signing the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavit.
Sensing an opportunity to raid the Fur Workers, the AFL's

Meatcutter's Union petitioned the NLRB for an election.

The

company suspended negotiations and the commission summoned
Local 21

's

leaders.

"^^^

The commission knew Local 21

's

officers were not

communists and called on MIT professor Walter W. Rostow to
explain how communist international officers exerted control
over noncommunist locals.

Rostow studied the CIO Executive

Committee's report on communist influence in the IFLWU.

He

traced a pattern of foreign policy resolutions passed at
IFLWU conventions that "matched" the line of the Communist
party.

He also "discovered" a pattern of IFLWU's donations

to groups on the Attorney General's list.
file members
The commission then "exposed" for rank and

into letting
how the local's leaders had been "duped"
was
themselves believe that "Communist top leadership

Americanism." When
compatible with good unionism and good
business manager
confronted by the commission, the local's
denouncing the
turned on Gold and the national leadership
During the course
"hard core of Communism in this country."
Gold resigned, targeted
of the commission's investigation.
290

members of the local resigned and Local 21 voted to secede
from the IFLWU.

The commission concluded that "a

legislative body can powerfully assist in removing Communist
control over unions" by forcing public attention on the

strategy and tactics of communists and by removing the fear

anticommunists have that they will lose their jobs if they
speak out against leadership.
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The commission had less success with the UE.

Its

leaders refused to answer questions when summoned to the
commission; none turned on national leadership as local
IFLWU leaders had.

The commission's report named eight UE

organizers and seven UE District Council

2

officers as

members of the Communist party, and called Albert
Fitzgerald, president of the UE

,

a "dupe."

The commission

castigated rank and file union members for permitting
"agents of a foreign power to direct their destinies."

It

the hope
urged more "vigilance and action" and "express [ed]

assistance to
that its investigation and report will be of
and, once rid
union members in crushing Communist control;
again permit it to be
of Communism, that its members never

recaptured.

"^^^

its new policy of
In December 1953, when GE announced

Bowker hoped the threat
firing workers who took the Fifth,
Apparently the threat
tongues.
loosen
would
job
a
losing
of
found few UE members who
did not work since the commission
reason may have been
belonged to the Communist party. One

witnesses fired first,
that McCarthy got uncooperative
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leaving the commission with no threat.

For instance,

Alexander Gregory appeared before McCarthy sitting as
man committee in Lynn in January 1954.

a one-

Gregory, a 64 year

old naturalized citizen from Bulgaria, told McCarthy "I am

placed in a position today either to testify as
informer or lose my job."

a

political

McCarthy pressed Gregory to talk

about meetings of the Communist party he attended and names
of communists at the meetings.

Gregory replied, "I refuse

to answer that under the First and Fifth Amendments on

account it would bother my conscience to be an informer."

week later, Gregory lost his job at GE.^^*

A

If UE loyalists

like Gregory did not buckle before McCarthy, they were

unlikely to be intimidated by the commission.
Some former GE employees worked to stop the

anticommunist crusade.
Nathaniel Mills as

a

In December 1953, when Teto named

communist, GE fired him.

A month

later, McCarthy ejected Mills for disrupting his hearing.
In March 1954, Mills appeared as a witness at a state house

hearing to oppose proposed legislation prohibiting Communist
party members and sympathizers from peaceful picketing.

Mills told the committee he had been a member of the
Communist party in 1951 when it was outlawed and he had not

changed his beliefs since then.

This admission prompted

Representative Christopher lannello,
Roxbury, to take a punch at Mills.

from the hearing.

"^^^
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a

Democrat from

Both men were removed

since men like Mills and Gregory were never going to
talk, the commission based its report on information from

Teto and Carey.

It also relied on "experts" to make the

With the Fur Workers, the commission turned to Walter

case.

Rostow; with the UE, the commission turned to Louis Budenz.

The commission cited a chapter,

Budenz

'

s

"Red Web in Labor," from

book. Wen Without Faces, to make its case against

the UE.
The final two reports issued by the commission

concerned Dirk Struik and the Communist party.

Both reports

reprinted documents and testimony; neither contained any new
analysis or information.

Struik was

a

mathematician at MIT,

named by Philbrick in 1949 as a leading member of a Boston
cell known as the Pro-4 group.

In 1951,

HUAC summoned

Struik where he invoked his privilege against self
incrimination.

Meanwhile Struik continued teaching at MIT.

When the Middlesex County grand jury indicted Struik and two
others for violating the 1919 sedition statute, MIT

suspended Struik with pay.

In 1953, other MIT professors

appearing before HUAC corroborated Philbrick 's charge
against Struik.
Struik

-s

position.

In 1956, when the state court dismissed

indictment, MIT reinstated Struik to his former
events
MIT agreed to reopen Struik 's case if "new

of Professor
or new information again raise the question
faculty." The
Struik 's fitness to be a member of the MIT

commission disapproved of MIT's action.

Unwilling to

detailing the case
concede, it issued a lengthy report
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against Struik hoping to rouse public opinion to its
side.^^^

The most interesting feature of the Struik report is

what it omits.
education.

This is the commission's only report on

There is nothing about Harvard University,

public school teachers, subversive books or any of the other

education issues that concerned legislators or made
headlines in the postwar period.

Perhaps the commission had

run out of money and was unable to do more than reprint

material from its files.
The commission's final substantive report, issued in

January 1958, concerned the Communist party itself.

One

wonders why the commission bothered; there was no new
information to report, no new names to reveal.

It lists 37

people giving "biographical sketches" for each one.

The

bulk of the report consisted of lengthy excerpts from their

testimony before the commission sparring with Bresnahan, the
commission's counsel, and refusing to answer questions.

The

report reiterated earlier charges against Reverend Donald
Lothrup, pastor of Boston's Community Church.

Lothrup had

been a target of anticommunists for twenty years.

The 1937

special commission identified Lothrup as a "fellow

traveller"; Philbrick and Budenz named Lothrup as a member
of the Communist party.

Still, he and his group persisted.

The attack on Lothrup may have been a response to

mounting criticism leveled at the commission by Protestant
church leaders.

In November 1956,

the Massachusetts Baptist

.

.

Convention passed a resolution condemning the legislature
for continuing the special commission.

In 1957,

the

Massachusetts Council of Churches led the fight to shut down
the commission.
To conclude, the special commission's greatest success

was turning members of the DPOWA and IFLWU against their

left-led national leadership.

Beyond that, the commission

uncovered little information McCarthy, Jenner or HUAC had
not already publicized.

The handful of teachers and GE

workers who lost their jobs were fired on account of

testimony at federal committees not the commission
Much harder to assess is the intangible political cost
of publishing names of 137 members and sympathizers of the

Communist party.
the person

'

s

Along with each name, the reports listed

street address and brief political biography

These were not "innocent liberals"; they were people in or
near the party.

Some had already broken with the party and

that was noted in the reports.

Nevertheless, it was an

inquisition about unpopular political views and surely must
have chilled the expression of ideas.

On a personal level,

the commission invaded the privacy of people it named,

putting them and their politics on public display.

The

image of a rebellious Puritan pilloried on the town common

seems apt.
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Conclusion

While anticommunist sentiment was not new in

Massachusetts when the war ended, the cold war gave it an
immediacy most Americans accepted.

Local anticommunist

crusaders seized on the charged political environment and
pushed more initiatives through the legislature than at any
other time.

While historian Robert Griffith calls this

process "derivative," this study shows it was parallel until
1953,

and then reactionary.

Few people supported the

Communist party; most tolerated it as a necessary nuisance

within a democracy.
Local anticommunists

'

call to outlaw the party

succeeded when the Supreme Court ruled communist organizing
was not protected by the constitution.

Anticommunists' call

to expose subversion succeeded because national

anticommunists won that battle on the federal level and
brought their investigations to Massachusetts.

The state

legislature had kept anticommunist activists at bay, while
the federal legislature lacked the will or desire.

Anticommunist crusaders dominated the special
commission.

They were motivated by the teachings of the

Catholic church, not party politics.

Their goal was to

expose un-American behavior among Yankee intellectuals and

their Jewish collaborators.

Twenty years later, socially

conservative Irish Catholics aimed their fire at African

Americans infiltrating their schools; forty years later, at
lesbians and gay men infiltrating their parade.
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CHAPTER

7

BAY STATE ANTICOMMUNISM IN PERSPECTIVE

Ant i communism differed among states, and often among

places within a state, because local conditions differed.
In Massachusetts,

class and ethnicity shaped the politics of

anticommunism; national and international events provided
In other states,

the context for action.

drove anticommunism.

different factors

In Texas and Louisiana,

for instance,

where the struggle to maintain white supremacy colored all
politics, white Southerners used anticommunism to discredit
the civil rights movement.^

In Hawaii and California,

proximity to communist-controlled China and Korea led
conservative elites to exaggerate the threat of domestic
The unique political culture of each state

subversion.^

shaped anticommunist sentiment and initiatives.
From 1930 to 1960, the political culture of
a strong,

Massachusetts included

liberal tradition among

Yankee Republicans side-by-side with a strong, socially

conservative tradition among Irish Catholic Democrats.
Liberals' strength and prestige mediated between the far
left and the far right, discrediting both and keeping the

center from collapsing.
not breed demagogues,
or Illinois

's

Because of this, Massachusetts did

like California's Senator Jack Tenney

Senator Paul Broyles, or experience the

excesses of red baiting, as in New York or California.

For

recruited a large
the same reason, the Communist party never
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cadre of disciplined members in Massachusetts.

Liberal

intellectuals attracted to the party maintained independence
not tolerated among less prestigious members.

Liberal organizations in Massachusetts never buckled

under anticommunist pressure as did their counterparts in

other states."^

Leaders of the Civil Liberties Union of

Massachusetts, an affiliate of the American Civil Liberties
Union, but not a chapter, refused to follow its lead and

expel party members from leadership position.

Many Bay

State liberals responded to anticommunist hysteria on

principle

,

not expediency.

The socially conservative Catholic tradition also

rested on principle.

Papal authority consistently warned

Catholics about the danger of godless communism, a rival
religion that attracted workers in periods of economic

depression and threatened the underpinnings of democratic
institutions that sustained the church in the United States.
This message inspired Catholics to fight communism as a
moral issue.

Father Coughlin's vicious anticommunism and

anti-Semitism went beyond papal authority and attracted
Catholic extremists in Boston.
Based on this unique configuration in the state's

political culture, Massachusetts repressed its communists
reluctantly.

Conservative Republicans and Irish Catholic

Democrats sponsored anticommunist initiatives in the
legislature; veterans groups and lay Catholics did the same
on the local level.

Massachusetts anticommunists maintained
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an unbroken thread of activity throughout the period of this

study,

1930 to 1960.

Indeed, there is ample evidence of

antiradicalism dating at least from the 1919 Boston police
strike, and probably well before too.

At times the thread

was stronger, and supported by broader sectors of Bay
Staters, but it was never unbroken.

The evidence of

anticommunism and antiradicalism during the Second World
War, expressed as opposition to conscientious objectors and

support for the Christian Front, links the "little Red
Scare" of the depression to postwar McCarthyism.
As in other states, and on the national level,

legislative initiatives peaked during the Korean War.

In

one important respect, however, Massachusetts differed from

other industrial states unable to check the rise of local
demagogues.

In California,

Jack Tenney led

a

decade long

A leftist during

investigation of subversion in the state.*

the popular front era, he turned against former political

associates in 1939 over a union sguabble.

As a politician,

Tenney used anticommunism to carve out a base of power

within the fractious California legislature.

He held

hearings across the state and filed careless reports based
on flimsy evidence that eventually backfired on him, causing
the legislature to appoint a new chairman.
In other states.

Republican law makers personified

anticommunism in their legislatures.^
Paul Broyles chaired Illinois

-s

Republican Senator

Seditious Activities

Investigation Commission and Republican Representative
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Albert Canwell chaired Washington's Fact-Finding Committee
on Un-American Activities, intentionally modelled on

California's Tenney Committee.

In Maryland,

Frank Ober, a

conservative Republican lawyer who was not a politician, led
that state's anticommunist crusade.

New York was a slightly different case.

There, the

legislature as a whole, rather than one zealous
anticommunist, was deeply concerned about subversion in the

Empire State.

One commentator noted:

"The intensity [of

interest about subversion] has varied from time to time, and
the terminology has changed slightly, but the pattern of
1950 differed very little from that of 1798."^

Another point of comparison is the level to which state

investigating commissions copied federal committees.
Historian Robert Griffith, among others, postulates that

anticommunism on the state level was "derivative" of
national anticommunism and that state legislatures

"responded almost slavishly to the force of federal law and

precedent and to the anxieties aroused by national
leaders."^

With respect to Massachusetts, Griffith

overstates the case.

The Bay State set up its first

investigating commission in 1937, the year before Chairman

Martin Dies launched the House Un-American Activities
Committee in Washington.

Its second,

short-lived,

investigating commission in 1950-51, owed its existence more
other
to the outbreak of war in Korea than to HUAC and

federal committees.

In 1947 and 1948, Massachusetts
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.

liberals successfully fought back a move to establish a
state commission, Griffith's prediction notwithstanding.
Its third investigating commission,
1963,

lasting from 1953 to

comes closest to fitting the thesis.
In other states,

the fit is closer.

Historian Michael

Heale concludes that California's committee copied the

methods and targets of HUAC and other committees.®

On a

slight variation of the copycat thesis, Washington lawmakers

modelled their Canwell Commission on California's Tenney
State committees shared personnel and resources

Commission.

with each other and with federal committees.

Historian

Ellen Schrecker found close collaboration among people

connected to an "anti-Communist network" which provided
expertise and information for anticommunists working on the
state level.

^

The Broyles commission in Illinois hired

Benjamin Gitlow, a former member of the Communist party, to

investigate subversion at the University of Chicago and Dr.
J.

B.

Matthews, HUAC

'

s

witnesses at hearings.

director of research, to interrogate

Matthews testified before

Washington's Canwell commission as well as in Boston.
Unlike these states, Massachusetts was not intimately

connected to this network, perhaps because no demagogic

politician led its anticommunist probe.

Instead, shared

informants, like Herbert Philbrick and William Teto,

provided the most important link between national and state
investigations
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Even though California's experience mirrored the red

scare in Washington, Heale argues that alone does not

explain what happened.

A full analysis incorporates "the

impact of foreign affairs on the state's own political

configuration."

In other words,

postwar anticommunism was

product of influences from above and below.

evidence from Massachusetts as well.

a

This fits the

In 1953,

local

politicians reacted both to diocesan pressure and to that
of federal investigating committees focused on Massachusetts

by establishing its own committee to "clean house."

More work has been done on the state level than the
local level, making comparison even riskier.

Don Carleton,

in his detailed study of anticommunism in Houston's public

school system,

found a small group of right wing, elite

women, who belonged to the loosely organized national

network of Minute Women, led the crusade.

'^^

Conservative

newspaper editors and businessmen aided their efforts.

In

Massachusetts, elite matrons, like Zara Dupont, were more
likely to be demonstrating against the execution of Sacco
and Vanzetti than against leftist educators.

The Bay State

had its share of right-wing women, but they had much less

influence than the women in Houston.
a moral crusade,

churches.

backed by the Baptist and Methodist

In Massachusetts,

church's support.

The Houston women led

only Catholic women had their

Right-wing, Protestant women lacked

religious, moral component in their crusade.
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a

James Selcraig, in his study of Midwestern

anticommunism, also looks at local factors.

He finds

conservative businessmen, conservative press^ Legionnaires,
and anticommunist liberals supported local initiatives.

Although there are many similarities with Massachusetts,
each state had a unique configuration of factors.

In

addition to the local actors Selcraig found. Catholic lay
groups in Massachusetts consistently and ardently battled
subversion.

Newspapers played different roles in

Massachusetts than in the Midwest.

Throughout the Bay

State, many papers, such as The Boston Herald, Christian

Science Monitor, Springfield Union, Berkshire Eagle
(Pittsfield, Mass) decried the excesses of anticommunism.
Of course, there were others that applauded anticommunist

initiatives, like the Boston Post, Boston American, and New

Bedford Standard Times.

In the Massachusetts press,

then,

anticommunism was a contested topic.
None of the state and local studies look at how

anticommunism operated within the labor movement, and thus
miss an important part of the picture.

In Massachusetts,

opportunist labor leaders capitalized on anticommunism to
eliminate their left wing rivals.

However, a surprisingly

large number of workers were more interested in the labor

record of their leaders than in their political beliefs,

suggesting that working men and women were much less
politiciar
concerned about communist infiltration than were

and labor leaders.
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APPENDIX
PERCENT OF POPULATION THAT IS NATIVE BORN
WITH NATIVE PARENTS, BY RACE, AND FOREIGN STOCK,*
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, IN CITIES OF 50,000 OR MORE, 1930
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